Aldaberto Vasquez v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 29, 2024
• Docket: 13-23-00262-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-23-00262-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ALDABERTO VASQUEZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 148TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Aldaberto Vasquez was indicted on one count of continuous sexual

abuse of a young child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). After

a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense of aggravated

sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony. See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B). The trial court assessed punishment at fifty years’ incarceration. By one issue, appellant

challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2017, Margarita Villareal filed a report regarding an outcry of sexual

abuse made by M.R. 1, a student at the elementary school where Villareal worked as a

school nurse. Villareal explained that M.R. came to the nurse’s office complaining that

her panties were stained with blood and that she was “having pain down there.” When

Villareal asked M.R. “how can I help you,” M.R. began to cry and told Villareal that there

was an incident with “a friend of her mom” or her mom’s “boyfriend.” M.R. informed

Villareal that a male with “dark complexion” “touched her hard” and that it “hurt[] a lot.”

M.R. also explained that the male “touched her leg,” “her genitalia area,” and “her buttock

area.” M.R. did not use any names. According to Villareal, M.R. said that M.R.’s mother

knew “but she didn’t believe her.” As a school nurse, it was Villareal’s duty to report the

allegations.

M.R., who was fourteen years old at the time of trial, testified that she previously

lived in Robstown, Texas, with her mother and her stepfather. Though she could not recall

his name, she identified appellant as her stepfather. She described her relationship with

appellant as “[v]ery abusive and very sexual,” explaining that appellant “would touch [her],

and he would do very bad stuff.” Elaborating, M.R. stated that appellant “would touch [her]

on [her] middle parts, [her] thighs, [and her] upper” body, and she confirmed that “middle

1 To protect the identity of the complainant, we refer to her by initials. See TEX. CONST. art. 1,

§ 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt. (“The rule does not limit an appellate court’s authority to disguise parties’ identities in appropriate circumstances in other cases.”). 2 part” referred to her “privates” where she “urinate[s] from.” M.R. stated that appellant used

his hands to touch her on her “outside” and “inside” and that it happened “a lot,” agreeing

that it was more than eight times.

M.R. testified that she went to the school nurse often because she was “bleeding

a lot” and would sometimes have pain. She explained that she felt she could trust the

nurse, so she told her that she was being touched by someone. She also explained that

she had not told her mother, but that her mother found out through the report that was

filed by Villareal. After the report was filed, M.R. recalls being taken to the hospital by

“CPS,” the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), where

she received a medical examination. She then entered the foster care system for “a few

months” before going to live with her aunt. She returned to live with her mother

approximately six months later.

M.R.’s mother, G.E., testified that she and appellant were in a dating relationship

for approximately nine years, starting when M.R. was about six months old. During their

relationship, G.E. was employed and worked varying shifts in the evening and morning

hours. There were times that appellant would take care of M.R. when G.E. was at work.

G.E. recalled M.R.’s school contacting her to pick M.R. up from school and she was

contacted by the Department that same day when they came to her home. She, along

with the Department, took M.R. to have a medical examination. M.R. was taken from

G.E.’s custody that day because appellant was still living with G.E. and the Department

“thought [M.R.] was in . . . danger.” The Department told G.E. to remove appellant from

the house, but because he was “paying the bills at the time,” G.E. did not do so

3 immediately. G.E. stated that M.R. never disclosed the abuse to her.

Lilia Ramos, a former forensic examiner with the Children’s Advocacy Center

(CAC), where M.R. was forensicaly examined, testified that M.R. named appellant as her

abuser and reported that “he touched the outside of her leg, her inner thigh, and what

[M.R.] referred to as her middle part.” She reported “a couple of different incidents.” She

explained that M.R. stated all contact was over the clothing.

Records from M.R.’s medical examination performed by a sexual assault nurse

examiner (SANE) were admitted. In the records, M.R. stated that appellant had touched

her under her clothes, and she indicated he touched her female sexual organ, her

buttocks, and her chest. During the examination, M.R. described several instances where

appellant touched her, including instances where others were aware of what was

happening—such as her brother, nephew, and mother. The SANE examination revealed

injuries to M.R.’s female sexual organ, including an abrasion and some redness, which

were indicative of recent trauma.

Appellant testified that he “never touched [M.R.] inappropriately, and [he] never

mistreated her.” He further explained that the weekend before M.R.’s outcry, M.R. had

spent time with her grandmother and her grandmother’s boyfriend, a dark-complected

male. Appellant stated he believed that the grandmother’s boyfriend may have been the

perpetrator. Appellant stated that he and G.E. had “an ugly separation” before the case

happened, and he eventually met another woman, got married and started a family with

her. He explained that he was unaware of the accusations against him when he left G.E.

Appellant agreed that M.R. is a good child but asserted that she was lying about the

4 accusations against him.

In a single count indictment, the State alleged that, during a period that was thirty

days or more in duration, appellant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against

the child complainant, M.R., who was under fourteen years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 21.02(b). The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense of

aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony. See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i),

(2)(B). The trial court assessed punishment at fifty-years’ incarceration. This appeal

ensued.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction. He specifically attempts to attack the credibility of M.R.’s

testimony.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction

considers all the evidence in the record, whether direct or circumstantial, and whether

properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To assess whether the

evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we review all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and amount to

5 justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at

917.

When reviewing the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, we consider

whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. Id. at 907. We must “defer to the

jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the

witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899–900

(emphasis omitted). As stated by the Supreme Court in Jackson, the standard of review

“gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to

ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Chasco v. State, 568 S.W.3d 254,

257–58 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, pet. ref’d). We do not become a thirteenth juror by re-

evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence or substituting our judgment for that

of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Reed v.

State, 158 S.W.3d 44, 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). Our duty as

a reviewing court is to ensure that the evidence presented can actually support a

conclusion that the defendant committed the crime. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. We

will uphold the verdict unless we determine any rational factfinder would have a

reasonable doubt as to any essential element. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009).

The offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child is a lesser-included offense of

continuous sexual abuse of a young child—the offense with which appellant was charged

6 in the indictment and that was included in the trial court’s charge. See Price v. State, 413

S.W.3d 158, 163 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, 2013), aff’d, 434 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (“The Legislature made aggravated sexual assault [of a child] a lesser included

offense of continuous sexual abuse [of a young child] by defining [‘]act of sexual abuse[’]

to expressly include aggravated sexual assault [of a child]”) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 21.02(c)(4), (e)(3)). A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child if the person

intentionally or knowingly “causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child

by any means;” or “causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual organ of

the actor;” and “the victim is younger than 14 years of age.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B); see Castillo v. State, 7 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. App.—Austin

1999, pet. ref’d) (conducting legal sufficiency review of lesser-included offense conviction

by examining evidence through prism of hypothetically correct charge for lesser-included

offense).

Physical evidence is not necessary to affirm a sexual assault conviction. See

Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

(stating physical evidence is not required to affirm a sexual assault conviction when the

child victim provides ample testimony to establish that a sexual assault occurred). Further,

the uncorroborated testimony of a child seventeen years of age or younger is sufficient to

support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.07; Ryder v. State, 581 S.W.3d 439, 449 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2019, no pet.). Courts liberally construe the testimony of child sexual abuse victims. Lee

v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d

7 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Bautista v. State, 605 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

B. Analysis

Appellant concedes that, under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

complainant’s uncorroborated testimony alone is enough to support a conviction for child

sexual abuse. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1). However, appellant

asks this Court not to follow Article 38.07 because, as he argues, M.R.’s credibility and

truthfulness were at issue. Appellant does not cite any authority to support his position

that we can and should decline to follow longstanding precedent because the appellant

believes the child victim was lying. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring a clear and

concise argument with appropriate citations to authorities). Appellant is essentially asking

this Court to re-weigh the evidence and determine if M.R.’s testimony was credible to

support his conviction. We cannot do so. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. The jury is

the ultimate authority in determining credibility of the witnesses and weighing the

evidence at trial. See Bautista, 605 S.W.3d at 526 (citing Canfield v. State, 429 S.W.3d

54, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).

Here, the jury heard M.R.’s testimony providing her account of appellant sexually

assaulting her by touching the “inside” of her sexual organ. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B). The jury also heard testimony that there was medical evidence to

support M.R.’s account—specifically trauma-related abrasions to M.R.’s female sexual

organ. Even with appellant’s testimony asserting his innocence and discussing possible

motivations for M.R. to lie, including a bad breakup between appellant and G.E., the jury

8 found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (a

reviewing court must not sit as thirteenth juror, disagree with the jury’s “weighing of the

evidence,” or “disagree[] with a jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence”). We conclude

that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is

legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.07(a), (b)(1); Ryder v. State, 514 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet.

ref’d); Chasco, 568 S.W.3d at 258.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the 29th day of August, 2024.