Alcantara v. 603-607 Realty Associates

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Alcantara v. 603-607 Realty Associates

273 A.D.2d 329, 710 N.Y.S.2d 99, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8215

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 19, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 273 A.D.2d 329 (Alcantara v. 603-607 Realty Associates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Alcantara v. 603-607 Realty Associates, 273 A.D.2d 329, 710 N.Y.S.2d 99, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8215 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants 603-607 Realty Associates and Leopold Loevinger appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kangs County (Steinhardt, J.), dated June 8, 1999, as denied that branch of their motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is barred by a general release, and granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for a determination that the general release does not bar that cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the general release executed in the prior action was not intended to encompass the [330]*330cause of action now asserted on behalf of the infant plaintiff. The meaning and extent of a general release depend upon the controversy being settled and the purpose for which it is given, and “a release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not desire or intend to dispose of’ (Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299; see also, Meyer v Fanelli, 266 AD2d 361; Dillon v Dean, 236 AD2d 360). Here, the release, executed in the context of settling the infant plaintiffs claim for arm injuries arising from a 1993 accident, clearly was not meant to relieve the appellants of their potential liability for an eye injury which the infant plaintiff allegedly sustained in a completely unrelated accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found that the release does not bar the first cause of action asserted on behalf of the infant plaintiff (see, Meyer v Fanelli, supra; B.B.& S. Treated Lbr. Co. v Groundwater Technology, 256 AD2d 430; Dillon v Dean, supra; Lefrak SBN Assocs. v Kennedy Galleries, 203 AD2d 256). Santucci, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants 603-607 Realty Associates and Leopold Loevinger appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kangs County (Steinhardt, J.), dated June 8, 1999, as denied that branch of their motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is barred by a general release, and granted the plaintiffs’ cross motion for a determination that the general release does not bar that cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the general release executed in the prior action was not intended to encompass the [330]*330cause of action now asserted on behalf of the infant plaintiff. The meaning and extent of a general release depend upon the controversy being settled and the purpose for which it is given, and “a release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not desire or intend to dispose of’ (Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299; see also, Meyer v Fanelli, 266 AD2d 361; Dillon v Dean, 236 AD2d 360). Here, the release, executed in the context of settling the infant plaintiffs claim for arm injuries arising from a 1993 accident, clearly was not meant to relieve the appellants of their potential liability for an eye injury which the infant plaintiff allegedly sustained in a completely unrelated accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found that the release does not bar the first cause of action asserted on behalf of the infant plaintiff (see, Meyer v Fanelli, supra; B.B.& S. Treated Lbr. Co. v Groundwater Technology, 256 AD2d 430; Dillon v Dean, supra; Lefrak SBN Assocs. v Kennedy Galleries, 203 AD2d 256). Santucci, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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273 A.D.2d 329, 710 N.Y.S.2d 99, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alcantara-v-603-607-realty-associates-nyappdiv-2000.

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