Aldridge v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 11, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-04592
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Chase C Aldridge, No. CV-19-04592-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Chase Colton Aldridge’s (“Claimant”) appeal 16 from the denial of his application for social security disability benefits. (Doc. 13). The 17 Commissioner has responded, (Doc. 14), and Claimant has replied, (Doc. 17). The Court 18 now rules on the appeal. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 A. Disability Determination 21 To qualify for benefits, an applicant must first show he is “under a disability.” 42 22 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). If he shows he suffers from a medically determinable physical or 23 mental impairment that prevents him from engaging in any “substantial gainful activity,” 24 the applicant is disabled. Id. § 423(d)(1)–(2). 25 By rule, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the Social Security 26 Administration (“SSA”) follows a five-step process to determine whether the applicant 27 meets the statutory definition of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). This process may 28 end at any step at which the ALJ can find the applicant disabled or not. Id. § 1 404.1520(a)(4). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the applicant is “doing 2 substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the applicant is not disabled. 3 Id. If he is not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and considers whether any of the applicant’s 4 physical or mental impairments or combination of impairments are “severe.” Id. § 5 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If that threshold is met, the ALJ proceeds to step three to determine 6 whether the applicant’s impairment or combination of impairments “meets or equals” an 7 impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 8 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the applicant is disabled. Id. If not, before proceeding to step 9 four, the ALJ must assess the applicant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). Id. § 10 404.1520(a)(4). The RFC represents the most an applicant “can still do despite [his] 11 limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). At step four, the ALJ uses the RFC to determine 12 whether the applicant can still perform his “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 13 If so, the applicant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the final step to determine 14 whether—considering the applicant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience—he 15 “can make an adjustment to other work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the applicant cannot, 16 he is disabled. Id. 17 B. The ALJ’s Decision 18 Here, the ALJ first found that Claimant was not doing substantial gainful activity. 19 (Doc. 12-3 at 23). Next, the ALJ found that Claimant had the following severe 20 impairments: autism spectrum disorder, unspecified bipolar disorder, and borderline 21 intellectual functioning. (Id.). The ALJ then determined that none of these impairments 22 met or medically equaled anything in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. (Id. 23 at 24). Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found Claimant had the requisite RFC to 24 “perform a full range of work at all exertional levels” subject to several nonexertional 25 limitations. (Id. at 27–34). In making that determination, the ALJ assigned little weight to 26 the opinions of Dr. Brent Geary, Dr. Renee Behinfar, and Nurse Practitioner Daniel 27 Chafetz. (Id. at 31–33). The ALJ also discounted Claimant’s allegations regarding the 28 severity of his limitations. (Id. at 28–29). The ALJ ultimately concluded that Claimant, 1 although Claimant had no past relevant work, he could make an adjustment to other work 2 because, considering all his limitations, he could perform the requirements of a kitchen 3 helper, cleaner, and material distributor. (Id. at 34–35). This appeal followed. 4 II. ANALYSIS 5 A. Standard of Review 6 This Court may not overturn the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits unless it is 7 legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 8 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). “Substantial evidence means . . . . such relevant evidence as a 9 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 10 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human 11 Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). On review, the Court “must consider the entire 12 record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 13 detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific 14 quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 15 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ, not this Court, draws inferences, resolves conflicts in medical 16 testimony, and determines credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 17 1995); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, the Court 18 must uphold the ALJ’s decision even when “the evidence admits of more than one 19 rational interpretation.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 20 Because harmless error principles apply in this context, this Court upholds the 21 ALJ when the record makes clear that any error was “‘inconsequential to the ultimate 22 nondisability determination,’ or ‘if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,’ even 23 if the agency ‘explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Treichler v. Comm’r of 24 Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The Court 25 “review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination,” 26 however, “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [s]he did not rely.” 27 Revels, 874 F.3d at 654 (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010); see Trevizo v. Berryhil, 28 871 F.3d 664, 677 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the district court erred by 1 looking to the record and developing its own reasons to discredit a medical opinion); see 2 also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (explaining that if an agency order’s 3 validity depends on a determination “which the agency alone is authorized to make and 4 which it has not made . . . a court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has 5 exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency”). 6 B. Opinions of Medical and Other Sources 7 Claimant first quarrels with the ALJ’s reasons for giving little weight to the 8 opinions of Dr. Brent Geary, Dr. Renee Behinfar, and Nurse Practitioner Daniel Chafetz. 9 (Doc. 13 at 6). The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ considered proper factors when 10 evaluating these opinions, and that Claimant’s contrary arguments focus too heavily on 11 specific favorable evidence or, at worst, establish only harmless error. (Doc. 14 at 9–17). 12 Medical opinions from acceptable sources are generally entitled to deference but 13 are not necessarily binding on the ALJ. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 14 Cir. 2008). Where, as here, the record contains conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ 15 may reject an examining doctor’s opinion by providing, “specific and legitimate reasons 16 that are supported by substantial evidence,” which she may do by “setting out a detailed 17 and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting evidence, stating [her] interpretation 18 thereof, and making findings.” Revels, 874 F.3d at 654(first quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of 19 Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); and then quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 20 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). Nurse practitioners, however, are “other sources” and 21 “are not entitled to the same deference.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 22 2012). To assign less weight to “other source” opinions, an ALJ need only give 23 “germane” reasons with evidentiary support. Id. In either case, the ALJ may assign less 24 weight to a source’s opinion by providing a well-supported explanation of how the 25 source’s conclusions are inconsistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 26 see also Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). 27 i. Dr. Brent Geary – Examining Psychologist 28 The ALJ considered, but assigned only little weight to, Geary’s opinion that 1 Claimant was so significantly limited by his autism, range of memory, and bipolarity that 2 his ability to function independently on a sustained basis was highly limited. (Doc. 12-3 3 at 33). In assigning that opinion little weight, the ALJ noted its inconsistency with the 4 entire evidence of record, particularly work adjustment training case notes from 2014 and 5 Claimant’s mental health status examinations and progress notes from 2014 to the time of 6 the hearing. (Id. at 29–33). Broadly, Claimant argues that there is no inconsistency 7 between Geary’s findings and the evidence cited because (1) Geary’s diagnosis 8 (consistent with other doctors) related to intellectual limitations but the evidence cited 9 related to behavioral limitations; (2) the ALJ did not explain what made Claimant’s care 10 “conservative”; and (3) the ALJ inappropriately relied on activities of daily living that do 11 not necessarily transfer to the work setting. (Doc. 13 at 12–20). 12 Addressing Claimant’s first argument, the Court agrees with his general 13 observation that an ALJ must engage with the underlying basis for a medical opinion, 14 Orn, 495 F.3d at 634, but disagrees that the ALJ failed in that regard here. The relevant 15 question is whether the evidence that the ALJ cited could also reasonably be viewed as 16 inconsistent with Geary’s opinions about how his neurocognitive disorders would prevent 17 him from working. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039–40. And the records from Claimant’s 18 time in the work adjustment program certainly sufficed in that regard. 19 For example, those records showed that Claimant was adequately groomed, 20 understood his duties well, had no problems with authority figures, and exhibited 21 appropriate punctuality. (Doc. 12-9 at 72–88, 93–114). Although Claimant sometimes 22 received a score of “2” in certain performance categories, indicating a need for 23 improvement, he was quite often awarded the maximum score of “3” too. Indeed, 24 contrary to Geary’s conclusions and the testimony of Claimant’s mother, Claimant was 25 not only able to follow instructions but was also reportedly improving in both his overall 26 performance and in his ability to complete tasks without being told what to do. Finally, 27 while Claimant, or his mother, gave Geary the impression that he had somehow “failed” 28 the program “both times” he participated, the reports indicated that he voluntarily 1 withdrew from the program after speaking with his attorney. (Compare Doc. 12-9 at 56 2 with Doc. 12-9 at 118–19).1 3 Claimant offers no specific explanation as to why this evidence could not 4 reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with Geary’s opinion; instead, Claimant focuses on 5 how Geary’s conclusions were consistent with several other doctors who he claims 6 similarly opined on his intellectual, instead of behavioral, limitations. (Doc. 13 at 13–15). 7 In the abstract or in other contexts, the distinction Claimant draws between intellectual 8 and behavioral limitations may have merit, but it does not establish error here, where the 9 ALJ’s task was to consider whether those limitations prevented Claimant from working. 10 Thus, evidence from Claimant’s work adjustment training program showing that he 11 generally succeeded at work without frequently needing to be reminded of instructions 12 and, indeed, even improved in this area and began to take initiative without instructions 13 could certainly be viewed as inconsistent with Geary’s abstract assessment that 14 Claimant’s intellectual limitations prevented him from working.2 15 Moreover, Geary’s opinions concerning the severity of Claimant’s limitations 16 were also inconsistent with Claimant’s self-reported belief that he got along well with 17 others and felt his condition improving with medication, as well as the fact that 18 examinations consistently noted “generally unremarkable” findings regarding his mental 19 status. (Doc. 12-3 at 30; see also, e.g., Doc. 12-8 at 92, 98, 104, 163, 180). Finally, to the 20 extent that Claimant asserts that Geary’s opinion must have been followed because it was 21 consistent with the opinions of some other doctors, despite this other conflicting evidence 22 of record, he simply asks this Court to second guess the ALJ’s interpretation of evidence

23 1 Claimant, or his mother, also made this misleading representation to other doctors, the ALJ, and in his appeal to this Court. (Docs. 12-3 at 57–59, 73; 12-8 at 66; 13 at 2). The 24 Court notes further its agreement with the ALJ’s observation that, if Geary had this information, his prognosis may have been different. (Doc. 12-3 at 33). 25 2 Claimant appears to also argue that the ALJ erred by assessing Claimant’s impairments 26 herself when he had been assigned several Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) ratings around 50. (Doc. 13 at 15). But a GAF serves purposes that are different from the 27 SSA’s disability assessment, Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1151, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998), and therefore the ALJ can reject it for its inconsistency with other evidence of record, see 28 Shorter v. Saul, 777 F. App’x 209, 212 (9th Cir. 2019), like the ALJ did here, (Doc. 12-3 at 31). 1 susceptible to two rational interpretations, which is not this Court’s function. Burch v. 2 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2005). 3 The same evidence of record is also inconsistent with the testimony of Claimant’s 4 mother, which the ALJ compared to the information she told Geary, and upon which 5 Geary’s report was largely based. (Doc. 12-3 at 29, 33). Although Claimant states that the 6 ALJ provided no support for this characterization, the record could not be clearer on this 7 point because Geary himself said so. (Doc. 12-9 at 51) (“The mother provided a 8 considerable amount of the information found below.”). Claimant also incorrectly 9 contends that the ALJ did not discount his mother’s reports. (Doc. 13 at 9). Not so. The 10 ALJ did discredit her, stating that Claimant’s “behavior during work adjustment training 11 [wa]s significantly different from his and his mother’s testimony and . . . Geary’s 12 findings and opinion.” (Doc. 12-3 at 29). Because an ALJ provides specific and 13 legitimate reasons to reject an examining physician’s opinion that is “to a large extent” 14 based upon reports properly discounted as incredible, Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041,3 this 15 too provided a proper basis for discounting Geary’s report. 16 The Court also finds, despite Claimant’s arguments to the contrary, that the ALJ 17 provided a specific and legitimate reason for discounting Geary’s opinion because it was 18 inconsistent with Claimant’s conservative treatment regimen. (Doc. 13 at 16). Claimant 19 argues that the ALJ erred by failing to interpret the evidence related to Claimant’s 20 improvement “with an awareness that improved functioning while being treated and 21 while limiting environmental stressor[s] does not always mean that a claimant can 22 function effectively in a workplace.” (Id.). This is not a case, however, where the ALJ 23 improperly considered conservative treatment in denying benefits without also 24 considering whether that treatment allowed the claimant to experience workplace 25 success. See Revels, 874 F.3d at 667. Rather, the work adjustment training program 26 records provided additional context indicating Claimant could succeed in the workplace

27 3 Claimant cites Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1199–1200, for the notion that the doctor must be the one to discredit the person supplying them information. (Doc. 13 at 9). That case 28 involved the higher “clear and convincing reason” standard, making its analysis on that point inapplicable here. 1 with conservative treatment, contrary to Geary’s opinion. For similar reasons, the 2 presence of that evidence also renders ineffective Claimant’s contention that the ALJ’s 3 decision to deem his treatment conservative failed to account for the chronic nature of his 4 condition. (Id.). Again, when an examining doctor opines that the severity of the 5 claimant’s impairments precludes sustained work, an ALJ does not err in assigning less 6 weight to that opinion when the record also contains evidence that the claimant 7 succeeded in the workplace environment while managing his condition with medication. 8 See Lindquist v. Colvin, 588 F. App’x 544, 547 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Inman v. Colvin, 9 669 F. App’x 849, 850 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The ALJ properly accorded less weight to 10 Inman’s treating physician’s opinion because it was contradicted by Inman’s employment 11 history . . . .”). In the end, this objection is yet another request for this Court to adopt 12 Claimant’s interpretation of the evidence over the ALJ’s, which this Court cannot do. 13 Burch, 500 F.3d at 680–81. 14 Given that substantial evidence supports these specific and legitimate reasons, the 15 Court need not address Claimant’s arguments opposing the ALJ’s additional reasons for 16 assigning little weight to Geary’s opinion because if any errors occurred in analyzing 17 these additional reasons (and the Commissioner concedes that there were) those errors 18 were harmless at any rate. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 19 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); see Hume v. Saul, 776 F. App’x 507, 507 (9th Cir. 2019); see also 20 Rosas v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-02315-AS, 2019 WL 1403296, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21 27, 2019) (collecting cases).4 22 ii. Dr. Renee Behinfar – Examining Psychologist 23 Claimant next takes issue with the ALJ’s decision to assign little weight to 24 Behinfar’s opinions. (Docs. 12-3 at 31–32; 13 at 20). Behinfar opined that Claimant 25 needed clarification on simple instructions, appeared distractible and unfocused, likely 26 4 For example, Claimant also contends that the ALJ erred because she “did not mention 27 or give any review to . . . Geary’s specific work-related restrictions.” (Doc. 13 at 8). But any error was harmless because the ALJ’s well-supported reason for discounting other 28 aspects of Geary’s opinion, namely its inconsistency with other record evidence, “apply equally well” to his findings on those specific restrictions. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117. 1 needed repetition in the area of adapting to change, had only minimal social reciprocity, 2 and would have difficulties getting along with coworkers and following instructions 3 without supervision. (Doc. 13 at 20). The ALJ found Behinfar’s opinions “did not 4 adequately take into consideration all of [his] subjective and objective symptoms, signs, 5 limitations, and severity of condition,” did not appear to be based on access to the entire 6 record but instead on Claimant’s mother’s account, and were contradicted by Claimant’s 7 appearance at the hearing and performance in his work adjustment training. (Doc. 12-3 at 8 32). As explained above, the ALJ could reasonably view the work adjustment training 9 records as contrary to Behinfar’s observations because they generally tended to show that 10 Claimant had performed adequately in the areas that Behinfar opined on, in a workplace 11 environment. Behinfar clearly did not have access to these records and was told that 12 Claimant “failed both times” he participated in the work adjustment training, which was 13 obviously a fiction given that he actually stopped on advice of counsel. (Doc. 12-8 at 66). 14 Moreover, because Behinfar noted a substantial amount of information supplied by 15 Claimant’s mother, (id. at 65), and Behinfar’s conclusions largely reflected that 16 information (with only one reference to her objective findings), the ALJ could reasonably 17 conclude that Behinfar’s opinions were largely premised upon Claimant’s mother’s 18 subjective reports, reports that the ALJ had properly discounted given their inconsistency 19 with other evidence. These were each specific and legitimate reasons for discounting 20 Behinfar’s opinion and were also supported by substantial evidence in the record. 21 Claimant now asserts the ALJ either offered no explanations in support of these 22 reasons or that the explanations given were too vague to pass muster. (Doc. 13 at 20–21). 23 But the ALJ was not required to rewrite evidentiary discussions contained elsewhere in 24 her decision. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010). That the ALJ 25 simply referred to her earlier detailed discussion of evidence contrary to Behinfar’s 26 opinions and did not explicitly restate that evidence does not render her explanation 27 vague or incomplete. It was clear how that evidence connected to Behinfar’s opinions and 28 why it detracted from them. See Monroe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, No. CV-18- 1 02571-PHX-JAT, 2019 WL 6712055, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 2019) (explaining that the 2 ALJ must make an adequate effort to relate contrary record evidence to rejected medical 3 opinions (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–22 (9th Cir. 1988)). 4 Notwithstanding Claimant’s objections to the contrary, the ALJ provided specific and 5 legitimate reasons for discounting this medical opinion. 6 iii. Nurse Practitioner Daniel Chafetz 7 Claimant finally takes issue with the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the opinions of 8 Nurse Practitioner Daniel Chafetz. (Doc. 13 at 21–22). Because Chaftez is an “other 9 source,” the ALJ needed only germane reasons with evidentiary support to do so. 10 Here, Chafetz opined that Claimant had moderate to severe mental limitations, 11 including heavy sedation as a side-effect of his medication. (Doc. 12-3 at 31). The ALJ 12 discounted his opinion for its inconsistency with the entire evidence of record, citing 13 evidence of Claimant’s progress reports and mental status examinations that tended to 14 show he was generally outgoing, friendly, capable of helping around the house, never 15 reported side effects, and received conservative treatment. (Id.). Claimant cursorily 16 argues that these reasons lacked evidentiary support for the same reasons that he alleges 17 Geary’s and Behinfar’s did. (Doc. 13 at 22). By this, the Court takes Claimant to refer 18 back to his review of the evidence which he viewed as consistent with Geary and 19 Behinfar’s opinions. (Id. at 12–19). As the Court has already stated, however, Claimant’s 20 arguments in this regard at best offer a dueling rational interpretation of the record. In 21 such a scenario, the Court must accept the ALJ’s interpretation.5 22 C. Claimant’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 23 Claimant next argues the ALJ improperly assessed his subjective testimony about 24 his disabling limitations, broadly asserting the ALJ never specified what daily activities 25 conflicted with his limitations, that the activities cited did not conflict with those 26 5 The Court’s analysis also applies to Claimant’s brief argument that the ALJ erred by 27 giving significant weight to non-examining sources. (Doc. 13 at 22 n.18). Opinions of nonexamining physicians, “may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by 28 other evidence in the record and are consistent with it.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 limitations, and that other evidence in the record supports the contrary conclusion. (Doc. 2 13 at 23–25). In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of 3 Claimant’s subjective pain testimony was completely proper. (Doc. 14 at 14-19). 4 An ALJ’s credibility assessment of subjective symptom testimony proceeds in two 5 steps. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. First, “the claimant ‘must produce objective medical 6 evidence of an underlying impairment’ or impairments that could reasonably be expected 7 to produce some degree of symptom.” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 8 1281–82 (9th Cir. 1996)). If he does so, “and there is no affirmative evidence of 9 malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] 10 symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. 11 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281, 1283–84). The ALJ may rely on numerous factors 12 when doing so but cannot discredit the claimant’s testimony solely because it was not 13 substantiated by objective medical evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 14 883 (9th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). 15 At the hearing, Claimant testified that he could not work because his mental 16 impairment created an intense lack of focus, caused him to make mistakes, and resulted 17 in anger issues.6 (Doc. 12-3 at 55–65). The ALJ discounted Claimant’s subjective 18 symptom testimony for several reasons, including that they were yet again inconsistent 19 with observations contained in the work adjustment training program records, (id. at 29), 20 and it is axiomatic that this was a proper matter to consider, Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 21 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 22 755. As noted, evidence that Claimant’s impairments did not prevent him from 23 succeeding in a workplace environment obviously conflicted with his allegations that he 24 could not do so. Claimant’s contrary argument that the work adjustment training report 25 was not at odds with his testimony because his testimony concerned at-home behavior,

26 6 Although Claimant now maintains that the ALJ cited nothing to discredit his testimony that he could not engage in “sustained” work, the fact is that Claimant never gave that 27 testimony. (E.g., Doc. 13 at 23, 25). Furthermore, it is unclear how evidence of Claimant’s ability to work four-hour days competently fails to conflict with opinion 28 evidence that he could not engage in sustained work. 1 || fundamentally misconceives the relevant inquiry when calculating the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 2|| 404.1545(a)(1). This alone was a clear and convincing reason to assign only little weight 3|| to Claimant’s subjective symptom testimony.’ 4 Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, 5 || supported by substantial evidence, for not accepting Claimant’s subjective symptom 6 || testimony. 7\| Ill. CONCLUSION 8 Based on the foregoing, 9 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.® 11 Dated this 11th day of March, 2020. 12 13 14 1s James A. Teilborg Senior United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 || 7 Claimant briefly asserts that the ALJ erred when she “rejected” the lay witness testimony of Claimant’s mother on the basis that it was not as persuasive as that of medical professionals. (Doc. 13 at 25 n.19). As should be clear by the foregoing discussion, however, the ALJ also discredited her testimony because it was inconsistent 27|| with the entire evidence of record, specifically the work adjustment training program records. 28 8 To the extent mandate is required, the judgment shall serve as the mandate.

-12-