Alava v. Buffalo Airport Car Rental

Opinion

Alava v Buffalo Airport Car Rental

2026 NY Slip Op 04830

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Alex Xavier Alava, appellant,

v

Buffalo Airport Car Rental, etc., et al., respondents.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2025-01099, (Index No. 517728/18)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Barry E. Warhit

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Cherny & Podolsky, PLLC, Brooklyn, NY (Mari Milorava-Kelman of counsel), for appellant.

Gallo Vitucci Klar LLP, New York, NY (C. Briggs Johnson and Nate Drexler of counsel), for respondents.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Larry D. Martin, J.), dated November 14, 2024. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In August 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained on May 26, 2018, when a vehicle in which he was a passenger crashed into a traffic pole in Brooklyn. The vehicle allegedly was operated by the defendant John Doe and owned by the defendant Buffalo Airport Car Rental, LLC (hereinafter Buffalo). The defendants interposed an answer to the complaint in which they asserted, inter alia, as their fourteenth affirmative defense, that they could not be vicariously liable for the accident pursuant to the Graves Amendment (see 49 USC § 30106).

The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, among other things, a copy of the rental agreement for the vehicle between Buffalo and an individual who is not a party to this action, which provided, in pertinent part, that the rental period commenced on April 27, 2018, and concluded on May 4, 2018 (hereinafter the rental agreement). The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense. In an order dated November 14, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion. The plaintiff appeals.

"Under the Graves Amendment (49 USC § 30106), the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle cannot be held liable for personal injuries resulting from the use of such vehicle if the [*2]owner (i) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, and (ii) engaged in no negligence or criminal wrongdoing" (Bravo v Vargas, 113 AD3d 579, 580; see Ballatore v HUB Truck Rental Corp., 83 AD3d 978, 979). "The Graves Amendment does not apply where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to hold a vehicle owner liable for the alleged failure to maintain a rented vehicle" (Olmann v Neil, 132 AD3d 744, 745; see Casine v Wesner, 165 AD3d 749, 749-750). Thus, in order to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, the defendants were required to show (1) that Buffalo owned the vehicle, (2) that it engaged in the business of leasing or renting motor vehicles, (3) that the accident occurred during the period of the lease or rental, and (4) that there is no triable issue of fact as to the plaintiff's allegation that negligent maintenance contributed to the accident (see Carrera v Prophete, 240 AD3d 655, 656; Kurtaj v Borax Paper Prods., Inc., 231 AD3d 939, 941).

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, the rental agreement. However, the date of the subject accident does not fall within the date range for the rental period for the subject vehicle listed on the rental agreement, and the defendants did not submit evidence showing that the rental agreement was extended beyond the projected return date (see Alfaro v Lavacca, 186 AD3d 1591, 1592-1593; Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 129 AD3d 888, 892; cf. Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 178 AD3d 1006, 1012). Moreover, the defendants failed to submit any evidence to demonstrate that Buffalo did not negligently maintain the vehicle (see Caldeira v EAN Holdings, LLC, 240 AD3d 654, 655; Casine v Wesner, 165 AD3d at 750). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

However, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense. CPLR 3211(b) provides that "[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit." "When moving to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the affirmative defenses are without merit as a matter of law because they either do not apply under the factual circumstances of [the] case, or fail to state a defense" (Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d 971, 974 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Diversified Building Co., LLC v Nader Enters., LLC, 243 AD3d 542, 543). "On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(b), the court should apply the same standard it applies to a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the factual assertions of the defense will be accepted as true" (Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d at 974 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "If there is any doubt as to the availability of a defense, it should not be dismissed" (Blachowicz v City of New York, 241 AD3d 1513, 1516 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the defendants' fourteenth affirmative defense was without merit as a matter of law (see Amsterdam Tobacco Co., Inc. v Harold Levinson Assoc., LLC, 241 AD3d 469, 469-470).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

BARROS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court