Alden v. Kona Palisades, Inc.
This text of 641 P.2d 330 (Alden v. Kona Palisades, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Kona Palisades, Inc. (Association) appeals the granting of summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief against it for violation of a restrictive covenant.
Based upon the record before us, we hold that summary judgment was improperly granted and reverse.
This action has its genesis in an earlier class-action suit filed by the Kona Palisades Estates Community Association (Association) on behalf of its membership against the THC Financial Corporation (THC).1 As can be determined from the notice of the proposed settlement which was made a part of the record before us, that action was settled in the spring of 1977. The settlement provisions contained, inter alia, the following:
1. The Defendant to grant an option for one year to the Kona Palisades Community Association to purchase a lot for $1.00 for use by the Association as a community recreational center. The Association to exercise the option only after it has demonstrated to the Defendant that it has the approved construction plans, construction contract and financing for the improvement approved and signed by all parties. The Defendant to issue a warranty deed with a reverter caluse [sic] that the lot reverts back to the Defendant if the lot is not used for recreation center purposes.
The settlement notice required those members of the class who were opposed to it to file written protest or disapproval by a certain date. See Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 23(c).
As required by the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions applicable to the Kona Palisades Estates Subdivision, plans were submitted to and approved by the Architectural Committee. On October 12, 1979, the majority of the Association’s member[49]*49ship voted in favor2 of expending the necessary funds for the construction of the center.3 The required permits were then obtained by the Association and construction commenced.
The present complaint for permanent injunctive relief was filed by certain members of the Association to enjoin construction of the center because they claim such construction was in violation of a restrictive covenant, to wit: “2. All of said lots shall be used for single family residence.”
The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was granted by the court on January 14, 1980. This appeal followed.
The thrust of the Association’s argument is that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action because they failed to seek redress of their grievance through the channels authorized in the Association’s bylaws. The Association also argues that a proper reading of the charter and covenants required the court to order the parties to arbitration pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 658-1.4 We find little merit to these contentions and are inclined to follow the appellees’ view.
However, in this case, we are concerned with the serious factual and legal issues raised by the possibility of participation by the [50]*50present plaintiffs in the action that gave rise to the present dispute. In matters litigated as class actions, the general rule is that a judicially-approved settlement is binding upon the members of the class who have not opted out. HRCP Rule 23(c)(2);5 3B Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.60, 23-468; see also In Re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 525 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975). Neither side has addressed itself to this aspect of the case; and at oral argument, neither was prepared to discuss the effect of the prior class-action settlement on the present abilities of the parties to bring this action.
The record before us fails to answer the questions: (1) Were present plaintiffs given notice and included in the class action? (2) If they were, did they or did they not request exclusion from the class? and (3) If they did not, are they barred from bringing this action for lack of standing or should they be estopped from doing so?
The law is clear, as we have stated innumerable times, that on review of a motion for summary judgment, this court must be satisfied that no arguable factual issues exist and the movant is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. HRCP Rule 56. Our courts have long recognized the policy that summary judgment is a drastic measure to be used sparingly. In this action, we are concerned that there has been an inadequate airing of all of the necessary factual issues involved.
We see sufficient factual and legal issues to overcome the motion for summary judgment; and, accordingly, the judgment is reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
641 P.2d 330, 3 Haw. App. 47, 1982 Haw. App. LEXIS 113, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alden-v-kona-palisades-inc-hawapp-1982.