Alberto Maldonado v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 3, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00003-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00003-CR

ALBERTO MALDONADO, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 181st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 32473B, Honorable Titiana Frausto, Presiding

July 3, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Alberto Maldonado, was convicted of possession of a controlled

substance in an amount less than one gram, a state-jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a)–(b). The trial court imposed punishment at two years

confinement in a state-jail facility but suspended said sentence and placed appellant on

four years probation. Appellant perfected appeal from this judgment.

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief

in support thereof. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed.

2d 493 (1967). Therein, he represented that his diligent search of the record uncovered no error entitling appellant to relief. So too did counsel 1) inform appellant of this and his

right to file a pro se response and 2) forward to him a copy of the appellate record.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional

evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that “[i]n Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities”); see also Davis v. State, 683 S.W.3d 828, 829–30 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2023, no pet.) (discussing when an Anders situation arises and counsel’s

obligation).

By letter, the court notified appellant of his right to file a response to counsel’s

motion and brief by July 2, 2025, if he wished to do so. To date, no response has been

received.

We conducted our own independent review of the record to determine the

presence of arguable issues and found none, except for those addressed below. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of

Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs

and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). During our review, we

discovered that the certified bill of costs dated February 5, 2025, included a time payment

fee of $15.00 assessed against appellant. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

concluded that a time payment fee like the one imposed here “must indeed be struck for

being prematurely assessed because a defendant’s appeal suspends the duty to pay

court costs and therefore suspends the running of the clock for the purposes of the time

2 payment fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “As a

consequence, even now, assessment of the time payment fee in this case would be

premature because appellate proceedings are still pending.” Id.

Our review of the record further uncovered the assessment, within the February

5th bill of costs, of $4,230 for court-appointed attorney’s fees despite appellant’s being

found indigent and unable to pay such fees. Given the trial court did not expressly find a

material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances, appellant is presumed to

remain indigent, and the assessment of those attorney’s fees also must be deleted from

the current bill of costs. 1 See Woodard v. State, No. 07-23-00377-CR, 2024 Tex. App.

LEXIS 4642, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 2, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (stating that when there is no evidence that a defendant can

pay court-appointed attorney’s fees, the proper remedy is to reform the judgment by

deleting the provision to repay court-appointed attorney’s fees).

Accordingly, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, modify the bill of

costs by deleting the $15.00 time payment fee and the assessment of court-appointed

attorney’s fees against appellant, and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 2

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Do not publish.

1 There was mention of appellant being employed. Yet, the court did not find his job relieved him from his status as a pauper. Moreover, it told appellant that if he cared to appeal, it would appoint him counsel. If nothing else, the latter indicates that the trial court continued to deem appellant indigent.

2 Within five days from the date of this court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this

opinion and this court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.35. 3