1 2 3 4 JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 ALBERTO DIAZ, ) Case No. CV 25-5993-JPR ) 13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 14 Vv. ) TO REMAND AND REMANDING CASE TO ) LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 15 || NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, Inc., ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 18 Plaintiff filed this action in Los Angeles County Superior 19 Court on May 1, 2025. (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 at 9.) 59 || The Complaint raises claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer 1 Warranty Act for breach of express warranty, breach of the 22 implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of California 23 Civil Code section 1793.2 (b). (Id. at 5-9.) On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff personally served on Defendant a 25 || COPY of the Complaint and Summons. (Id., Enav Decl., ECF No. 9-1 26 G6 & Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-4 at 2-3.) Defendant answered on June 30. 27 The next day, Defendant removed the case to this Court. On July og | 31, Plaintiff moved to remand this action to state court, arguing
1 that the removal notice was untimely. Defendant opposed on 2 August 14, and a week later, Plaintiff replied and requested 3 judicial notice.1 The Court heard argument on September 4 and 4 took the matter under submission. 5 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the 6 undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge. (See ECF No. 6.) For the 7 reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 8 Remand and ORDERS this action REMANDED to Los Angeles County 9 Superior Court. 10 BACKGROUND 11 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of 12 California and Defendant a Delaware corporation “operating and 13 doing business in” California. (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 14 at 3.) On December 4, 2022, Plaintiff leased from Defendant a 15 2023 Nissan Frontier. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff purchased the 16 vehicle on June 16, 2024. (Id.) “The Subject Vehicle, as 17 reflected in the sales contract, has an approximate value of 18 $62,114.36.” (Id.) It was allegedly “delivered to Plaintiff 19 with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and 20 developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty 21 including, but not limited to, engine and electrical system 22 defects.” (Id.) “Plaintiff first presented the Subject Vehicle 23 for repairs on or around September 10, 2024, with approximately 24 24,689 miles on the odometer, and reported a failure to start 25 requiring a jump start.” (Id.) “On or around September 14, 26 2024, with approximately 24,881 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff 27 1 The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice at 28 the September 4 hearing. (ECF No. 18.) 2 1 presented the Subject Vehicle again and reported a recurrent 2 failure to start requiring a jump start.” (Id.) “On or around 3 September 21, 2024, with approximately 25,194 miles on the 4 odometer, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle again and 5 reported the ‘Rear Automatic Braking (“RAB”)’ warning light 6 illuminating on the instrument cluster.” (Id.) 7 Plaintiff seeks recision of the purchase contract and 8 restitution of all monies expended on the subject vehicle; 9 general, special, incidental, and consequential damages; a civil 10 penalty of two times the amount of actual damages; prejudgment 11 interest; and attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 9.) 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to 14 federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. An action may be 15 removed based on diversity jurisdiction. Hunter v. Philip Morris 16 USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). A court has diversity 17 jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the 18 lawsuit is between citizens of different states. See § 1332(a). 19 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal 20 jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if 21 there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 22 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 23 1992) (per curiam); see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 24 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941). The removing party bears the burden of 25 establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 26 Under § 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal “shall be filed 27 within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through 28 service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting 3 1 forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding 2 is based.” Otherwise, “if the case stated by the initial 3 pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed 4 within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 5 otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or 6 other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case 7 is one which is or has become removable.” § 1446(b)(3). 8 For the 30-day clock to begin under § 1446(b)(1), “the 9 ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial 10 pleading.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 695 11 (9th Cir. 2005). When it is “unclear from the complaint whether 12 the case is removable,” the pleading is “indeterminate” and does 13 not start the clock. Id. at 692–93. To trigger the 30-day clock 14 under § 1446(b)(3), the “amended pleading, motion, order, or 15 other paper must make a ground for removal unequivocally clear 16 and certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1095 (9th 17 Cir. 2021). “When the defendant receives enough facts to remove 18 on any basis under section 1441, the case is removable, and 19 section 1446’s thirty-day clock starts ticking.” Durham v. 20 Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006). 21 “[N]otice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined 22 through examination of the four corners of the applicable 23 pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make 24 further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. Although “defendants 25 need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork,” the removal 26 statute still “requires a defendant to apply a reasonable amount 27 of intelligence in ascertaining removability.” Kuxhausen v. BMW 28 Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation 4 1 omitted). That duty includes “[m]ultiplying figures clearly 2 stated in a complaint.” Id. 3 “[W]hen a complaint filed in state court alleges on its face 4 an amount in controversy sufficient to meet the federal 5 jurisdictional threshold, such requirement is presumptively 6 satisfied unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ that the 7 plaintiff cannot actually recover that amount.” Guglielmino v. 8 McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). But when 9 it is “unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court 10 complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled,” 11 the removing party must establish by a preponderance of the 12 evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met. See 13 id. 14 A notice of removal “need include only a plausible 15 allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 16 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 17 LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).
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1 2 3 4 JS-6 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 ALBERTO DIAZ, ) Case No. CV 25-5993-JPR ) 13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 14 Vv. ) TO REMAND AND REMANDING CASE TO ) LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 15 || NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, Inc., ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 18 Plaintiff filed this action in Los Angeles County Superior 19 Court on May 1, 2025. (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 at 9.) 59 || The Complaint raises claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer 1 Warranty Act for breach of express warranty, breach of the 22 implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of California 23 Civil Code section 1793.2 (b). (Id. at 5-9.) On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff personally served on Defendant a 25 || COPY of the Complaint and Summons. (Id., Enav Decl., ECF No. 9-1 26 G6 & Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-4 at 2-3.) Defendant answered on June 30. 27 The next day, Defendant removed the case to this Court. On July og | 31, Plaintiff moved to remand this action to state court, arguing
1 that the removal notice was untimely. Defendant opposed on 2 August 14, and a week later, Plaintiff replied and requested 3 judicial notice.1 The Court heard argument on September 4 and 4 took the matter under submission. 5 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the 6 undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge. (See ECF No. 6.) For the 7 reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 8 Remand and ORDERS this action REMANDED to Los Angeles County 9 Superior Court. 10 BACKGROUND 11 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of 12 California and Defendant a Delaware corporation “operating and 13 doing business in” California. (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 14 at 3.) On December 4, 2022, Plaintiff leased from Defendant a 15 2023 Nissan Frontier. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff purchased the 16 vehicle on June 16, 2024. (Id.) “The Subject Vehicle, as 17 reflected in the sales contract, has an approximate value of 18 $62,114.36.” (Id.) It was allegedly “delivered to Plaintiff 19 with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and 20 developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty 21 including, but not limited to, engine and electrical system 22 defects.” (Id.) “Plaintiff first presented the Subject Vehicle 23 for repairs on or around September 10, 2024, with approximately 24 24,689 miles on the odometer, and reported a failure to start 25 requiring a jump start.” (Id.) “On or around September 14, 26 2024, with approximately 24,881 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff 27 1 The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice at 28 the September 4 hearing. (ECF No. 18.) 2 1 presented the Subject Vehicle again and reported a recurrent 2 failure to start requiring a jump start.” (Id.) “On or around 3 September 21, 2024, with approximately 25,194 miles on the 4 odometer, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle again and 5 reported the ‘Rear Automatic Braking (“RAB”)’ warning light 6 illuminating on the instrument cluster.” (Id.) 7 Plaintiff seeks recision of the purchase contract and 8 restitution of all monies expended on the subject vehicle; 9 general, special, incidental, and consequential damages; a civil 10 penalty of two times the amount of actual damages; prejudgment 11 interest; and attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 9.) 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to 14 federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. An action may be 15 removed based on diversity jurisdiction. Hunter v. Philip Morris 16 USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). A court has diversity 17 jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the 18 lawsuit is between citizens of different states. See § 1332(a). 19 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal 20 jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if 21 there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 22 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 23 1992) (per curiam); see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 24 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941). The removing party bears the burden of 25 establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 26 Under § 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal “shall be filed 27 within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through 28 service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting 3 1 forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding 2 is based.” Otherwise, “if the case stated by the initial 3 pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed 4 within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 5 otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or 6 other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case 7 is one which is or has become removable.” § 1446(b)(3). 8 For the 30-day clock to begin under § 1446(b)(1), “the 9 ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial 10 pleading.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 695 11 (9th Cir. 2005). When it is “unclear from the complaint whether 12 the case is removable,” the pleading is “indeterminate” and does 13 not start the clock. Id. at 692–93. To trigger the 30-day clock 14 under § 1446(b)(3), the “amended pleading, motion, order, or 15 other paper must make a ground for removal unequivocally clear 16 and certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1095 (9th 17 Cir. 2021). “When the defendant receives enough facts to remove 18 on any basis under section 1441, the case is removable, and 19 section 1446’s thirty-day clock starts ticking.” Durham v. 20 Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006). 21 “[N]otice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined 22 through examination of the four corners of the applicable 23 pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make 24 further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. Although “defendants 25 need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork,” the removal 26 statute still “requires a defendant to apply a reasonable amount 27 of intelligence in ascertaining removability.” Kuxhausen v. BMW 28 Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation 4 1 omitted). That duty includes “[m]ultiplying figures clearly 2 stated in a complaint.” Id. 3 “[W]hen a complaint filed in state court alleges on its face 4 an amount in controversy sufficient to meet the federal 5 jurisdictional threshold, such requirement is presumptively 6 satisfied unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ that the 7 plaintiff cannot actually recover that amount.” Guglielmino v. 8 McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). But when 9 it is “unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court 10 complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled,” 11 the removing party must establish by a preponderance of the 12 evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met. See 13 id. 14 A notice of removal “need include only a plausible 15 allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 16 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 17 LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Evidence establishing the 18 amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff 19 contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.” 20 Id. When removal is challenged, “[t]he parties may submit 21 evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or 22 declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant 23 to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Ibarra v. 24 Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 25 Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th 26 Cir. 1997)). 27 “If the notice of removal was untimely, a plaintiff may move 28 to remand the case back to state court.” Carvalho v. Equifax 5 1 Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) 2 (citations omitted). A motion to remand must be made within 30 3 days after filing of the notice of removal. § 1447(c). 4 DISCUSSION 5 The parties do not dispute that the Court has diversity 6 jurisdiction over this matter. (See Mot. Remand, Mem. P. & A., 7 ECF No. 9 at 6; Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 8.) Rather, Plaintiff moves 8 to remand on the basis that Defendant’s notice of removal was 9 untimely and “procedurally defective as removability of this 10 action was clear and ascertainable from the face of [the] 11 Complaint.” (Mot. Remand, Mem. P. & A., ECF No. 9 at 6.) He 12 asserts that the “Complaint and the requested prayer for 13 restitution and civil penalties alone, when conducting an 14 arithmetic calculation, establishes $186,343.08 in controversy.” 15 (Id. at 10 (citation omitted); see also Reply, ECF No. 15 at 5.) 16 Defendant contends that its own factual investigation into 17 “Plaintiff’s likely actual damages . . . not the allegations in 18 Plaintiff’s Complaint” provided the basis for its conclusion that 19 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and thus the 30-day 20 deadline under § 1446(b)(1) was not triggered by the Complaint. 21 (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 8.) 22 A. The Amount in Controversy Is Clear from the Face of the 23 Complaint 24 Song-Beverly provides for restitution “in an amount equal to 25 the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,” Cal. Civ. Code § 26 1793.2(d)(2)(B), and for a civil penalty of up to twice the 27 amount of actual damages, see § 1794(c), (e). Certain offsets 28 are applied to the “actual price paid or payable by the buyer,” 6 1 including the “amount directly attributable to use by the buyer 2 prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the 3 manufacturer or distributor.” § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). This offset is 4 calculated by dividing the “number of miles traveled by the new 5 motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer first delivered the 6 vehicle . . . for correction of the problem that gave rise to the 7 nonconformity” by 120,000 and multiplying the result by the 8 “actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or payable by the 9 buyer.” Id. Effective January 1, 2025, additional offsets exist 10 for negative equity; manufacturers’ rebates and credits; and the 11 actual price of “optional equipment, service contracts, or 12 [guaranteed asset protection] financing purchased by the 13 plaintiff.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 14 § 871.27(b)-(d).2 15 As noted above, Plaintiff seeks restitution, a civil penalty 16 of two times the amount of actual damages, and attorney’s fees, 17 among other remedies. (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 at 9.) 18 1. Actual damages 19 The Complaint alleges that the “Subject Vehicle, as 20 reflected in the sales contract, has an approximate value of 21 $62,114.36.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant argues that “a vehicle’s 22 ‘approximate value’ is not synonymous with either actual damages 23 under the Song-Beverly Act or the amount in controversy in the 24 litigation.” (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 7.) But a vehicle’s 25 26 2 For actions involving motor vehicles sold in 2025 and before, like Plaintiff’s, manufacturers may elect to be governed by 27 the new provisions. § 871.30. Defendant has elected to do so, and thus the new provisions apply to this case. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 11 28 at 11.) 7 1 “approximate value” has generally been accepted as a sufficient 2 base value from which to determine actual damages and calculate 3 the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Pulcini v. Ford Motor Co., 4 No. 2:24-cv-08846-JLS-AS, 2024 WL 4836469, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5 19, 2024) (granting plaintiff’s motion to remand in similar 6 circumstances because complaint specified subject vehicle’s 7 approximate value as $59,632.59 and sought restitution and civil 8 penalties in amount two times actual damages, and thus it was 9 clear from face of complaint that amount in controversy was at 10 least $75,000); Calderon v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. CV 25-05137- 11 AS, 2025 WL 2267923, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (same in case 12 involving complaint specifying subject vehicle’s approximate 13 value as $50,483.84); Hernandez v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 8:25- 14 cv-00276-FWS-ADS, 2025 WL 914758, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2025) 15 (same in case involving complaint specifying subject vehicle’s 16 approximate value as $97,955.24); Estrada v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 17 No. 25-cv-00783-SK, 2025 WL 842173, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 18 2025) (same in case involving complaint specifying subject 19 vehicle’s approximate value as $53,566); but see Covarrubias v. 20 Ford Motor Co., No. 2:25-cv-00328-JLS-MAA, 2025 WL 907544, at *3 21 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2025) (“[I]n actions brought under the 22 Song-Beverly Act, a complaint is indeterminate as to the amount 23 in controversy when that complaint alleges only the approximate 24 value of a vehicle without also providing any information as to 25 the amount actually paid for the vehicle by plaintiff — i.e., the 26 total cash price paid for a purchased, or monthly payments made 27 on a leased, vehicle.”). 28 The Complaint alleges facts sufficient to calculate the 8 1 mileage offset. In addition to providing the “approximate value” 2 of the vehicle, it alleges that Plaintiff first presented the car 3 for repairs for “failure to start requiring a jump start” on 4 September 10, 2024, at which time the vehicle had “approximately 5 24,689 miles on the odometer.” (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 6 at 4.) This allegation provides the number of miles driven 7 before Plaintiff first presented the vehicle for repair, as 8 required for the mileage-offset formula.3 See § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). 9 And courts have used the “approximate value” of a vehicle as the 10 basis for calculating the mileage offset.4 See, e.g., Larios v. 11 Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 2:25-cv-05095-AJR, 2025 WL 2402250, at 12 *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2025) (equating “approximate value” of 13 14 3 Defendant argues that the Complaint “does not make 15 unequivocally clear and certain which presentation was the first defect presentation relating to issues giving rise to the claim for 16 which two or more repair attempts occurred for the purposes of 17 calculating the mileage offset.” (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 12-13.) That argument lacks merit. To begin, as Plaintiff correctly 18 explains (Reply, ECF No. 15 at 4 n.3), the “unequivocally clear and certain” standard applies only to removal under § 1446(b)(3). See 19 Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. Further, the Complaint includes the mileage for each time Plaintiff presented the subject vehicle. 20 (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 12; see also Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 21 at 4.) That is sufficient to calculate the mileage offset. See Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 21-cv-03032-WHO, 2021 WL 22 2588977, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021) (allegation in complaint documenting when plaintiff first presented subject vehicle for 23 repair and what mileage was on odometer at that time was sufficient for calculating mileage offset). 24 25 4 Defendant contends that the “approximate value” is “particularly speculative here” because Plaintiff leased the 26 subject vehicle before buying it, citing Tecson v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-02918-FLA (PVC), 2025 WL 1504444 (C.D. Cal. 27 May 27, 2025). (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 10 n.5.) Because Plaintiff seeks recision of the purchase contract rather than the lease (Mot. 28 Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 at 4), that case is inapposite. 9 1 vehicle with “purchase price” and using that amount in offset 2 formula); Estrada, 2025 WL 842173, at *2 (finding defendant’s 3 challenge to use of “approximate value” of vehicle 4 “disingenuous,” using “approximate value” in offset formula, and 5 calculating offset). 6 True, the Complaint does not include values for the other 7 statutory offsets.5 It should have. See Schneider v. Ford Motor 8 Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that 9 estimated restitution amount did not account for values needed to 10 calculate required mileage offset and explaining that 11 consideration of mileage offset was “appropriate” because 12 estimate of amount in controversy must be reduced if “a specific 13 rule of law or measure of damages limits the amount of damages 14 recoverable” (citation omitted)); Ayad v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 15 No. 2:25-cv-4152-RAO, 2025 WL 2490849, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 16 2025) (finding in case involving section 871.27 offsets that 17 complaint that did not include values other than vehicle’s 18 “approximate value” and mileage offset was “indeterminate” 19 because it was “not clear whether the ‘approximate value’ in [it] 20 [wa]s the actual price paid or payable, and not some other value 21 that was included in the sales contract but was further 22 discounted”). But given the particular facts of this case, the 23 24 5 Plaintiff argues that section 871.27 “does not redefine 25 ‘actual damages’ or the offsets and deductions” and that it instead “reiterates the definition set forth in Civil Code section 1793.2, 26 subdivision (d)(2)(B) — namely, that actual damages are the ‘actual price paid or payable by the buyer’ of the vehicle.” (Reply, ECF 27 No. 15 at 5-6.) That argument ignores the statute’s plain text stating that the new offsets are to be included “in the calculation 28 of the actual price paid or payable.” § 871.27. 10 1 absence of those values is not outcome-determinative. Here, 2 Plaintiff’s car had an “approximate value of $62,114.36” at the 3 time of purchase (see Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-3 at 4), a 4 “relatively high purchase price in relation to the jurisdictional 5 threshold,” and thus it is “reasonable to assume” that the other 6 offsets “would not reduce Plaintiff’s actual damages . . . so 7 substantially that the amount in controversy would fall below the 8 jurisdictional minimum.” Larios, 2025 WL 2402250, at *6 (finding 9 that because subject vehicle had “relatively high purchase price 10 in relation to the jurisdictional threshold ($50,895), was less 11 than a year old at the time of first repair (purchased on May 12, 12 2023 with first repair in December of 2023), and had only 6,780 13 miles on the odometer,” it was “reasonable to assume” that the 14 other offsets “would not reduce Plaintiff’s actual damages . . . 15 so substantially that the amount in controversy would fall below 16 the jurisdictional minimum”); see also Schneider, 756 F. App’x at 17 701 (concluding that although estimate of amount in controversy 18 did not account for mileage offset, it was “reasonable to assume 19 that the [subject vehicles] did not lose nearly all of their 20 value after a few years of use” and that such reduction would not 21 be so substantial that amount in controversy would fall below 22 jurisdictional minimum). And Ayad, upon which Defendant relies 23 (Def.’s Suppl. Auth., ECF No. 16 at 2), did not cite or discuss 24 Schneider or Larios. 25 2. Civil penalties 26 The Complaint reflects that Plaintiff seeks civil penalties 27 in the amount of two times actual damages. (Mot. Remand, Ex. 1, 28 ECF No. 9-3 at 9.) As Defendant concedes (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 at 11 1 14), the maximum amount of civil penalties factor into the amount 2 in controversy. See Wang v. FCA US LLC, No. 8:24-cv-02060-JWH- 3 KES, 2025 WL 1218745, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (“The Ninth 4 Circuit routinely considers civil penalties when deciding whether 5 the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied, 6 including in Song-Beverly cases.” (citing Babasa v. LensCrafters, 7 Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007), & Morey v. Louis Vuitton 8 North Am., Inc., 561 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011))). Here, 9 Defendant argues only that the civil penalties were indeterminate 10 because the actual damages were speculative. (Opp’n, ECF No. 11 11 at 14.) True, an estimate of civil penalties may be uncertain 12 when the actual damages alleged in a complaint are indeterminate. 13 See, e.g., Woods v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 24-01594-MWF (PVCx), 14 2024 WL 4709973, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2024) (“Because 15 Defendant’s calculation of actual damages is speculative, so too 16 are its calculations of civil penalties.”). But as explained 17 above, the actual damages were determinable from the face of the 18 Complaint, and thus Defendant was required to calculate civil 19 penalties into the amount in controversy. See Kuxhausen, 707 20 F.3d at 1140. Applying simple multiplication, two times the 21 subject vehicle’s “approximate value” of $62,114.36 is 22 $124,288.72. When actual damages and civil penalties — not to 23 mention some amount of attorney’s fees — are added together, the 24 Complaint set forth a total amount in controversy well over the 25 statutory minimum.6 26 27 6 As the Court noted at the hearing, remand might be a closer call in a case involving a vehicle with a substantially lower 28 alleged approximate value. The Court takes no position on how it 12 1 B. Defendant’s Removal of the Action Was Untimely 2 Because the Complaint was determinate as to the amount in 3 controversy, Defendant was required to remove the action within 30-day deadline under § 1446(b) (1). See Harris, 425 F.3d at 5 692-93. As noted above, Defendant was personally served on May 612, 2025 (Mot. Remand, Enav Decl., ECF No. 9-1 9 6 & Ex. 2, ECF 9-4 at 2-3), and thus the 30-day deadline for removal under 8] S 1446(b) (1) expired on June 11. Defendant did not remove until July 1, 2025, 21 days after the applicable deadline. 10 | Accordingly, Defendant’s removal of this action was untimely, and 11 remand is proper. See Solarte v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. CV 23- 12 |} 9SS-MWF (MRWx), 2023 WL 4624986, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2023) 13 ] (finding that removal was untimely “[b]ecause it is clear from the face of the Complaint that diversity jurisdiction exists, 15 [so] Defendant was obligated, but failed, to remove this action 16 J} within thirty days of being served with the Complaint,” and 17 remanding) - 18 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 19 Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 20 GRANTED and this action is REMANDED to Los Angeles County 21 || Superior Court. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 patep: September 12, 2025 fi breonhlotl-~ JEAN ROSENBLUTH 25 U.S. Magistrate Judge 26 27 28 | would rule in such circumstances. 13