Alanna Zabel; AZ I AM, Inc. v. Lauren Sanchez; The Collective Book Studio LLC; Simon & Schuster LLC

Opinion

7 JS-6

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11

12 Case No.: 2:25-cv-05558-MEMF-E Alanna Zabel; AZ I AM, Inc.,

13 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 14 MOTION TO DISMISS, REQUEST FOR v. JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND EVIDENTIARY 15 OBJECTION [DKT. NOS. 18, 18-1, 26]

16 Lauren Sanchez; The Collective Book Studio 17 LLC; Simon & Schuster LLC, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Request for Judicial Notice, and 22 Evidentiary Objection. Dkt. Nos. 18, 18-1, 26. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS 23 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Request for Judicial Notice, and Evidentiary Objection (Dkt. Nos. 24 18, 18-1, 26). 25 26 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Allegations1 3 Plaintiff Alanna Zabel is a yoga instructor and children’s book author. 1AC ¶¶ 22, 37. Zabel 4 met Lauren Sanchez at one of her yoga classes. Id. ¶ 22. Zabel and Sanchez later became close 5 friends. See id. ¶¶ 23, 25. In 2008, Sanchez and Zabel discussed Zabel helping Sanchez write a 6 children’s book about a fly remaining stuck on a helicopter windshield for the entire flight. See id. ¶¶ 7 27, 48. In 2009, Sanchez signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement with Zabel’s business AZ I AM, Inc. 8 to discuss various business partnerships with Zabel, which included writing and publishing 9 children’s books. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 49. Zabel has gifted several of her children’s books to Sanchez. Id. ¶ 10 47. Zabel and Sanchez had a falling out in 2009. See id. ¶¶ 33-35. 11 In December 2022, Zabel wrote and published a children’s book Dharma Kitty Goes to Mars, 12 which “centers on Pratya, an AZ I AM Girl from India who is smart, focused, and loves science. In 13 the story, Pratya is unintentionally launched into space with her pet cat, Dharma Kitty. The book 14 teaches children to control their reactions and manage their anxieties.” Id. ¶ 42, 54. Before Zabel 15 published Dharma Kitty, Zabel reached out to Sanchez sometime earlier in 2022 to discuss her book 16 concept of Dharma Kitty and their prior business partnership. Id. ¶ 52. Zabel also reached out to Jeff 17 Bezos, Sanchez’s partner at the time, and was told Bezos received the email. Id. ¶ 53. 18 In September 2024, Sanchez authored a children’s book titled The Fly Who Flew to Space 19 that was published by The Collective Book Studio and distributed by Simon & Schuster. Id. ¶¶ 56- 20 57. Sanchez claims the inspiration for this children’s book came from her experience with a fly that 21 flew with her on a helicopter ride, and the story concerns a fly who goes to space. Id. ¶ 56. Zabel 22 alleges that “the major plot points and overall story arc of [Sanchez’s The Fly Who Flew to Space 23 and Zabel’s Dharma Kitty Goes to Mars] are nearly exactly the same.” See id. ¶¶ 61-62, 66-71. 24 / / / 25

26 1 The following factual background is derived from the allegations in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, 27 Dkt. No. 12 (“1AC”), except where otherwise indicated. For the purposes of this Motion, the Court treats these factual allegations as true, but at this stage of the litigation, the Court makes no finding on the truth of 28 1 II. Procedural History 2 On September 17, 2024, Plaintiff Alanna Zabel filed her first action against Defendant 3 Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, asserting claims for (1) 4 intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) theft of intellectual property, and (3) unlawful use of 5 Plaintiff’s intellectual property under Desny v. Wilder. See Ex. C, Dkt. No. 18-4; 1AC ¶ 11. For the 6 state action claim of theft of intellectual property, Zabel alleged that Sanchez “used [Zabel’s] book 7 concept without [Zabel’s] consent or authorization,” and Sanchez’s book contained “over 60% of 8 similar content and story as the book concept [Zabel] had shared.” See Ex. C ¶¶ 12, 21, 28-31, Dkt. 9 No. 18-4. Zabel then moved to dismiss this state action eight days later on September 25, 2024. See 10 Ex. D, Dkt. No. 18-5; see also 1AC ¶ 13. 11 On December 13, 2024, Zabel filed a second action against Sanchez in the Central District of 12 California, alleging claims of (1) Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, (2) Desny Claim 13 (Theft of Ideas), (3) Unfair Business Practices, and (4) Unjust Enrichment. See Ex. E, Dkt. No. 18-6; 14 see also 1AC ¶ 14. Zabel alleged that Sanchez used “[Zabel’s] book concept without [Zabel’s] 15 consent or authorization,” and that the infringing work “contains well over 60% of similar content 16 and story” as Zabel’s copyrighted book that Zabel had shared with Sanchez prior to publication. See 17 Ex. E ¶¶ 21, 30-31, 40-43, Dkt. No. 18-6. Zabel then moved to dismiss this federal action on January 18 24, 2025, and the Court issued an order granting the dismissal without prejudice on January 16, 19 2025. See Ex. H, Dkt. No. 18-9; Ex. I, Dkt. No. 18-10. 20 Now, on June 18, 2025, Plaintiffs Alanna Zabel and AZ I AM, Inc. (“AZ I AM”) filed a 21 complaint against Defendants Lauren Sanchez, the Collective Book Studio LLC (“Collective”), and 22 Simon & Schuster LLC (all defendants collectively referred to as “Defendants”), alleging claims of 23 (1) Copyright Infringement as to all Defendants and (2) Breach of Contract as to Defendant Sanchez. 24 See Dkt. No. 1. On July 2, 2025, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to bring only one claim of 25 Copyright Infringement as to the same Defendants in the original complaint. See Dkt. No. 12 26 (“1AC”). 27 On August 6, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended 28 Complaint. Dkt. No. 18 (“Motion”). Defendants also filed a Request for Judicial Notice on that same 1 day. Dkt. No. 18-1 (“RJN”). On August 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. Dkt. No. 22 2 (“Opposition”). On August 22, 2025, Defendants filed their reply. Dkt. No. 25 (“Reply”). And on 3 that same day, Defendants also filed an evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Alanna Zabel 4 (Dkt. No. 22-1) submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their Opposition. Dkt. No. 26 (“Evidentiary 5 Objection”). Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the Evidentiary Objection.2 6 REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (DKT. NO. 18-1) 7 I. Applicable Law 8 A court may judicially notice facts that: “(1) [are] generally known within the trial court’s 9 territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 10 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Under this standard, courts may judicially 11 notice “undisputed matters of public record,” but generally may not notice “disputed facts stated in 12 public records.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 13 grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). 14 On a motion to dismiss, courts are generally prohibited from “consider[ing] any material 15 beyond the pleadings.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) 16 (quoting Lee, 250 F.3d at 688). Courts generally only consider the complaint and other materials 17 “submitted with and attached to the Complaint.” Id. at 999. Documents not attached to the 18 complaint—including documents that might otherwise be subject to judicial notice—may only be 19 considered if: “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s 20 claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document.” Id. (citing Marder v. Lopez, 450 21 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006)). 22 II. Discussion 23 A. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice Shall be Granted. 24 In support of their Motion, Defendants request the Court judicially notice nine (9) 25 documents. See RJN. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ request for judicial notice. See generally 26

27 2 The Court grants Defendants’ Evidentiary Objection as Plaintiffs did not file an Opposition and thus 28 1 Opposition. The documents are listed below (with descriptions based on Defendants’ descriptions of 2 the documents): 3 1. Exhibit A – A true and correct copy of Ms. Sanchez’s work The Fly Who Flew To Space 4 (a hard copy has been lodged with the Court); 5 2. Exhibit B – A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s work Dharma Kitty Goes To Mars (a 6 hard copy has been lodged with the Court); 7 3. Exhibit C – Complaint filed on September 17, 2024 in the Superior Court of California 8 for the County of Los Angeles, District of Santa Monica, in the action Alanna Zabel v. 9 Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, Case No. 24SMCV04463; 10 4. Exhibit D – Request for Dismissal filed on September 25, 2024 in the action Alanna 11 Zabel v. Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, Case No. 24SMCV04463; 12 5. Exhibit E – Complaint filed on December 13, 2024 in the United States District Court for 13 the Central District of California, in the action Alanna Zabel v. Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, 14 Case No. 2:24-cv-10764 – FLA (SSCX); 15 6. Exhibit F – Subpoena to Produce Documents, Information, or Objects or to Permit 16 Inspection of Premises in a Civil Action to the Collective Book Studio, Inc. issued on 17 January 7, 2025 in the action Alanna Zabel v. Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, Case No. 2:24- 18 cv-10764 – FLA (SSCX); 19 7. Exhibit G – Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time Pursuant to Rule 6(b) filed on 20 January 12, 2025 in the action Alanna Zabel v. Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, Case No. 2:24- 21 cv-10764 – FLA (SSCX); 22 8. Exhibit H – Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal filed on January 14, 2025, in the action 23 Alanna Zabel v. Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, Case No. 2:24-cv-10764 – FLA (SSCX); 24 9. Exhibit I – Order Granting Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal filed on January 16, 2025, in 25 the action Alanna Zabel v. Wendy (Lauren) Sanchez, Case No. 2:24-cv-10764 – FLA 26 (SSCX). 27 See generally RJN. 28 1 Exhibits A and B are copies of the works at issue in this copyright action, and they are 2 referred to in the First Amended Complaint. See 1AC ¶¶ 61-71. Exhibits A and B are thus 3 incorporated by reference, so the Court will take judicial notice to them both. Exhibits C through I 4 are public records, where its existence and contents (i.e., the fact that this document exists and that it 5 contains the words in the document) cannot reasonably be disputed, and thus the Court will take 6 judicial notice. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice as to all 7 documents, Exhibits A-I. 8 MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. NO. 18) 9 I. Applicable Law 10 Defendants bring their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek to dismiss a complaint for 12 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 13 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 14 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 16 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 17 the misconduct alleged.” Id. Labels, conclusions, and “formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s 18 elements” are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. 19 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context- 20 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Generally, a court must accept the factual allegations in the pleadings as true 22 and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 918 23 (9th Cir. 2017); Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. But a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 24 couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 25 As a general rule, leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be freely granted unless it is 26 clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. 27 Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 / / / 1 II. Discussion 2 Defendants move to dismiss Zabel’s 1AC and her sole claim for copyright infringement. For 3 the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Zabel’s claims are barred by Rule 41(a) and 4 Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with prejudice.3

5 A. Zabel’s Voluntary Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(B) is an Adjudication on 6 the Merits That Bars the Third Action Against Sanchez. 7 Defendants contend that Zabel’s third action against Sanchez is barred under Rule 8 41(a)(1)(B)’s two-dismissal rule because it arises out of the same claims as the prior two dismissals. 9 See Motion at 14-15. Zabel contends that the two-dismissal rule does not apply because the dismissal 10 was not voluntary, and even if it was, it was under a limited circumstance where Rule 41(a)(1)(B) 11 should not apply. See Opposition at 4-9. 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(1)(B) states that “Unless the notice or stipulation 13 states otherwise, the [voluntary] dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously 14 dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of 15 dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). This is known as 16 the “two-dismissal rule.” “There are four requirements that must be met to trigger the two-dismissal 17 rule: (1) the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed an action in either state or federal court, (2) thereafter the 18 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed a second action pending in federal court, (3) the two dismissals 19 concerned the same claim, and (4) the plaintiff seeks to raise the twice-dismissed claim again in 20 federal court.” Rose Ct., LLC v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 119 F.4th 679, 685 (9th Cir. 2024). 21 The two-dismissal rule was adopted to “‘limit a plaintiff’s ability to dismiss an action’ and ‘curb 22 abuses’ of ‘liberal state and federal procedural rules [that] often allowed dismissals or nonsuits as a 23 matter of right until the entry of the verdict.’” Id. at 685-86 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 24 Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990)). “This two-dismissal rule … was intended to prevent delays, costs, 25 26

27 3 Defendants contend that Plaintiff AZ I AM lacks standing to bring a copyright claim and must be dismissed. See Motion at 14. Plaintiffs agree, and thus the only Plaintiff remaining is Plaintiff Alanna Zabel. See 28 1 and harassment caused by plaintiffs securing numerous dismissals without prejudice.” Charles Alan 2 Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2368 (4th ed. 2023). 3 Here, Sanchez can satisfy all four requirements to bar Zabel’s third action against her. First, 4 it is undisputed that Zabel voluntarily dismissed an action in state court “in order to pursue her 5 [copyright] claim in federal court.” See 1AC ¶¶ 11-13. Second, Zabel voluntarily dismissed a second 6 action that was pending in federal court. See Ex. H, Dkt. No. 18-9; Ex. I, Dkt. No. 18-10 (noting that 7 Plaintiff’s Request for Dismissal was granted and the court dismissed the action without prejudice); 8 see also 1AC ¶ 18. Zabel does not contest that the second action was dismissed but argues that the 9 dismissal was not voluntary. See Opposition at 4-6. As discussed below, the Court finds it was 10 voluntary.4 11 Third, the two dismissals concerned the same claim. The Ninth Circuit adopted the “same 12 transactional approach [used for res judicata claims] for purposes of the two-dismissal rule and 13 [held] that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same 14 set of facts as the first action and the claim could have been or was raised in the preceding action.” 15 Rose Ct., LLC, 119 F.4th at 686. So, “the key question in determining whether the claims are the 16 same is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of fact.’” Id. (cleaned up). 17 Zabel first brought an action in state court for “Theft of Intellectual Property,” where Zabel alleged 18 that Defendant Sanchez “used [Zabel’s] book concept without [Zabel’s] consent or authorization,” 19 and Sanchez’s book contained “over 60% of similar content and story as the book concept [Zabel] 20 had shared.” See Ex. C ¶¶ 12, 21, 28-31, Dkt. No. 18-4. Zabel’s second action and first federal action 21 for copyright infringement arose out of the “same transactional nucleus of fact” as her state action, 22 where Zabel alleged the same facts of unauthorized use of Zabel’s book concept and Sanchez’s book 23 containing “60% of similar content and story” as Zabel’s book. See Ex. E ¶¶ 21, 30-31, 40-43, Dkt. 24 No. 18-6; see also Motion at 15. Therefore, the third element is satisfied. 25 26

27 4 Because Zabel argues the second action was not voluntary, it cannot be said that Zabel does not dispute that “she previously has field and voluntarily dismissed by notice two actions asserting the same claim at issue 28 1 Fourth, Zabel seeks to raise the same twice-dismissed claim again in this third action in 2 federal court. Zabel has stated in her Notice of Related Cases that the prior second federal action, 3 arose “from the same transaction, happening, or event and call[ed] for the determination of the same 4 or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact” as her first federal action, which as 5 discussed above, also had the “same transactional nucleus of fact” as the first state action. See Dkt. 6 No. 6; Rose Ct., LLC, 119 F.4th at 686. Therefore, the fourth element is satisfied. 7 Zabel contends that the second dismissal was not voluntary, so the second element was not 8 satisfied and thus the two-dismissal rule does not apply. See Opposition at 5-6. Defendants contend 9 that the dismissal was voluntary because the Court does not look to what motivated the dismissal and 10 Zabel’s argument goes against the purpose of Rule 41. See Reply at 6-7. 11 The Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he term ‘voluntary’ in Rule 41 means that the party is filing 12 the dismissal without being compelled by another party or the court. In other words, it does not mean 13 that other circumstances might not have compelled the dismissal or that the party desired it.” See 14 Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 F.2d at 726-27 (quoting Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 15 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988)). “[W]hile [Rule 41] delineates the 16 bases upon which the defendant may seek an involuntary dismissal, [a court] does not consider the 17 plaintiff's reasons for seeking a voluntary dismissal.” Id. at 727. 18 Here, Zabel was not compelled by Sanchez or any other Defendant to file the dismissal 19 because Zabel had “alternatives to filing for voluntary dismissal.” Id. at 727. Zabel claims that she 20 was compelled to file the dismissal because if she did not, then Sanchez was going to file an anti- 21 SLAPP motion, forcing Zabel to pay Sanchez’s attorneys’ fees. See Opposition at 5. However, Zabel 22 had the choice to respond to the anti-SLAPP motion and adjudicate the matter, as she is doing now 23 with this Motion. If Zabel prevailed, then she would not have had to pay attorneys’ fees. Zabel did 24 not allege any true misconduct by Sanchez that would show she was compelled. See 1AC ¶¶ 16-19. 25 Also, Zabel chose to propose a stipulation to stay the first federal proceedings, see Opposition at 7, 7 26 n.2., and then later moved on her own to stay those proceedings once the stipulation was denied by 27 Sanchez, see Ex. G, Dkt. No. 18-8. And the Court will not consider any other reason that Zabel may 28 claim as to why she was compelled to file the dismissal. See Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 1 F.2d at 727; see also Motion at 16. Thus, Zabel’s decision to file a dismissal was voluntary, so her 2 second dismissal must be deemed an adjudication on the merits under Rule 41(a)(1)(B). B. Zabel Has Not Established That Her Circumstances Constitute a 3 Circumstance Where Rule 41(a) Shall Not Be Literally Applied 4 Zabel also contends that even if the prior dismissals were voluntary, Rule 41(a) should not 5 apply because her circumstances qualify as a “limited circumstance,” where Rule 41(a) is not 6 literally applied. See Opposition at 6-9 (citing Axon Enter. Inc. v. Vievu LLC, No. 17-01632, 2018 7 WL 317289, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2018)). Defendants contend that there are no limited 8 circumstances to warrant such a finding. See Motion at 16-17; Reply at 7-8. 9 The Ninth Circuit in Lake held that “a few cases have suggested that, in certain limited 10 circumstances, the Rule [41] will not be literally applied.” Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 11 F.2d at 727. But the main case cited in support of that proposition, see Poloron Prod., Inc. v. 12 Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1976), was “limited to its facts 13 [of a jointly stipulated and consented to voluntary dismissal by all parties] and [did] not preclude 14 application of the bar where the voluntary dismissal [was] unilateral.” See id.; see also Lake at Las 15 Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 F.2d at 727. And the other case discussed, Sutton Place Dev. Co. v. 16 Abacus Mortg. Inv. Co., 826 F.2d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1987), was a dismissal by motion that did not 17 fall under the two-dismissal rule, “but it hardly suggest[ed] that dismissals which [fell] squarely 18 within the language of the Rule should be read out of it via an intent inquiry.” Id. (emphasis in 19 original). 20 Here, unlike the plaintiff in Poloron or Sutton, there was no jointly stipulated dismissal or 21 dismissal by motion to warrant a limited circumstance that disregards a literal application of Rule 22 41(a). See Reply at 7-8. Zabel has not pointed to any other factual situation that warrants a “limited 23 circumstance.” See Opposition at 6-9. 24 Zabel contends that her mistake of filing in the wrong court for her first action, because she 25 was pro se, contributed to such a “limited circumstance,” see Opposition at 6, but being pro se does 26 not excuse her from following the same procedures and rules. See Briones v. Riviera Hotel & 27 Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), 28 overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). And while 1 the circumstances of the L.A. wildfires are serious, see Opposition at 6, it is not a “limited 2 circumstance” because Zabel had time to voluntarily file a third-party subpoena on January 7, 2025, 3 and a request to stay the proceedings on January 11, 2025—all during the midst of the fires. See Ex. 4 G, Dkt. No. 18-8; Ex. F, Dkt. No. 18-7. Also, as discussed above, Sanchez’s threat of anti-SLAPP 5 motion and motion to dismiss is not a limited circumstance, but simply parties engaging in litigation. 6 See Opposition at 6-7. 7 Finally, Zabel’s cite to Axon for support of her “limited circumstance” argument is 8 unavailing. See Opposition at 8-9; see also Reply at 7-8. In Axon, even though defendant’s counsel 9 threatened a motion to dismiss prior to dismissal, the plaintiff’s dismissal fell between the “unilateral 10 actions seen in Lake and the stipulated voluntary dismissal in Poloron,” because the “parties met and 11 conferred, and Plaintiff provided Defendant with a draft version of its motion for voluntary dismissal 12 and requested its approval [and] Defendant responded affirmatively.” See Axon Enter. Inc., 2018 13 WL 317289, at *6. The plaintiff’s prior dismissals were thus seen as “neither purely unilateral nor 14 done for an improper purpose,” because there were no signs of harassment and there appeared to be 15 a “tacit agreement or understanding between counsel before Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its prior 16 actions.” See id. at *7. Therefore, the court applied the “limited circumstance” exception and did not 17 bar the plaintiff’s third action under Rule 41(a). Unlike the plaintiff in Axon, even though there were 18 also no signs of harassment, Zabel’s dismissal was purely unilateral and there was no “tacit 19 agreement or understanding” between the parties, as discussed above.5 20 Defendants have met the four requirements in Rose Court; Zabel cannot show that the 21 dismissal was compelled or warranted by a limited circumstance; and this Court declines to apply an 22 intent inquiry that the Ninth Circuit has said it should not. Accordingly, Zabel’s dismissal of her 23 second action was an adjudication on the merits that barred her third action against Sanchez. 24 / / /

25 26

27 5 It does not matter whether Axon ran foul of the rule that courts “do[] not consider the plaintiff’s reasons for seeking a voluntary dismissal” under Rule 41 or whether Rose Court overruled Axon (which it did not), see 28 1 C. ZCalabieml’ sA Vgaioinlastti oCno lolfe cRtiuvlee a4n1d(a S)(i1m)(oBn) &A gSacihnusts tSearn. chez Bars Her Copyright 2 Defendants contend that Rule 41(a) bars Zabel’s claim against Collective and Simon & 3 Schuster. See Motion at 18-19; see also Reply at 9. Zabel contends that Rule 41(a) does not bar her 4 claim against Collective and Simon & Schuster because neither Collective nor Simon & Schuster are 5 substantially the same as Sanchez, the dismissed named defendant. See Opposition at 9. 6 “Generally, only defendants named as a party in the prior two dismissed actions may invoke 7 the two-dismissal rule. But the rule applies even to a defendant who was not previously named if that 8 defendant is ‘substantially the same as the defendant dismissed.’” Rose Ct., LLC, 119 F.4th at 688 9 (quoting Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 F.2d at 728). 10 In Rose Court, even though U.S. Bank was not named as a defendant in the prior dismissed 11 action, U.S. Bank was barred by Rule 41(a) because the named defendant, SPS, and U.S. Bank were 12 seen as “substantially the same” since SPS and U.S. Bank were “closely connected based on their 13 agency relationship with respect to the loan, and the allegations against SPS implicated U.S. Bank’s 14 interests.” Id. And in Lake, even though the two Transneva defendants were not named in the prior 15 action, the Transneva defendants were also barred because the Transneva defendants and 16 Transcontinental, the named defendant and parent company of the Transneva defendants, were seen 17 as “substantially the same” since “the danger of harassment to the parent continued when the closely 18 related Transneva entities were sued.” Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 F.2d at 728. 19 Here, like the defendants in Rose Court and Lake, Sanchez, the named defendant in the prior 20 actions, and Collective and Simon & Schuster are “substantially the same.” First, even though Zabel 21 did not allege any direct agency relationship between Sanchez, Collective, and Simon & Schuster, 22 see 1AC ¶¶ 6-10, the allegations against Sanchez implicated Collective’s and Simon & Schuster’s 23 interests, because they are all sued for the same copyright infringement claim, see id. ¶¶ 89-91, 95- 24 99; see also Rose Ct., LLC, 119 F.4th at 688; Reply at 9. In fact, prior to the publication of Sanchez’s 25 book, Zabel sent cease-and-desist letters to Sanchez, Collective, and Simon & Schuster for the same 26 alleged copyright infringement. See 1AC ¶ 81; see also Motion at 19. Resolution of the copyright 27 claim as to Collective and Simon & Schuster will thus turn on substantially the same legal issues and 28 evidence as resolution for Sanchez’s claim because a copyright owner has the exclusive right “to do | | and to authorize” the reproduction and distribution of the copyrighted work, and can transfer or 2 | license the right, like to a publisher or distributor. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3); 3 Nimmer on 3 || Copyright § 10.02. 4 Second, there would still be a “danger of harassment” to Sanchez if Collective and Simon & 5 | Schuster were to be sued, because to prove that Collective and Simon & Schuster engaged in 6 || copyright infringement, Zabel would have to first succeed in showing that Sanchez engaged in 7 | copyright infringement. See Lake at Las Vegas Invs. Grp., Inc., 933 F.2d at 728; Motion at 19. Thus, 8 || the policies around Rule 41(a) would not be advanced if Zabel could continue to sue Collective and 9 | Simon & Schuster while being barred from suing Sanchez. Therefore, Collective and Simon & 10 || Schuster are “substantially the same” as Sanchez in the context of the prior two actions, and thus the 11 | two-dismissal rule applies to bar Zabel’s current copyright action against Collective and Simon & 12 || Schuster. 13 Accordingly, Rule 41(a) bars Zabel’s claims against Collective and Simon & Schuster.® 14 Ill. Conclusion 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 16 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 18) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s First 17 Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 18 2. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 18-1) is GRANTED. 19 3. Defendants’ Evidentiary Objection (Dkt. No. 26) is GRANTED. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Uf 23 Dated: March 25, 2026 24 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 25 United States District Judge 26

28 6 The Court need not address if Zabel sufficiently stated a copyright claim, because as discussed above, all claims against all Defendants are barred by Rule 41(a). See Motion at 20-30; Opposition at 10-15.