Alcantara v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2014
• Docket: 12-4834-cv (L)
• Status: Published

Opinion

12‐4834‐cv (L) Alcantara v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int’l Pension Fund Pension Plan

1 In the 2 United States Court of Appeals 3 For the Second Circuit 4 ________

5 August Term 2013 6 Nos. 12‐4834‐cv, 12‐4839‐cv, 12‐4851‐cv, 12‐4861‐cv, 12‐4912‐cv

7 RAFAEL ALCANTARA, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS 8 SIMILARLY SITUATED, ALONSO GOMEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF 9 OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, CELESTINO JUAREZ, 10 INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 11 VASILICHIA BABU, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS 12 SIMILARLY SITUATED, ANGEL DE LA CRUZ, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON 13 BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, KHIM CHAND, 14 INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 15 TESFAYE GHEBREMEDHIN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL 16 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RATHIN DUTTA GUPTA, INDIVIDUALLY, 17 AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, LUIS MEJIA, 18 INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 19 ANTONIO MEROLLA, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS 20 SIMILARLY SITUATED, ROLANDO MONTANO, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON 21 BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RUSSELL NEUBERT, 22 INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 23 TAGLIARENI SALVATORE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL 24 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, MUSOVIC SMAIL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON 25 BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, JUAN F. TORRES, 26 INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 2 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 KENNETH KERN, MELVIN MENARD, GARRETT SCHOL, GUY STALTER, 2 ALMOND REID, MICHAEL DʹANTONIO, PHILLIP ROGERS, DONALD 3 SCROGHAM, BRIAN K. FOWLER, SR., JOSEPH ALTAMORE, INDIVIDUALLY, 4 AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, LESLIE DURHAM, 5 RANDALL FARMER, RODNEY SIMPSON, JAMES THOMAS, JAMES SMITH, 6 STEVEN SHANKLES, MATTIE DAVIS, JOYCE SLATON, RICKEY MEDLEY, 7 KATHY BENEFIELD, TIMOTHY WRIGHT, M.D., RODNEY FOSTER, SANDRA 8 BRANDON, EDDIE WRIGHT, TOMMY WOMACK, ROGER WOOTEN, RICKEY 9 WILBORN, GARY WHITMORE, WALTER WATSON, DANNY WHITE, TERRY 10 WAGNER, DANIEL THURMAN, RICKY TEAT, BEECHER TANNER, JR., 11 MICHAEL SLATON, TOMMY SIBERT, DONNA SMITH, CHRIS SMITH, GARY 12 SARRATT, CHARLES ROGERS, WILLIAM RICHEY, GUY RICE, PHYLLIS 13 CRAZE, GARY MEDLEY, RANDALL MOORE, MARK MONEY, MICHAEL 14 NORRIS, TONY NELSON, DONALD JONES, DAVID LAWMAN, TONEY IVEY, 15 ROBERT JONES, LARRY INGLE, BILLY HOLKEM, HERBERT HEAD, PAMULA 16 HARPER, RODNEY BROTHERS, DENNIS BRANDON, CONNIE BURGESS, 17 RUTH BAILEY, JIMMY AMMONS, KENNETH BEARDEN, NICKEY GORHAM, 18 RALPH FLYNN, JAMES FERGUSON, WALTER ESLOON, GLENDA DUPREE, 19 ROGER DAVIS, ALAN DALTON, JAMES CRAWFORD, DOUGLAS COMBS, 20 MELISSA CISCO, BILLY COOK, CHARLES COKER, BILLY CATHEY, 21 KENNETH BURT, DANIEL CARTER, EDWARD BEARDEN, SHEILA 22 HAMMOND, SALVADOR MARTINEZ, RANDALL GARRISON, LESLIE 23 CADDICK, JOSEPH BARELA, SHEILA JUAREZ, ROGER GONZALEZ, PHILLIP 24 G. SCOTT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE ON BEHALF OF A 25 CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS, TERRY WAYNE FINCH, TERRY 26 MOORE, RONALD BLACKWELL, 27 Plaintiffs‐Appellees,

28 JOHN STEVEN CHAMBERS, KEVIN WATERS, 29 Plaintiffs,

30 v. 3 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL 2 PENSION FUND PENSION PLAN, BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY UNION 3 AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AS 4 PLAN ADMINISTRATOR, JOHN DOES 3‐10, AS TRUSTEES OF THE BAKERY 5 AND CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION 6 FUND, FRANK HURT, STEVEN V. BERTELLI, DAVID B. DURKEE, ANTHONY 7 JOHNSON, ART MONTMINY, ROBERT OAKLEY, RANDY D. ROARK, JOSEPH 8 THIBODEAU, RICHARD B. COOK, DAN CRAIG, THOMAS G. KIRCHNER, 9 JON MCPHERSON, LOU MINELLA, JOHN WAGNER, JOHN DOE NO. 1, 10 JOHN DOE NO. 2, AS TRUSTEES OF THE BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY 11 UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND, THE BAKERY 12 AND CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION 13 FUND, JOHN BECK, PLAN MANAGER, BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY 14 UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND BOARD OF 15 TRUSTEES, BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY 16 INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND, 17 Defendants‐Appellants.1 18 ________

19 Appeal from the United States District Court 20 for the Southern District of New York. 21 Nos. 11 Civ. 1471, 11 Civ. 9203, 12 Civ. 141, 22 12 Civ. 142, 12 Civ. 913 ― Vincent L. Briccetti, Judge. 23 ________

24 ARGUED: NOVEMBER 20, 2013 25 DECIDED: MAY 1, 2014 26 ________

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to the listing above. 4 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 Before: KEARSE, JACOBS, and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges. 2 ________ 3 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for 4 the Southern District of New York (Briccetti, J.). The district court 5 held that the anti‐cutback rule in § 204(g) of the Employee 6 Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), 7 precludes plan amendments that reduce retirement‐type subsidies 8 for Plaintiffs‐Appellees who ceased employment without satisfying 9 the preamendment conditions for the subsidy, but who could later 10 satisfy the conditions without returning to work. We AFFIRM the 11 judgment of the district court.

12 ________

13 JULIA PENNY CLARK (Jeremiah A. Collins, Osvaldo 14 Vazquez, on the brief), Bredhoff & Kaiser PLLC, 15 Washington, DC, for Bakery and Confectionery 16 Union and Industry International Pension Fund 17 Pension Plan, Bakery and Confectionery Union and 18 Industry International Pension Fund Board of 19 Trustees, as Plan Administrator, John Does 3‐10, as 20 Trustees of the Bakery and Confectionery Union and 21 Industry International Pension Fund, Frank Hurt, 22 Steven V. Bertelli, David B. Durkee, Anthony Johnson, 23 Art Montminy, Robert Oakley, Randy D. Roark, 24 Joseph Thibodeau, Richard B. Cook, Dan Craig, 25 Thomas G. Kirchner, Jon McPherson, Lou Minella, 26 John Wagner, John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2, as 27 Trustees of the Bakery and Confectionery Union and 28 Industry International Pension Fund, The Bakery and 29 Confectionery Union and Industry International 30 Pension Fund, John Beck, Plant Manager, Bakery and 31 Confectionery Union and Industry International 5 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 Pension Fund Board of Trustees, Bakery and 2 Confectionery Union and Industry International 3 Pension Fund.

4 BENJAMIN GOULD (Lynn L. Sarko, Derek W. 5 Loeser, David S. Preminger, Erin M. Riley, Alison 6 S. Gaffney, on the brief), Keller Rohrback LLP, 7 Seattle, WA, Chrisopher A. Seeger, Diogenes P. 8 Kekatos, Seeger Weiss LLP, New York, NY, 9 William D. Frumkin, Elizabeth E. Hunter, 10 Frumkin & Hunter LLP, White Plains, NY for 11 Alcantara Plaintiffs.

12 Thomas O. Sinclair (M. Clayborn Williams, on the 13 brief), Sinclair Williams LLC, Birmingham, AL, for 14 Phillip G. Scott and Terry Wayne Finch.

15 DAVID P. MARTIN, The Martin Law Group, LLC, 16 Tuscaloosa, AL, Robert Brett Adair, Adair Law 17 Firm, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Blackwell, 18 Martinez, and Moore Plaintiffs.

19 ________

20 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

21 In this appeal from a judgment of the United States District 22 Court for the Southern District of New York (Vincent L. Briccetti, 23 Judge) we consider whether the anti‐cutback rule in § 204(g) of the 24 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 25 U.S.C. § 1054(g), precludes plan amendments that reduce retirement‐ 26 type subsidies for plan participants who have ceased employment 27 without satisfying the preamendment conditions for the subsidy, but 28 who could later satisfy the preamendment conditions without 6 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 returning to work. We hold that the rule protects such benefits and, 2 accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

3 I. BACKGROUND

4 The relevant facts are uncontested. Defendants‐Appellants 5 are the Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International 6 Pension Fund Pension Plan (the “Plan”), a multiemployer defined‐ 7 benefit pension plan, and its Board of Trustees. The Plaintiffs‐ 8 Appellees are participants in the Plan. The plaintiffs’ former 9 employers are parties to collective bargaining agreements with local 10 unions of the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain 11 Millers International Union.

12 The Plan provides for a range of benefits. The standard 13 benefit, payable at age 65 — the “normal retirement age” under the 14 Plan — was labeled Plan A. Participants could elect to receive their 15 Plan A pension benefits as early as age 55, but at an actuarially 16 reduced level that reflected the earlier (and longer) expected stream 17 of payments. Certain employers elected to offer additional 18 subsidized early retirement benefits that were not actuarially 19 reduced. Two of these plans, Plan G (the “Golden 80 Plan”), and 20 Plan C (the “Golden 90 Plan”), are at issue here. Under those Plans, 21 a participant who had completed at least ten years of service with a 22 participating employer, and whose combination of his age and years 23 of service totaled 80 or 90 years, respectively, could retire and 24 receive full pension benefits.

25 Prior to July 2010, the Plan allowed a participant to “age into” 26 Golden 80 or 90 benefits. This meant that a participant who had 7 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 achieved the ten‐year minimum service requirement, but who had 2 left covered employment before achieving the requisite 80‐ or 90‐ 3 year age‐plus‐years‐of‐service level, would still become eligible for 4 Golden 80 or 90 benefits as soon as his age‐plus‐years‐of‐service 5 reached the required 80‐ or 90‐year requirement.

6 In July 2010, the Trustees amended the Plan to eliminate the 7 option to “age into” benefits and to require that a participant be 8 employed at the time he qualified for Golden 80 or 90 benefits. The 9 amendment did not affect those participants who had already aged 10 into Golden 80 or 90 benefits. The amendment affected only those 11 participants who had completed the ten‐year minimum service 12 requirement, but who had not yet reached the requisite age‐plus‐ 13 years‐of‐service level and were no longer working for an employer 14 participating in the Golden 80 or 90 Plans. The brunt of this change, 15 according to plaintiffs, fell on former employees who were laid off 16 due to either plant closings or reductions in force and subsequently 17 were unable to find work in the industry.

18 Participants who lost their opportunity to qualify for Golden 19 80 or 90 benefits as a result of the amendment filed various suits 20 alleging that the plan amendment violated § 204(g), ERISA’s anti‐ 21 cutback rule, which prohibits plan amendments that reduce or 22 eliminate certain pension benefits. In response, the Plan contended 23 that the rule protected only those Golden 80 and 90 Plan participants 24 who remained in covered employment at the time they achieved the 25 required age‐plus‐years‐of‐service level. 8 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 The cases were consolidated and the parties cross‐moved for 2 judgment on the pleadings. The district court held that the 3 amendment violated the anti‐cutback rule. In re Bakery & 4 Confectionery Union & Indus. Intʹl Pension Fund Pension Plan, 865 F. 5 Supp. 2d 469, 474‐75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Judge Briccetti reasoned that 6 “[e]ligibility for plaintiffs is based on a sum of their respective ages 7 and lengths of service. Because they can continue to age into 8 pension benefits even after they have separated from their respective 9 employers, Section 204(g) applies. And because plaintiffs may, post‐ 10 amendment, satisfy the pre‐amendment requirements to obtaining a 11 Plan C or Plan G pension, the anticutback rule bars the amendment.” 12 Id. at 474. The district court entered judgment, the defendants 13 appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 54(b). We affirm.

15 II. DISCUSSION

16 We review de novo a judgment entered on the pleadings 17 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Kirkendall v. 18 Halliburton, Inc., 707 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2013). “In deciding a Rule 19 12(c) motion, we apply the same standard as that applicable to a 20 motion under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in 21 the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 22 of the nonmoving party.” Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d 23 Cir. 2004). 9 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 The anti‐cutback rule, ERISA § 204(g), provides as follows:

2 (g) Decrease of accrued benefits through amendment of 3 plan

4 (1) The accrued benefit of a participant under a 5 plan may not be decreased by an amendment of 6 the plan [except in certain circumstances not 7 applicable here].

8 (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a plan 9 amendment which has the effect of‐‐

10 (A) eliminating or reducing an early 11 retirement benefit or a retirement‐type 12 subsidy (as defined in regulations), or

13 (B) eliminating an optional form of benefit,

14 with respect to benefits attributable to service 15 before the amendment shall be treated as 16 reducing accrued benefits. In the case of a 17 retirement‐type subsidy, the preceding sentence 18 shall apply only with respect to a participant who 19 satisfies (either before or after the amendment) 20 the preamendment conditions for the subsidy.

21 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).

22 The issues presented on appeal are whether the Golden 80 and 23 90 Plans are considered “accrued benefits” under § 204(g)(1) or 24 “retirement‐type subsid[ies]” under § 204(g)(2) for the purposes of 25 the anti‐cutback rule, and, if the latter, whether plaintiffs, as former 26 employees, can “satisf[y] (either before or after the amendment) the 27 preamendment conditions for the subsidy.” 10 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 In our view, it is clear that the Golden 80 and 90 Plans are 2 “retirement‐type subsid[ies]” that qualify for protection under 3 § 204(g)(2). The term “retirement‐type subsidy” is defined in IRS 4 regulations interpreting a parallel provision of the Internal Revenue 5 Code.2 A retirement‐type subsidy is:

6 the excess, if any, of the actuarial present value of a 7 retirement‐type benefit over the actuarial present value 8 of the accrued benefit commencing at normal retirement 9 age or at actual commencement date, if later, with both 10 such actuarial present values determined as of the date 11 the retirement‐type benefit commences. Examples of 12 retirement‐type subsidies include a subsidized early 13 retirement benefit . . . .

14 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)–3(g)(6)(iv).

15 The Golden 80 and 90 Plans fall within this definition. The 16 Plans provide a “retirement‐type benefit” because they provide a 17 “benefit under a defined benefit plan . . . that . . . continues after 18 retirement, and is not an ancillary benefit.” Id. § 1.411(d)–3(g)(6)(iii). 19 It is undisputed that the actuarial value of the Golden 80 and 90 20 Plans at the time they begin distributing benefits is in “excess” of 21 “the actuarial present value of the accrued benefit commencing at 22 normal retirement age.” Id. § 1.411(d)–3(g)(6)(iv). Accordingly, for 23 the purposes of the anti‐cutback rule, the Golden 80 and 90 Plans are 24 retirement‐type subsidies.

25 The evolution of § 204(g) reinforces this conclusion. Prior to 26 the passage of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (“REA”), Pub. L. 27 No. 98‐397, 98 Stat. 1426, the anti‐cutback rule was limited to the 2 Pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, the IRS regulations are applicable to the interpretation of sections 202 through 204 of ERISA. See 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200a‐2. 11 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 text now included in § 204(g)(1) and thus applied only to “accrued 2 benefits.” Whether early retirement benefits, retirement‐type 3 subsidies, and optional forms of benefits were protected was unclear 4 because the statute did not specifically address those types of 5 benefits.

6 Congress recognized that these benefits could be important 7 components of retirement packages and passed the REA in part to 8 limit the circumstances under which these benefits could be reduced 9 or eliminated through plan amendments. S. Rep. No. 98‐575, at 27 10 (1984). To do so, Congress added § 204(g)(2) which did not disturb 11 the existing protection for “accrued benefits,” but went on to 12 provide that reductions to early retirement benefits, retirement‐type 13 subsidies, and optional forms of benefits were to be “treated as” 14 reductions of “accrued benefits.” Accordingly, where a benefit 15 qualifies as a retirement‐type subsidy, it is subject to § 204(g)(2) of 16 the anti‐cutback rule.

17 Section 204(g)(2) contains an additional provision, the 18 meaning of which is the primary point of disagreement on this 19 appeal. Under that provision, the anti‐cutback rule applies to 20 retirement‐type subsidies, “only with respect to a participant who 21 satisfies (either before or after the amendment) the preamendment 22 conditions for the subsidy.” 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2). The plaintiffs 23 would have us read the “only with respect to a participant . . .” 24 language as simply requiring that a participant “satisf[y] (either 25 before or after the amendment) the preamendment conditions for 26 the subsidy” to have their benefits protected by the rule. The 27 plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied (or will satisfy) this 28 requirement. The preamendment Plan, they argue, conditioned 29 Golden 80 or 90 benefits on the sum of plaintiffs’ years‐of‐ 30 employment plus age equaling 80 or 90, respectively. Because 31 plaintiffs either have seen, or if they continue to age will see, that 12 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 number equal 80 or 90 and because the Plan has no time limitation 2 within which a participant must reach that number, the 3 preamendment condition, they contend, is or will be satisfied.

4 The Plan agrees that Golden 80 and 90 Plans are retirement‐ 5 type subsidies, but insists that § 204(g)(2) contains an implicit 6 “continued employment” requirement, under which a participant, to 7 be protected by the anti‐cutback rule, must have remain in covered 8 employment until he becomes eligible for the subsidy. The Plan 9 insists that the “only with respect to a participant . . .” language is 10 intended to have a limiting effect on the application of the anti‐ 11 cutback rule to retirement‐type subsidies and that, read literally as 12 the plaintiffs urge, the sentence has none because a participant could 13 never be eligible for a subsidy without “satisf[ying] . . . the 14 preamendment conditions for the subsidy.” On the basis of this 15 reading, the Plan contends that the scope of the limitation is unclear 16 and can be understood only by resort to the legislative history, 17 which the Plan argues reveals that Congress intended to limit the 18 protection of the anti‐cutback rule to current employees. For several 19 reasons, we disagree with the Plan’s approach.

20 Legislative interpretation begins with the plain text of the 21 statute and, where the text is unambiguous, also ends there because 22 the “judicial inquiry is complete.” Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 189 23 (2d Cir. 2013). We read the provision as straightforwardly applying 24 to participants, such as the plaintiffs, who qualified for the subsidy 25 before the amendment or who could do so afterwards. The text says 26 nothing about satisfying the preamendment conditions “while 27 employed,” or before “separating from service,” or anything to that 28 effect. To the contrary, the statutory wording cuts against such a 29 requirement. Section 204(g)(2), which requires that a “participant” 30 satisfy the preamendment conditions of the subsidy in order to enjoy 31 the protections of the anti‐cutback rule, is elucidated by the 13 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 definition of a “participant” under ERISA as “any employee or 2 former employee of an employer, . . . who is or may become eligible to 3 receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan.” 29 4 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (emphasis added). Consequently, it is immaterial 5 that some plaintiffs had not yet satisfied the preamendment age‐ 6 level conditions when they left covered employment, because § 7 204(g)’s prohibition on cutbacks applies to former as well as to 8 current employees.

9 The Plan’s approach would require us to delve into the 10 complex legislative history of ERISA and the REA in search of 11 limiting principles that Congress did not include in the text. This 12 “would result not in a construction of the statute, but, in effect, an 13 enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted . . . may be 14 included within its scope.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) 15 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Accordingly, we 16 are not inclined to overlook the plaintiffs’ straightforward and 17 reasonable interpretation of the statute in favor of one that renders 18 the text ambiguous and resorts to legislative history or policy 19 arguments to give it meaning. See also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 20 U.S. 490, 513 (1981).

21 This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other circuits 22 recognizing that a participant may “grow into” eligibility for 23 retirement‐type subsidy benefits under the anti‐cutback rule by 24 satisfying the eligibility requirements after the date of the 25 amendment. See, e.g., Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 221 F.3d 517, 521 (3d Cir. 26 2000); Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1036‐37 (7th Cir. 1996); 27 Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indus., Inc., 984 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 28 1993); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1146 (3d Cir. 1993); 29 Hunger v. AB, 12 F.3d 118, 121 (8th Cir. 1993). As the Seventh Circuit 30 explained in Ahng, “[t]he courts of appeals that have ruled on an 31 employee’s right to ‘grow into’ early retirement benefits have . . . 14 No. 12‐4834‐cv

1 uniformly held that as long as an employee satisfies, or will be able to 2 satisfy, the eligibility requirements of the early retirement benefit in 3 effect prior to the amendment, § 204(g) protects the benefit.” 96 F.3d 4 at 1036 (emphasis added).

5 Other courts have denied a participant the ability to “grow 6 into” benefits only where he has ceased employment without 7 completing the minimum years of service necessary to become 8 eligible for the retirement‐type subsidy or failed to satisfy some 9 other preamendment condition that cannot be cured. In that 10 situation, courts have permitted the reduction or elimination of the 11 benefits because the participant, even without the amendment, 12 would never have been able to satisfy the preamendment conditions 13 of the subsidy. See Shaver v. Siemens Corp., 670 F.3d 462, 490‐91 (3d 14 Cir. 2012) (denying application of § 204(g)(2) because service with 15 successor employee “forever disqualifie[d the participants] from 16 receiving . . . benefits under th[e] plan” which was “a prohibition 17 that the passage of time cannot cure”); Hunger, 12 F.3d at 121; Berger 18 v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 918 (3d Cir. 1990). In contrast, the 19 plaintiffs here all have, or will, become eligible for the Golden 80 or 20 90 benefits simply through the passage of time.

21 For these reasons we hold that the plaintiffs have satisfied (or 22 will satisfy) the preamendment conditions and their Golden 80 and 23 90 benefits are protected by the anti‐cutback rule.

24 CONCLUSION

25 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.