Aleasia Mason v. Director, Division of Workforce Services

2024 Ark. App. 167

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: March 6, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 167 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. E-22-667

Opinion Delivered March 6, 2024 ALEASIA MASON APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS APPELLANT BOARD OF REVIEW

V. [NO. 2022-BR-01400]

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN APPELLEE PART

RITA W. GRUBER, Judge

The appellant, Aleasia Mason, appeals from the Arkansas Board of Review’s (Board’s)

November 22, 2022, decision affirming the Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) decision that found

her liable to repay $15,065 in overpaid unemployment benefits. Mason received both state

benefits and Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) benefits, pursuant

to the CARES Act. We affirm in part and remand in part.

The Division found Mason ineligible for benefits in a related case, Mason v. Director,

E-22-669, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(3)(A) (Supp. 2023), which we

affirm today without written opinion. On August 4, 2021, the Arkansas Division of

Workforce Services (DWS) issued a “Notice of Non-Fraud Overpayment Determination” to

Mason finding that she was not able and available for work for the weeks of May 9, 2020,

through February 6, 2021. Mason filed a timely appeal to the Tribunal from this determination, and the Tribunal affirmed it. Mason timely appealed this determination to

the Board, which remanded it in connection with the related appeals in case Nos. E-22-668

and E-22-669 that had been remanded because those decisions could affect the

determination in this case. The Tribunal issued its decision on May 11, 2022, finding that

the overpayment was not a direct result of Division error and that Mason was liable for the

$15,065 overpaid unemployment benefits. On May 31, Mason appealed the Tribunal’s

decision to the Board. The Board issued its decision on November 22, 2022, finding that

the overpayment was due to a disqualifying determination that had been issued after she had

received the benefits in question by answering yes to question No. 25 on the unemployment

application. Question No. 25 asks whether the claimant is able and available for work. Mason

brings her appeal to this court from the Board’s decision finding her liable to repay overpaid

benefits totaling $15,065.

In appeals of unemployment-compensation cases, we do not review cases de novo.

Keener v. Dir., 2021 Ark. App. 88, at 1, 618 S.W.3d. 446, 448. Our court’s review is limited

to the determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached that

determination with the evidence presented to it. Id. We review “the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings

of fact.” Id. Substantial evidence is considered evidence that a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Even when there is evidence on which the Board

might have reached a different decision, our scope of judicial review is limited to a

determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached the decision rendered

2 on the basis of the evidence presented. Id. Issues of credibility of witnesses and weight to be

afforded their testimony are matters for the Board to determine. Bradford v. Dir., 83 Ark.

App. 332, at 338, 128 S.W.3d 20, 23 (2003). While our role in these cases is limited, we are

not here to merely ratify the decision of the Board. Langston v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 601, at

3. Instead, our role is to ensure that the standard of review has been met. Id.

When a claimant receives both state and federal unemployment benefits and the

overpayment was a nonfraud overpayment, then the Board must conduct a separate waiver

analysis for the state and federal benefits received. McElroy v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 456, at 4.

The repayment of state benefits must be waived “if the director finds that the overpayment

received was a direct result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its

recovery would be against equity and good conscience.” Carman v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 51,

at 7, 660 S.W.3d 852, 857 (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2) (Supp. 2021)).

Carman also holds that the repayment of FPUC benefits may be waived if the State

determines that the payment of the FPUC benefits was made without fault on the claimant’s

part and that repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. Id. at 8, 660

S.W.3d at 857 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).

The record indicates that Mason received $2,800 in regular state unemployment

benefits. The Board found that the overpayment resulted from a disqualifying determination

issued after she had received benefits, and the benefits had been paid because she answered

question No. 25 incorrectly. Therefore, the Division did not make an error, and substantial

3 evidence supports its decision to require her to repay the $2,800 in regular state

unemployment benefits received for the weeks of May 9, 2020, through September 19, 2020.

In addition to the state benefits, she also received $3,265 in emergency

unemployment compensation benefits and $9,000 in FPUC benefits between the weeks of

May 9, 2020, and February 6, 2021. However, the Board failed to make any findings

regarding the federal-benefit-waiver analysis outlined in Carman.

When adequate findings of fact are not made on the issue presented, we remand to

the Board for it to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which to perform

proper appellate review. Wimbley v. Dir., 2024 Ark. App. 85, at 3, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.

Therefore, we must remand this case for further findings of fact as to (1) whether Mason was

at fault, and (2) whether repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience before

requiring Mason to repay the $3,265 in emergency unemployment compensation benefits

and $9,000 in FPUC benefits.

Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

GLADWIN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Aleasia Mason, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.