Rel: May 31, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
_________________________
SC-2023-0830 _________________________
Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery et al.
v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-23-901547)
PER CURIAM. This appeal arises from a dispute between the Alabama-West
Florida Conference ("the Conference") of the United Methodist Church, SC-2023-0830
Inc. ("the UMC"), and 44 Methodist churches in the Conference ("the
churches"). Amid growing tensions within the UMC over issues of human
sexuality, the churches sought to leave the UMC with their properties
under a specially enacted provision of the Book of Discipline -- the
governing law of the UMC. After the Conference denied the churches the
ability to vote to disaffiliate under that provision, the churches asked the
Montgomery Circuit Court to order the Conference to grant them that
vote. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Because this dispute centers on
ecclesiastical questions, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery and 43 other
Methodist churches are affiliated with the UMC through the Conference,
one of the subdivisions of the UMC. In 2023, the churches sought to
disaffiliate from the UMC because they disagreed with the UMC's
acceptance of homosexuality and its ordination of gay clergy.
Under the Book of Discipline -- the UMC's governing document --
the general rule is that a local church may disaffiliate but the UMC
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retains title to the associated church property. Nevertheless, in 2019,
amid increasing strife between local churches and the UMC over issues
of sexuality, the UMC created an exception to that rule by enacting ¶
2553. Under that provision, the UMC gave local churches a "limited
right" to vote to disaffiliate from the UMC and retain their property if
they were disaffiliating "for reasons of conscience" related to "the practice
of homosexuality or the ordination or marriage of self-avowed practicing
homosexuals." Paragraph 2553 specified that its unique disaffiliation
process would expire on December 31, 2023. It also provided that each
conference "may develop additional standard terms that are not
inconsistent with" the other provisions of the paragraph.
In June 2023, the Conference shifted its stance, requiring churches
in its jurisdiction seeking to disaffiliate under ¶ 2553 to submit an
"eligibility statement." In its eligibility statement, a church would have
to provide the Conference with the "reasons of conscience" related to the
"actions or inactions" of the UMC with which it disagreed. The
Conference would then evaluate those statements and decide whether to
allow each church's congregation to vote on disaffiliation under ¶ 2553.
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In accordance with that new requirement, each of the churches
submitted an eligibility statement; but in September 2023, the
Conference rejected those statements as insufficient under ¶ 2553. On
October 31, 2023, the churches filed a complaint in the Montgomery
Circuit Court against the Conference and several of its leaders -- Bishop
David Graves and District Superintendents Debora Bishop, Mike
Pearson, Jeff Wilson, and Jean Tippit -- asserting various claims,
including ones for declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach
of contract. Because of the looming December 31, 2023, deadline imposed
by ¶ 2553, the churches also filed an application for temporary
restraining order ("TRO") and a motion for preliminary injunction asking
the trial court to compel the Conference to allow them to vote on
disaffiliation at the annual conference on November 12. The court then
held an emergency hearing and heard evidence ore tenus.
The next day, the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction because, according to the court, the relief that the churches
requested was "ecclesiastical in nature and would require Court
interference in matters of church autonomy," which would violate the
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The churches appealed
that judgment.
Standard of Review
"We review de novo whether the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction." Solomon v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 1211, 1218
(Ala. 2006).
Analysis
The churches argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their
suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, they say, the case
presents only "civil and property issues." Churches' brief at 17. According
to the churches, even if the trial court had to interpret provisions of the
Book of Discipline in resolving the dispute, the court could still avoid
ecclesiastical questions by applying "neutral principles of law." Id. (citing
Haney's Chapel United Methodist Church v. United Methodist Church,
716 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. 1998) (plurality opinion)). But the churches'
central claims turn entirely on the interpretation of ¶ 2553 and whether
their efforts to leave the UMC were consistent with that church law.
Under existing First Amendment law and our precedent, that
interpretive issue constitutes an ecclesiastical question that courts do not
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have jurisdiction to decide. Accordingly, as discussed below, we must
affirm the judgment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment "severely circumscribes the role that civil
courts may play in resolving church property disputes." Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("Blue Hull"). Therefore,
courts must refrain from deciding such cases when their resolution turns
on " 'religious doctrine and practice.' " Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the
United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)
(quoting Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449).
Our Court has echoed the United States Supreme Court and said
that we do not have jurisdiction to " 'resolve disputes regarding [a
church's] spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs.' " Taylor v. Paradise
Missionary Baptist Church, 242 So. 3d 979, 989 (Ala. 2017) (quoting
Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So. 2d 746, 748 (Ala.
1976). That includes church-property disputes "if the basis of the schism
is due merely to a disparate interpretation of doctrine." Mount Olive
Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 674, 42 So. 2d 617, 618
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(1949); accord Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449 (explaining that "First
Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice").
The "basis of the schism" here is precisely a "disparate
interpretation of doctrine." Patrick, 252 Ala. at 674, 42 So. 2d at 618.
Recitation of the parties' arguments proves the point. The churches
argue that the Conference's imposition of an eligibility statement violates
¶ 2553 because the Judicial Council -- the UMC's ecclesiastical tribunal
-- previously issued a statement that ¶ 2553 " 'does not require
certification of eligibility based on reasons of conscience' " in order to
disaffiliate. Churches' brief at 13 (quoting Judicial Council Decision No.
1453). The Conference responds by pointing to a different decision, in
which the Judicial Council held that " 'conferences may develop
additional procedures' " for disaffiliation and that the eligibility-
statement requirement is therefore consistent with the Book of
Discipline. Defendants' brief at 4 n.4 (quoting Judicial Council Decision
No. 1425).
7 SC-2023-0830
In order to grant the churches the relief they seek -- the right to
vote on disaffiliation -- the trial court would have to survey the Judicial
Council's ecclesiastical decisions, interpret the doctrinal scope of ¶ 2553
of the Book of Discipline, and review Conference determinations about
the religious adequacy of the churches' eligibility statements. That is, to
decide any property questions, the trial court would have to adjudicate
whether each of the churches had adequate "reasons of conscience
regarding … the practice of homosexuality or the ordination or marriage
of self-avowed practicing homosexuals." ¶ 2553. Resolving those issues
would "inherently entail inquiry … into the substantive criteria by which
[courts] are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question" -- whether
the churches' reasons of conscience were sufficient for disaffiliation under
¶ 2553. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713. "But [that] is exactly the inquiry
that the First Amendment prohibits." Id.; accord Ex parte Bole, 103 So.
3d 40, 72 (Ala. 2012) (holding that a trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction when adjudicating the local church's claim would require an
"impermissible inquiry" into the church conference's findings and
decisions).
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In their reply brief, the churches attempt to reframe the suit as a
purely secular dispute over property. See Churches' reply brief at 6
("This is a property rights case."). According to the churches, even if the
trial court did have to interpret the Book of Discipline in adjudicating
their claims, those interpretive questions would not raise ecclesiastical
issues. Rather, the churches argue, the trial court should have followed
our precedent in Haney's Chapel and Trinity Presbyterian Church of
Montgomery v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1979), by applying
"neutral principles of law" to resolve this case.
The churches' attempt to recharacterize this dispute as primarily
about property is unavailing. The "neutral principles of law" approach
allows Alabama courts adjudicating church-property disputes to
"consider, in purely secular terms, the language of the deeds, the charter
of the local church, any applicable state statutes, and any relevant
provisions contained in the discipline of the national church" without
running afoul of the First Amendment. Haney's Chapel, 716 So. 2d at
1158. But that doctrine has limits: when deciding such property
disputes, civil courts "cannot resolve controversies involving religious
doctrine or practice." Tankersley, 374 So. 2d at 865-66.
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Adjudicating this dispute would entail precisely what Tankersley
proscribes: a resolution of "underlying controversies over religious
doctrine." Id. at 866. Contrary to the churches' argument, this case does
not " 'require[] a court merely to review church records and incorporation
documents, without delving into spiritual matters.' " Churches' reply
brief at 6 (quoting Murphy v. Green, 794 So. 2d 325, 330 (Ala. 2000)). In
fact, the churches did not provide the trial court with any deeds, trusts,
charters, or any other secular documents; ¶ 2553 of the Book of Discipline
is the sole basis for the property right that they claim to have. That right
-- to disaffiliate from the UMC and retain their properties -- hinges on
the UMC's ecclesiastical judgment about the adequacy of the churches'
"reasons of conscience." ¶ 2553. But the trial court cannot deploy
"neutral principles" to answer that question, which necessarily entails
"resolv[ing] controversies involving religious doctrine." Tankersley, 374
So. 2d at 865-66.
For that reason, Haney's Chapel is distinguishable. In that case,
the UMC sued to quiet title to local church property after the local
congregation withdrew from the UMC. The local congregation contended
that the two deeds that conveyed the property in trust for the benefit of
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the community of Haney's Chapel preempted any trust provision in the
Book of Discipline. Id. Applying "neutral principles of law" to the deeds,
this Court determined that the deeds' terms clearly "convey[ed] the
property to the local church" in order to "ensure that the national church
could not gain title to the property." Id. at 1159. Thus, there was no
ecclesiastical question to decide.
Likewise, Tankersley did not raise any ecclesiastical issues. There,
a majority of the members of a local congregation wanted to leave the
Presbyterian Church in the United States and retain control of the local
church's corporate entity and use of the corporation's property. 374 So.
2d at 862. The "basic question" before this Court was which parishioners
were members of the local church's corporation -- and therefore owners
of the property -- an issue that the Court resolved by examining the local
church's incorporation documents and property deeds. Id. at 866. The
trial court in that case therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction because
"there was no need to decide any ecclesiastical issues in order to decide
the property issues." 1 Id.
1The churches also argue that the trial court erred by relying on
recent companion cases in Oklahoma concerning Methodist churches. See Oklahoma Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. 11 SC-2023-0830
Here, by contrast, the "basic question" is not a straightforward one
of property or corporate law. To the contrary, the primary relief that the
churches requested -- in their initial complaint as well as in their TRO
application -- was the "right to vote, as local church congregations,
regarding the issue of disaffiliation" so that they could retain their
properties when they left the UMC. But rather than pointing to any deed
or other secular documents as the basis for their property right, the
churches exclusively relied on ¶ 2553, which they acknowledged is based
on ecclesiastical matters. Consequently, to reach any property issues,
the trial court would have to decide whether the individual churches had
Timmons, 538 P.3d 163 (Okla. 2023) ("Timmons I"), and Oklahoma Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Timmons, 538 P.3d 170 (Okla. 2023) ("Timmons II"). In Timmons I and II, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed a trial court's injunction ordering the Oklahoma Annual Conference to recognize the Oklahoma churches' vote to disaffiliate under ¶ 2553 and hold a special conference to approve that vote. In each case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the trial court to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the churches' property claims were "inextricably intertwined with church doctrine." Timmons I, 538 P.3d at 168; Timmons II, 538 P.3d at 175. According to the churches in this case, Timmons I and II are distinguishable because the Oklahoma churches sought a remedy contrary to, not consistent with, the Book of Discipline. But that is a distinction without a difference; the presence of an ecclesiastical question does not turn on whether the plaintiff seeks a remedy contrary to or consistent with the Book of Discipline. 12 SC-2023-0830
adequate "reasons of conscience regarding … the practice of
homosexuality or the ordination or marriage of self-avowed practicing
homosexuals." ¶ 2553. That inquiry is "strictly and purely ecclesiastical
in its character, -- a matter over which the civil courts exercise no
jurisdiction." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871).
Conclusion
Because exercising jurisdiction over this case would entail resolving
a dispute on the basis of religious practice or doctrine, we affirm the trial
court's judgment dismissing the suit.
AFFIRMED.
Bryan, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Mitchell, J., joins.
Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Parker, C.J., joins.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
Mendheim, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.
Shaw, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., recuse themselves.
13 SC-2023-0830
BRYAN, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion. I also agree with Justice Cook's
special writing and share his "sympathy for the predicament faced by the
churches in this case." ___ So. 3d at ___. Like Justice Cook, I too "am
concerned by the churches' claim" that the Alabama-West Florida
Conference ("the Conference") of the United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the
UMC"), "unfairly engineered the disaffiliation process to prevent their
departure from the UMC." ___ So. 3d at ___. The Conference's treatment
of the churches raises serious concerns about the fairness of the process
in this case. However, because the churches' claim relies solely on ¶ 2553
of the UMC's Book of Discipline, this case involves an ecclesiastical
matter over which, pursuant to controlling precedent, we do not have
jurisdiction. Thus, we are constrained to not reach the merits here.
By enacting ¶ 2553, the UMC allowed churches the opportunity to
leave the UMC and retain their property if they were to leave "for reasons
of conscience"; the churches had a certain period to make their decision.
Deep into that period, the Conference adopted a new requirement -- one
not explicitly contained in the Book of Discipline -- making it more
burdensome for churches to leave under ¶ 2553. There is something
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extremely unsettling about changing the rules during the course of the
game. I question whether this process was fair. However, as noted, we
simply do not have the jurisdiction to decide this matter.
Mitchell, J., concurs.
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COOK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully with the decision of this Court. Although this Court,
in Ex parte Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
Church, Inc., [Ms. SC-2023-0385, Apr. 12, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
2024), recently held that a civil court did have jurisdiction to review a
plaintiff's property claim against the Alabama-West Florida Conference
("the Conference") of the United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the UMC"), and
another UMC agency, the claims in the present action are materially
different because they concern "a dispute over issues of ' "religious
practice or doctrine." ' " Id. at ___ (citations omitted). While I am troubled
by the outcome here, it is the job of a good judge to stay within his or her
assigned role. As former United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia once stated, " '[t]he judge who always likes the results he reaches
is a bad judge.' " Katie Glueck, Scalia: The Constitution is "dead," Politico,
Jan. 29, 2013 (at the time of this decision, a copy of this article could be
located at: https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/scalia-the-
constitution-is-dead-086853).
I write separately to express my sympathy for the predicament
faced by the churches in this case. In particular, I am concerned by the
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churches' claim that the Conference unfairly engineered the disaffiliation
process to prevent their departure from the UMC. As the main opinion
explains, in 2019 the UMC enacted ¶ 2553 of the Book of Discipline,
which set forth a disaffiliation process that would expire on December 31,
2023. In June 2023, however, the churches allege, the Conference
suddenly and unexpectedly changed the process by which the churches
could exercise their right to disaffiliate from the UMC pursuant to
¶ 2553. This revised procedure required the churches to submit an
"eligibility statement" detailing the "current and specific disagreement(s)
that the [churches] ha[ve] with the changes to the Book of Discipline
made in 2019."
The churches' complaint alleges that the eligibility statements they
subsequently submitted "were summarily refused without any
explanation or reasoning" and that the Conference engineered this
procedural change "with the intent of preventing the last group of
churches from disaffiliating." One UMC clergyman likened similar
tactics deployed by other UMC conferences to "Lucy pulling the football
away as Charlie Brown tries to kick it" -- explaining that "churches
attempting to follow the disaffiliation process in good faith have had the
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football pulled away and disaffiliation unfairly refused." Thomas
Lambrecht, Finding Fairness, Good News, Mar. 3, 2023 (at the time of
this decision, a copy of this article could be located at:
https://goodnewsmag.org/finding-fairness/).
Although I sympathize with the fairness concerns raised by the
churches, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (and
our existing caselaw) leave this Court with no choice but to deny their
request for relief. Instead, the only remedy for the conduct alleged by the
churches in this case must come from the members of the Judicial
Council, the UMC's ecclesiastical tribunal (that is, its own judicial
system), guided by their faith, consciences, and the principles of Biblical
justice.
Parker, C.J., concurs.
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MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree that our courts should not exercise jurisdiction to settle the
dispute between the parties in this case, and, thus, I agree that the trial
court's judgment of dismissal is due to be affirmed. However, based on
the views expressed in my special writing in Sails v. Weeks, [Ms. SC-
2023-0158, Apr. 5, 2024] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2024) (Mendheim, J.,
concurring specially), I do not agree with the reasoning employed by the
main opinion to reach that conclusion.