Albritton v. Smaling

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 28, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00099
StatusUnknown

This text of Albritton v. Smaling (Albritton v. Smaling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Albritton v. Smaling, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DALON TASHON ALBRITTON,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 21-CV-99-JPS

RACINE COUNTY JAIL, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ORDER CHRISTOPHER SMALING, and CAPT. FRIEND,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Dalon Tashon Albritton, an inmate confined at Racine County Jail (“RCJ”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (Docket #1). This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On April 7, 2021, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $66.02. (Docket #6). Plaintiff paid that fee on April 26, 2021. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. (Docket #2). He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff brings a series of allegations against Defendants arising out of him contracting COVID-19 while incarcerated at RCJ. (Docket #1). At the time of the underlying events in 2020, Plaintiff had been at RCJ for six months. (Id. at 2). On October 2, 2020, Plaintiff asked a correction officer, C.O. Hernandez, for a protective mask, but C.O. Hernandez responded that he did not have any. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff’s “pod” was under quarantine and was moved to cell block 2A a few days later. (Id.) Plaintiff was put in Cell 16. (Id.) While there, a fellow inmate communicated to Plaintiff through a vent that the guards had recently transported a COVID-positive inmate through cell block 2A. (Id.) It seems that this inmate had been in Cell 17— next to Plaintiff’s cell—only ten minutes prior to Plaintiff arriving at Cell 16. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the area to which he was brought, and where the infected inmate had been, was not cleaned prior to Plaintiff arriving. (Id.) On October 5, 2020, Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff states that he only discovered that he had COVID-19 after a “cool” guard, Camarco, informed him and his fellow inmates about their positive tests. (Id. at 4). Shortly after these events, eighteen inmates, including Plaintiff, organized together to “take a stand” against the COVID-19 protocols at RCJ. (Id.). Videos of this protest were broadcast on Facebook Live and made the local news. (Id. at 3–4). According to Plaintiff, there is video footage of him holding up two bags of garbage, the result of RCJ not emptying inmates’ garbage. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff maintains that, because of the protest he helped organize, Sheriff Christopher Schmaling called the National Guard to RCJ. (Id.) At Sheriff Schmaling’s direction, the National Guard began administering COVID-19 tests at RCJ. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Schmaling gave permission to the National Guard to share the results of those tests with correctional officers, who then gave the results to inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff believes that this violated his rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Plaintiff alleges a host of other instances in which he was moved to areas recently occupied by COVID-positive inmates, transported with COVID-positive inmates, or placed around guards who had contact with COVID-positive inmates. (Id.) He also states that he was made to return his face mask anytime he returned from court to RCJ. (Id.) 2.3 Analysis First, the Court will begin with Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his rights under HIPAA. HIPAA does not confer a private right of action or rights enforceable in a § 1983 action. Stewart v. Parkview Hosp., 940 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, Plaintiff cannot proceed on a HIPAA claim.

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Related

Rhodes v. Chapman
452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Tyquan Stewart v. Parkview Hospital
940 F.3d 1013 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Albritton v. Smaling, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/albritton-v-smaling-wied-2022.