NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1054-24
ALBERT ANDERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent-Respondent. _________________________
Argued May 13, 2026 – Decided June 29, 2026
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PFRS No. xx6395.
Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader PC, attorneys; Samuel M. Gaylord, on the brief).
Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, argued the cause for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, Legal Affairs Deputy Director, attorney; Thomas R. Hower, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Albert Anderson appeals from a final agency decision by the Board of
Trustees ("Board"), Police and Fireman's Retirement System of New Jersey
("PFRS") that found he was not entitled to accidental disability retirement
benefits ("ADRB") under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). In doing so, the Board adopted
the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), finding Anderson's
disability claim was not "undesigned and unexpected." We affirm.
I.
Anderson served as a police officer with the Woodbury City Police
Department for eighteen years, following two years of prior service with the
Wildwood Crest Department. He successfully completed police academy
training, where he learned arrest procedures and use of force, and consistently
met the physical and in-service training requirements. He was, however, noted
to have a history of cardiac issues, especially atrial fibrillation ,1 and his
condition was previously treated with cardiac ablation.
1 Atrial fibrillation, or an irregular heartbeat, is the most common form of heart arrhythmia and affects more than two-million people a year. See Prystowsky, E.N., Perspectives and Controversies in Atrial Fibrillation, 82 Amer. Jour. of Cardiology, (4A), 3I-8I, 3I (1998). This condition is evidenced when one or both atria, the upper chambers of the heart, quiver at faster-than-normal and/or erratic rates. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 26th Edition (1995). A-1054-24 2 On April 17, 2018, while working a 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. shift, Anderson
responded to a reported robbery at a local gas station and interviewed the victim.
The victim explained that earlier that day he offered a reward to two males for
the return of his stolen bicycle. When the individuals returned the bicycle, they
demanded additional money. When the victim refused, he was assaulted by the
suspects who fled the scene.
The victim provided Anderson and other responding officers with
descriptions of the suspects and identified one of the perpetrators by name.
Anderson then observed an individual matching that description fleeing through
backyards. Anderson pursued the suspect and apprehended him after a brief foot
chase and following a physical struggle.
During it, Anderson experienced severe pain and a heavy sensation in his
chest. He immediately notified his supervisor of this medical condition and was
transported to the hospital. Since that date, he was unable to return to work
because he could not meet the physical requirements of his position. He
currently remains under medical care.
Anderson filed for ADRB and asserted that as a direct result of the foot
pursuit of the suspect, he suffered atrial fibrillation which prevented him from
performing his regular or assigned duties. The Board denied Anderson's
A-1054-24 3 application for ADRB and awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits
instead finding Anderson was "totally and permanently disabled from the
performance of his regular and assigned job duties. . . ." It also concluded the
"disability claim is the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing
disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work effort." Therefore, the
Board determined the incident that caused Anderson's disability was "not
undesigned and unexpected" and "[did] not qualify as a traumatic event that
would entitle [him] to [ADRB]."
Anderson appealed and the matter was referred to the Office of
Administrative Law for a hearing where Anderson was the only witness to
testify. The ALJ affirmed the Board's denial. The Board later adopted the ALJ's
decision as a final administrative determination which Anderson now appeals.
He contends his injury occurred during a violent, unplanned confrontation
that was both undesigned and unexpected, and not part of his routine duties. He
asserts that this incident qualifies as a traumatic event, entitling him to receive
ADRB.
II.
"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re
A-1054-24 4 Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)); see also Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police &
Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995). "An agency's determination on the
merits 'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone
v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting
Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).
"Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful
and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of
circumstances. Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J.
183, 204-05 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Bayshore Sewerage Co. v.
Dep't Env't Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)). When we consider
whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable , we
examine: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2)
whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record;
and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the "agency clearly erred in
reaching [its] conclusion." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting
In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)). To determine whether an agency's
A-1054-24 5 decision is supported by substantial evidence, we may not "engage in an
independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first
instance." In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157
N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).
"Like all of the public retirement systems, the PFRS includes provisions
for the grant of ordinary and accidental disability benefits." Mount v. Bd. of
Trs., Police and Fireman's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 419 (2018) (quoting Patterson
v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 42 (2008)). "A PFRS member
can qualify for ordinary disability benefits if [the member] is disabled for any
reason; the disability need not have a work connection." Ibid. However, "[t]o
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1054-24
ALBERT ANDERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent-Respondent. _________________________
Argued May 13, 2026 – Decided June 29, 2026
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PFRS No. xx6395.
Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader PC, attorneys; Samuel M. Gaylord, on the brief).
Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, argued the cause for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, Legal Affairs Deputy Director, attorney; Thomas R. Hower, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Albert Anderson appeals from a final agency decision by the Board of
Trustees ("Board"), Police and Fireman's Retirement System of New Jersey
("PFRS") that found he was not entitled to accidental disability retirement
benefits ("ADRB") under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). In doing so, the Board adopted
the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), finding Anderson's
disability claim was not "undesigned and unexpected." We affirm.
I.
Anderson served as a police officer with the Woodbury City Police
Department for eighteen years, following two years of prior service with the
Wildwood Crest Department. He successfully completed police academy
training, where he learned arrest procedures and use of force, and consistently
met the physical and in-service training requirements. He was, however, noted
to have a history of cardiac issues, especially atrial fibrillation ,1 and his
condition was previously treated with cardiac ablation.
1 Atrial fibrillation, or an irregular heartbeat, is the most common form of heart arrhythmia and affects more than two-million people a year. See Prystowsky, E.N., Perspectives and Controversies in Atrial Fibrillation, 82 Amer. Jour. of Cardiology, (4A), 3I-8I, 3I (1998). This condition is evidenced when one or both atria, the upper chambers of the heart, quiver at faster-than-normal and/or erratic rates. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 26th Edition (1995). A-1054-24 2 On April 17, 2018, while working a 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. shift, Anderson
responded to a reported robbery at a local gas station and interviewed the victim.
The victim explained that earlier that day he offered a reward to two males for
the return of his stolen bicycle. When the individuals returned the bicycle, they
demanded additional money. When the victim refused, he was assaulted by the
suspects who fled the scene.
The victim provided Anderson and other responding officers with
descriptions of the suspects and identified one of the perpetrators by name.
Anderson then observed an individual matching that description fleeing through
backyards. Anderson pursued the suspect and apprehended him after a brief foot
chase and following a physical struggle.
During it, Anderson experienced severe pain and a heavy sensation in his
chest. He immediately notified his supervisor of this medical condition and was
transported to the hospital. Since that date, he was unable to return to work
because he could not meet the physical requirements of his position. He
currently remains under medical care.
Anderson filed for ADRB and asserted that as a direct result of the foot
pursuit of the suspect, he suffered atrial fibrillation which prevented him from
performing his regular or assigned duties. The Board denied Anderson's
A-1054-24 3 application for ADRB and awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits
instead finding Anderson was "totally and permanently disabled from the
performance of his regular and assigned job duties. . . ." It also concluded the
"disability claim is the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing
disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work effort." Therefore, the
Board determined the incident that caused Anderson's disability was "not
undesigned and unexpected" and "[did] not qualify as a traumatic event that
would entitle [him] to [ADRB]."
Anderson appealed and the matter was referred to the Office of
Administrative Law for a hearing where Anderson was the only witness to
testify. The ALJ affirmed the Board's denial. The Board later adopted the ALJ's
decision as a final administrative determination which Anderson now appeals.
He contends his injury occurred during a violent, unplanned confrontation
that was both undesigned and unexpected, and not part of his routine duties. He
asserts that this incident qualifies as a traumatic event, entitling him to receive
ADRB.
II.
"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re
A-1054-24 4 Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)); see also Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police &
Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995). "An agency's determination on the
merits 'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone
v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting
Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).
"Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful
and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of
circumstances. Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J.
183, 204-05 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Bayshore Sewerage Co. v.
Dep't Env't Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)). When we consider
whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable , we
examine: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2)
whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record;
and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the "agency clearly erred in
reaching [its] conclusion." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting
In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)). To determine whether an agency's
A-1054-24 5 decision is supported by substantial evidence, we may not "engage in an
independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first
instance." In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157
N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).
"Like all of the public retirement systems, the PFRS includes provisions
for the grant of ordinary and accidental disability benefits." Mount v. Bd. of
Trs., Police and Fireman's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 419 (2018) (quoting Patterson
v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 42 (2008)). "A PFRS member
can qualify for ordinary disability benefits if [the member] is disabled for any
reason; the disability need not have a work connection." Ibid. However, "[t]o
be eligible for greater benefits under the accidental disability provision . . . a
PFRS member must satisfy N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)'s more rigorous
requirements." Ibid.
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 specifically sets forth the requirements for a PFRS
member to receive ADRB:
Any member may be retired on an accidental disability retirement allowance, provided that the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties.
A-1054-24 6 [N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1).]
To establish entitlement to ADRB, an applicant must prove:
1. That [they are] permanently and totally disabled;
2. As a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. Identifiable as to time and place,
b. Undesigned and unexpected, and
c. Caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
3. That the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. That the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; an[d]
5. That the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
[Richardson v. Board of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 212-213 (2007).]2
2 The Court also discussed other factual scenarios to provide guidance. For example, "a police officer who has a heart attack while chasing a suspect has not experienced a traumatic event," because there, "work effort, alone or in combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury." Richardson, 192 N.J. at 213. Conversely, "the same police officer, permanently and totally disabled during the chase because of a fall, has suffered a traumatic event." Ibid. Additionally, "the gym teacher who develops arthritis from the repetitive effect of his [or her] work over the years has not suffered a traumatic event," as "[his
A-1054-24 7 The Court held the "undesigned and unexpected" prong requires either "an
unintended external event" or "an unanticipated consequence" of an intended
event that "is extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Id. at 201
(quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). "Injury by ordinary work effort," when "the
employee was doing [their] usual work in the usual way" does not qualify. Ibid.
(quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). In short, "work effort itself . . . cannot be the
traumatic event." Id. at 211.
The Court emphasized the "polestar" of the inquiry was "whether, during
the regular performance of [the petitioner's] job an unexpected happening, not
the result of pre-existing disease along or in combination with the work, has
occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the
member." Id. at 214.
The determination of whether an incident is undesigned and unexpected
cannot "[be] resolved merely be reviewing the member's job description and the
scope of his or her training." Mount, 233 N.J. at 427. While "those
considerations may weigh strongly for or against an award of accidental
or her]disability is the result of a degenerative disease and is not related to an event that is identifiable as to time and place." Ibid. "On the contrary, the same gym teacher who trips over a riser and is injured has satisfied the standard." Ibid. A-1054-24 8 disability benefits," a reviewing court "must carefully consider not only the
member's job responsibility and training, but all aspects of the event itself."
Ibid.
The ALJ found, and the Board agreed, that Anderson experienced cardiac
issues while attempting to detain, restrain, and handcuff the suspect on his own,
which he successfully accomplished. Although Anderson claims that the
incident was undesigned and unexpected because of the suspect's refusal to
comply and his combative behavior, given Anderson's training, years of
experience, and the demands of his position, the incident cannot, under our
jurisprudence, be considered undesigned and unexpected.
Richardson and subsequent cases clarify that ordinary work effort, even if
strenuous, does not constitute a traumatic event unless it is accompanied by an
unintended external event or an extraordinary consequence. 192 N.J. at 202.
See Moran v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J. Super. 346,
351 (App. Div. 2014) (A firefighter's injury caused by unusual circumstances
including trapped victims and a lack of assistance and equipment represented an
undesigned and unexpected event to support the award of ADRB.); Brooks v.
Bd. of Trs., Dep't of Treasury, 425 N.J. Super. 277, 283 (App. Div. 2012) (A
custodian experienced an undesigned and unexpected accident when a weight
A-1054-24 9 bench dropped on its side and caused the full weight of the equipment to fall on
him.).
In contrast, Anderson's injury stemmed from a pre-existing condition for
which he had previously received medical intervention that may have been
exacerbated by his routine job activity, consistent with his responsibilities as a
police officer. Pursuit and restraint of fleeing and combative suspects were
routine parts of Anderson's duties despite each incident presenting unique and
unpredictable challenges. Nevertheless, Anderson was fully trained and
prepared for these contingencies. There was nothing out of the norm,
extraordinary, or unusual about the activity that ultimately led to Anderson's
disability. In sum, the facts neither demonstrate an intended external event nor
an extraordinary circumstance that might be considered unusual and that would
otherwise permit an ADRB award.
We are satisfied the Board's final determination relied on credible
evidence in the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. The
ALJ's findings, adopted by the Board, were fully supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record and according to the pertinent jurisprudence. We
decline to disturb the Board's decision.
Affirmed.
A-1054-24 10