Albert Blake v. Frank A. Hall

668 F.2d 52, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15039
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedDecember 18, 1981
Docket80-1792
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 668 F.2d 52 (Albert Blake v. Frank A. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Albert Blake v. Frank A. Hall, 668 F.2d 52, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15039 (1st Cir. 1981).

Opinion

BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants, inmates at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution Walpole (Walpole), brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights class action alleging that the condi *54 tions of their confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, were sought.. Named as defendants were Frank A. Hall, former Commissioner of Correction, Larry R. Meachum, Commissioner of Correction at the time of trial, and Frederick A. Butterworth, former Superintendent of Walpole. The damages ease was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the three defendants.

The judge, a year after the verdict, issued a written opinion finding no constitutional violations and denying injunctive relief.

The main issue on appeal is whether the evidence of conditions at Walpole compelled a finding of cruel and unusual punishment either as to the entire institution or as to certain sections of it. The attack on the jury verdict is confined solely to the claim that plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. There is one related issue: whether the court should have amended its findings of fact and judgment and received new evidence in regard to a section of Walpole (New Man’s Section).

We start with defendants’ contention that the seventh amendment required the district judge to accept as binding the findings of fact made by the jury in reaching its verdict. The landmark ease in the joint law-equity trial area is Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 859 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). In Beacon Theatres, the Court stressed the importance of the jury as a fact-finding body and held that, although the complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, because the counterclaim demanded a jury trial of the factual issues, the jury issues had to be tried first. The Court was concerned that if the equitable issues were decided first by the trial judge, the defendant’s seventh amendment right to a full jury trial of the counterclaim might be foreclosed by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. “The controlling principle of the Beacon Theatres case is the desire to protect jury determination of common issues.” 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed.Prac. & Proc.Civil § 2338, at 136 (1971). The problem in this case is determining what issues were decided by the jury in reaching its verdict. The charge instructed the jury in effect as follows. In order to recover, plaintiffs had to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right by one of the defendants. Such deprivation had to be the result of deliberate conduct or the reckless failure to act. The jury was also instructed that if plaintiff had deliberately created or substantially contributed to causing the unsanitary conditions (garbage and filth, including human excrement on the floors and walls of the cell blocks), which they alleged were unconstitutional, they could not recover.

Under these instructions, which have not been appealed, the jury could have made three findings in reaching its verdict: (1) that there were no constitutional violations; (2) if there were unconstitutional conditions, they were not caused by the deliberate or reckless conduct of the defendants; and (3) if there were unconstitutional violations, they were caused or substantially caused by the plaintiffs themselves. The jury could, of course, have reached all three conclusions. But the general verdict of no liability precludes further analysis. The district judge was not bound by the jury verdict in determining whether equitable relief should issue because there was no way to determine what common issues were decided by the jury. 1

We turn now to the main issue of whether conditions at Walpole compelled a finding of cruel and unusual punishment either as to the institution or sections of it. We review the facts and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the defendants. Hawkins v. Hall, 644 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1981). And, “[fjindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of *55 the trial court to judge of the credibility the witness.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). of

Even in a prison setting, there are no rigid standards as to what does and does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Penal measures must be evaluated against “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency” and “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968), and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2570, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1977) , the Supreme Court held that the punishment must not be grossly disproportionate to the offense and must not offend society’s evolving sense of decency. This circuit has applied these two benchmarks for determining whether prison conditions violated the eighth amendment in Hawkins v. Hall, 644 F.2d at 917, and Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 413 (1st Cir. 1977).

The gravamen of the complaint is that the unsanitary, and filthy conditions of Walpole compounded by inadequate lighting, heating and ventilation, amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ evidence depicted Walpole as a charnel house out of the middle ages. Although defendants did not suggest that the prison was a rose garden, their evidence was that, while there was definite room for improvement, conditions did not violate eighth amendment standards.

Before summarizing the evidence, it is necessary to describe the prison. Walpole is not an old facility compared to many state prisons. It was opened in 1955 with a capacity for 666 inmates. At the time of trial, there were 580 prisoners; the average population is about 600.

There are thirteen cell blocks plus two small cell areas, the New Man’s Section and the infirmary. 2 Each inmate has his own cell which is furnished with a bed, bedding, mattress, table, chair, a sink with hot and cold running water and a toilet. The prisoners are classified into different groups and each group is assigned to separate cell block areas.

Blocks A 1-A 4 house medium-security inmates. There are a total of 261 cells.

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Bluebook (online)
668 F.2d 52, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15039, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/albert-blake-v-frank-a-hall-ca1-1981.