Albatross Tanker Corp. v. S.S. Amoco Delaware

415 F.2d 692
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedSeptember 17, 1969
DocketNos. 508, 509, Docket Nos. 33035, 33036
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 415 F.2d 692 (Albatross Tanker Corp. v. S.S. Amoco Delaware) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Albatross Tanker Corp. v. S.S. Amoco Delaware, 415 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1969).

Opinion

MOORE, Circuit Judge:

This is a case where two ships collided on a clear night as they were rounding the northern tip of Staten Island. The Court below found that the ships, traveling in opposing directions and proceeding on courses which plotted concentric arcs, would have passed successfully starboard-to-starboard if the S.S. Amoco Delaware {Amoco), owned by appellant American Oil Company (American), had not suddenly swerved sharply to starboard, entering the Anchorage Ground where the S.S. Erna Elizabeth {Erna), owned by the Albatross Tanker Corporation (Albatross), was moving up the inner are, and rammed her starboard side. American appeals from this determination and assigns five errors on appeal.

American alleges (1) that the Erna failed to post and keep a proper lookout and the District Court erred in not so holding; (2) that the Court erred in failing to condemn the Erna for violating her statutory duty to stay to her right when navigating in a narrow channel— the Narrow Channel Rule; (3) that the Court committed error in holding that no whistle signal was required of the Erna when she spotted the Amoco; (4) that the Court erred in failing to condemn the Erna for negligently delaying her astern engine maneuver after she had sounded her own danger signal; and (5) that the Amoco had sighted the Erna at 4:27 and had signaled an intent to pass the Erna port-to-port.

The facts found by the trial court, supported by the evidence, are as follows. The collision occurred on November 25, 1962, on the Anchorage Ground off Tompkinsville, Staten Island. It was a clear night and the required navigation lights of both vessels, which were tankers, were set and burning brightly. The Amoco left her berth in Newark, New Jersey at about 3:00 a. m. on the morning of the collision, destined for Port Arthur, Texas. Shortly before the collision, she was proceeding outbound in an easterly direction through Kill van KuII, intending to turn southward into the channel. The Erna pulled up anchor the same morning at about 4:00 a. m. from her anchorage off Stapleton, Staten Island and proceeded in a northerly direction up the coast of Staten Island, always remaining in the Anchorage Ground and intending to enter the Kill van Kull by keeping close to the Staten Island shore.

The Amoco first sighted the Erna and sounded a one-blast signal at 4:29 a. m.1 At this point, the Erna was on the Anchorage Ground proceeding in a northerly direction and was just passing an anchored vessel named the Excelsior. The Erna was traveling on an arc paralleling the shore of Staten Island, [694]*694heading into the Kills.2 The one-blast signal from the Amoco at 4:29 signified Amoco’s intention to direct her course to her own starboard and pass the Erna port-to-port. If each ship had adhered to the course she was on at 4:29, a starboard-to-starboard passing would have been effected without difficulty. A port-to-port passing, on the other hand, would have been highly dangerous if not impossible. The Erna sounded a danger signal which rejected the Amoco’s proposal for a port-to-port passing. The Erna properly and promptly rejected this proposal by sounding a danger signal. The Amoco also sounded a danger signal. At this point, there was no likelihood of collision if each vessel had maintained its course, but the Amoco put her engines astern and veered sharply to starboard. The Erna promptly then put her engines astern, but the Amoco entered the Anchorage Ground and collided there with the Ema.

American contends that the Erna failed to post a proper lookout. This argument is based largely on American’s version of what such a lookout could and should have seen — a version which was rejected by the trial court after full consideration of the conflicting evidence. The trial court reasonably found that all the information that could have been reported by a lookout had been seen and heard on Erna’s bridge in ample time. Any lack of proper lookout, therefore, was not causally related to the collision.

American next claims that the Erna failed to comply with the Narrow Channel Rule, 33 U.S.C. § 210. But the Narrow Channel Rule did not apply to the Erna while she was in the Anchorage. Designated anchorage grounds are not part of the channel. The George F. Randolph, 200 F. 96, 97 (2 Cir.). The Court below found that the Erna “remained on the Anchorage Ground at all times” and “never navigated within a narrow channel.” This finding is not challenged by American.

Furthermore, the Narrow Channel Rule applies only when “it is safe and practicable.” The Court below accepted the Erna’s expert testimony that the Ema’s intended course through the Anchorage “was the most seamanlike and safe under the circumstances.” Additionally, to have gone directly into the main ship channel after leaving anchor would have involved the risk of crossing traffic lanes twice and, more importantly, potentially of grounding at the northern edge of the Constable Hook reach.

American alleges that if the situation was a starboard-to-starboard passing, then the Erna should have sounded a two-blast signal. 33 U.S.C. § 203; 33 C.F.R. § 80.03. Yet as this Court stated in New York, N. H. & H. R. v. B. & O., 236 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1956), vessels moving parallel to each other on their starboard sides “need not reach an agreement before proceeding with a starboard-to-starboard passing.” Id. at 231. The trial court found that the vessels were moving in parallel. Pilot Rule 80.2, 33 C.F.R. § 80.2, directs “Steam vessels are forbidden to use what has become technically known among pilots as ‘cross signals,’ that is, answering one whistle with two, and answering two whistles with one.” The Erna’s response to the Amoco’s one-blast signal — that is, Erna’s danger signal — was a rejection of Amoco’s port-to-port passing proposal, which, in effect, amounted [695]*695to a signal indicating the Etna’s intention to pass starboard-to-starboard. See Griffin on Collisions, at page 85. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Texas Co., 98 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1938). American argues that after sounding her danger signal, the Erna was under a duty to sound a two-blast signal for a starboard-to-starboard passage. However, the district court found that until the Amoco’s last-minute swing to starboard “collision was not imminent and that the vessels would have passed starboard-to-starboard had not the Amoco continued swinging sharply to the right.” This and other findings led to the court’s factual conclusion that “the proximate cause of the collision was the Amoco’s

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
415 F.2d 692, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/albatross-tanker-corp-v-ss-amoco-delaware-ca2-1969.