Alan Haag v. Wilson Properties, LLC, and John Owen Wilson (Appeal from Dale Circuit Court: CV-22-900063).

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: May 2, 2025
• Docket: SC-2024-0405
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: May 2, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0405 _________________________

Alan Haag

v.

Wilson Properties, LLC, and John Owen Wilson

Appeal from Dale Circuit Court (CV-22-900063)

WISE, Justice.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.

Stewart, C.J., and Mitchell and McCool, JJ., concur.

Sellers, J., concurs specially, with opinion. SC-2024-0405

SELLERS, Justice (concurring specially).

I fully concur with this Court's decision to affirm the Dale Circuit

Court's judgment granting an easement to Wilson Properties, LLC, and

John Owen Wilson ("the plaintiffs") to approximately .68 acres of land

owned by Alan Haag. However, I am concerned that granting an

easement may not provide the best long-term solution to the problem

presented here. While trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning

equitable remedies to achieve a fair outcome in land disputes, an

easement, in this case, might not be a wholly adequate solution.

I. Haag and Wilson Properties own adjoining tracts of land in Dale

County. Haag purchased his 850-acre tract of land in 2005 with his wife.

In 2019, following their divorce, she conveyed to him her interest in that

property through a quitclaim deed. Wilson Properties, of which Wilson is

the sole member and manager, purchased its 76-acre tract of land in

2015. The deeds for both properties contain general legal descriptions of

the tracts, and neither deed contains language that suggests that the

land had been surveyed by a professional land surveyor. Wilson

Properties never surveyed its property before purchasing it, and Wilson

did not survey that property before constructing a house on the land. He 2 SC-2024-0405

instead assumed that a series of red flags tied to trees marked the

boundary line between the two properties. Those flags had been placed

by the previous owner for tree-clearing purposes and did not relate to the

boundary line of the properties. Wilson also did not consult with Haag

about the location of the boundary line separating the properties.

Wilson worked in the construction industry and personally began

building a house. In 2016, he began excavating dirt to form the basement

of that new house. Wilson completed a three-story house in 2019. Over

the next few years, he also installed a variety of structures near the

house, including a new driveway, a fence post and gate, a water meter, a

septic system, a retaining wall, a generator shed, a concrete parking pad,

a propane tank, a solar-energy battery, and a side porch.

During that time, Haag was a permanent resident of Fort Myers,

Florida, but he would visit his property five to six times per year for

hunting and recreational purposes. Haag first noticed Wilson's work on

the land when he saw the excavation of the basement in 2016. Although

he was aware that the excavation might have been on his side of the

property line, he did not voice any concerns to Wilson at that time. Haag

visited the construction site multiple times over the next several years.

3 SC-2024-0405

Even though he and Wilson developed a friendship and socialized

together, Haag never brought up a boundary issue or any encroachment

problems with Wilson while Wilson was making improvements on the

land.

Haag first realized that Wilson had encroached on his property in

2022 when he was using Onx Hunt, a mobile application for hunters that

shows boundary lines overlayed onto aerial photographs of the land. Onx

Hunt appeared to show that a portion of Wilson's house had been built

on Haag's property. After Haag informed him of this, Wilson hired a land

surveyor to ascertain the true boundary line of the properties. The survey

showed that some of Wilson's improvements had in fact been made on

Haag's property.

II.

In June 2022, Wilson Properties, and Wilson commenced an action

in the Dale Circuit Court seeking, among other things, to quiet title to

the contested land, a declaration of Wilson Properties' constructive title

to the contested land, and a permanent injunction to prevent Haag from

disclaiming Wilson Properties' interest in the contested land. In

response, Haag filed a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring that

4 SC-2024-0405

Wilson had no rights to the improvements he had made on the Haag

property and a permanent injunction to prevent Wilson from maintaining

and building any new improvements on the contested land, and asserting

a common-law claim of continuing trespass based on Wilson cutting down

Haag's trees.

In March 2024, the circuit court conducted a bench trial. Following

the submission of the parties' evidence, including testimony from

Wilson's surveyor, the court found that Wilson had encroached on .68

acres of Haag's property. A corner of the house and a smaller structure

had been built over the property line onto Haag's property. Because Haag

had had notice that Wilson was building on his property and had done

nothing about it, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting them

"a permanent constructive/implied easement as to all existing

encroachments." Haag appealed the circuit court's decision. 1

III.

1" ' " When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain and palpable error." ' " Yeager v. Lucy, 998 So. 2d 460, 462 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Smith v. Muchia, 854 So. 2d 85, 92 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)). 5 SC-2024-0405

Equitable relief mandates a result that is "consistent with the

principles of justice." Dylan Reeves, Tilley's Alabama Equity § 1:1 (6th

ed. 2023). An equitable remedy is "an order directing a person to do or

not to do a specific act" with the backing of "the coercive power of the

court." 1A C.J.S. Actions § 158 (2016). In contrast, a legal remedy

generally is an award of monetary damages. Id. In other words, equitable

remedies involve the court's requiring a person to do or refrain from doing

something, while legal remedies involve a party's receiving monetary

compensation.

At the time of our nation's founding, the English legal system had

distinct courts that provided legal remedies and separate courts that

provided equitable remedies. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417

(1987). Alabama also historically had a bifurcated system of courts of law

and courts of equity up until 1973, when our Unified Judicial System was

created. See Ex parte Grimmett, 358 So. 3d 391, 397 (Ala. 2022)

(discussing the development of Alabama's Unified Judicial System).

Today, our trial courts provide both legal and equitable remedies. Cases

involving land usually require equitable remedies because land is

nonfungible. See Rose Nulman Park Found. ex rel. Nulman v. Four

6 SC-2024-0405

Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 29 (R.I. 2014). "If a remedy is not available by

action at law, equity will not hesitate, as a general rule, to take

cognizance of a suit that seeks protection of property rights." 27A Am.

Jur. 2d Equity § 30 (2019) (footnotes omitted).

Equitable actions require the court to carefully consider the facts of

the case and whether the requested remedy would lead to an appropriate

and just result; equity seeks to promote a sense of fairness and justice

that might not otherwise be available at law. "The trial court is

authorized in equity proceedings to mold its judgment so as to adjust the

equities of all the parties and to meet the obvious necessities of each

situation." American Fam. Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So. 2d 1053, 1061

(1990) (citing BBC Inv. Co. v. Ginsberg, 280 Ala. 148, 190 So. 2d 702

(1966)). Our courts have a variety of remedies to choose from to meet the

equities of each case, keeping in mind that "[f]lexibility rather than

rigidity has distinguished" equity. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S 321, 329

(1944).

When a trial court issues an injunction, it "command[s] the

respondent to perform or to abstain from performing a certain specific

act." Tilley's Alabama Equity § 3:1. In the context of land disputes,

7 SC-2024-0405

injunctions are useful "when injuries to realty are permanent,

continuous, and of frequent occurrence, tending to 'destroy the substance

of the inheritance, or ruin the estate, or permanently impair its future

use and enjoyment,' " and when " 'pecuniary compensation is

inadequate.' " Smith v. Morris, 181 Ala. 279, 280-81, 61 So. 276, 276

(1913) (quoting Hooper v. Dora Coal Min. Co., 95 Ala. 235, 239-40, 10 So.

652, 654 (1892)).

An easement, on the other hand, gives one "the right to use or

control the land" of another "for a specific limited purpose." Easement,

Black's Law Dictionary 642 (12th ed. 2024); see also Helms v. Tullis, 398

So. 2d 253, 255 (Ala. 1981) (discussing the different types of easements

and how they are created). Here, the parties sought injunctions, and, in

fashioning a remedy, the trial court granted an easement. An injunction

and an easement are both types of equitable remedies that could suffice

to provide needed relief in a land-dispute case. But here, because there is

a permanent habitable structure involved, the use of which would be

continuous, frequent, and routine, I am not convinced that an easement

offers the best solution in this case.

8 SC-2024-0405

This Court's opinion in Manning v. Wingo, 577 So. 2d 865 (Ala.

1991), is instructive. In Manning, the Wingos purchased a parcel of

property and made substantial restorations to the house on that

property. However, the property was not properly conveyed to the Wingos

and was subject to a will contest, meaning that improvements were made

to a house for which they did not have good title. Manning, who was

awarded the house after the will contest, sued the Wingos to force a sale

of the property for a division of the proceeds. The trial court ruled for the

Wingos and ordered them to pay Manning for her interest in the property

but otherwise allowed them to retain the property and their

improvements. This Court reversed the trial court's judgment on other

grounds.

Relevant to this case is how this Court approached the issue of the

Wingos' improvements on property they did not own. Historically, the

common law did not allow one who had made improvements on another's

property to recover the value of those improvements. Id. at 868-69 (citing

Kerret v. Nicholas, 88 Ala. 346, 6 So. 698 (1889)). After considering how

other jurisdictions had fashioned equitable remedies that alleviated the

rigidity of the common law, see, e.g., Somerville v. Jacobs, 153 W.Va. 613,

9 SC-2024-0405

170 S.E.2d 805 (1969); Coos Cnty. v. State, 303 Or. 173, 734 P.2d 1348

(1987), this Court acknowledged that the equitable remedies historically

available under Alabama common law did not offer a satisfactory

outcome in that case. Id. at 869.

Instead, this Court "balanc[ed] the equities involved under these

facts" and held that, although they were not the owners of the property

and thus traditionally could not recover, the Wingos had the right to

recover for the value of the improvements they had made on the property.

Id. The Court also recognized that there was an alternative outcome that

also achieved equity: the trial court could order Manning to sell the

property to the Wingos, minus the value of the improvements. Id. at 870.

Manning demonstrates two key facets of equitable remedies under

Alabama law: first, there can be multiple, valid equitable solutions in a

case and second, achieving a satisfactory equitable remedy may,

sometimes, require deviation from a strict rule that does not adequately

remedy the situation. Because the purpose of an equitable remedy is to

achieve a just outcome, a court can fashion its own remedy, rather than

be limited to the requested remedy, when, based on the court's experience

and discretion, it finds the requested remedy to be insufficient to balance

10 SC-2024-0405

the equities of the case. See Pinkston v. Hartley, 511 So. 2d 168, 169 (Ala.

1987) (affirming the trial court's granting of an implied easement but also

recognizing that the court could have fashioned a different equitable

remedy); see also Morrison v. May, 393 So. 3d 450, 460 (Ala. 2023)

(Sellers, J., dissenting) (commending the trial court for an appropriate

solution in a property dispute).

Here, the trial court was correct in ruling in favor of the plaintiffs.

Alabama law recognizes implied easements when an encroachment is

" 'open and visible, continuous, and reasonably necessary to the estate

granted' " and the trier of fact determines the easement is reasonably

necessary for the dominant estate. Stringer Realty Co. v. City of

Gadsden, 256 Ala. 77, 81, 53 So. 2d 617, 620 (1951) (quoting Birmingham

Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Mason, 222 Ala. 38, 40, 130 So. 559, 561 (1930)).

However, granting an easement over Haag's property was not the ideal

equitable remedy. While an easement gives the plaintiffs the legal right

to use the portion of Haag's property that Wilson inadvertently improved,

it does not answer deeper, long-term questions. For example, if Haag sells

his property, does the buyer take the property subject to the easement?

If Wilson sells his house, must the buyer receive Haag's approval to

11 SC-2024-0405

modify the house because a portion of it is on Haag's property? Who is

responsible for the increase in the value of the land and property taxes,

the landowner or the homeowner? I am concerned that an easement

appears simple and appealing on the surface but ultimately comes short

of giving the parties the equity they demand to fully protect, in this case,

the value of Wilson’s improvements located on an adjoining parcel.

A more ideal solution would have mirrored the trial court's solution

in Manning. Under that approach, the trial court would have ordered the

plaintiffs to buy the small portion of Haag's property on which the house

encroached. This would be the better option; unlike an easement, fee-

simple title provides a more permanent solution. Functionally, the

easement remedy allows the plaintiffs to use Haag's property as if it were

theirs. However, it would have been prudent to go a small step further

and give the plaintiffs outright legal ownership to the contested land.

This approach would also have given Haag compensation for the land

conveyed to the plaintiffs. Even if Haag was at fault for not stopping

Wilson from building on his property when he had notice of the

encroachment, he should not have to effectively forfeit his property

without just compensation. Haag is now forced to directly cede nearly

12 SC-2024-0405

three quarters of an acre for the plaintiffs' use and likely will suffer

diminished hunting value in his surrounding property. This is not a

result that balances the equities for both sides.

Another alternative remedy would have been for Haag to purchase

Wilson's house, minus the aggregate value of the improvements on the

Haag property. Either of these options would have provided for a more

permanent remedy that would extend to the future owners of the land

and would have given both sides some sort of compensation. Thus, the

circuit court had multiple equitable remedies to choose from to provide

for a just outcome.

Equity jurisdiction gives broad discretion to trial courts to render

an outcome that is consistent with the principles of justice based upon

the unique circumstances of each case. See BBC Inv. Co., 280 Ala. at 152,

190 So. 2d at 706 ("The courts of equity under a prayer for general relief

have power to mold their decrees to meet the equities developed at the

trial."). In doing so, trial courts, based on their experience and expertise,

should exercise discretion, which might require them to go beyond the

traditional methods of recovery to ensure a just result. See Manning, 577

So. 2d at 869. This Court will not reverse a trial court's judgment

13 SC-2024-0405

providing an equitable remedy unless it violates a principle of justice or

misapplies controlling law. Alabama Power Co. v. Drummond, 559 So. 2d

158, 161 (Ala. 1990). Trial courts may also provide remedies that they

determine are more appropriate than the requested remedies; Rule 54(c),

Ala. R. Civ. P., specifically allows courts to provide remedies to an

entitled party, even if those remedies were not specifically requested by

the party. See Central Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Ambrose, 435 So. 2d

1203, 1205-06 (Ala. 1983). Moreover, trial courts may even give a

pecuniary, legal remedy if they determine an equitable remedy is

unnecessary. See Hood v. Neil, 502 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. 1987). Our trial

courts have freedom to provide the remedy that they determine is

warranted and will adequately balance the equities of the case.

The decision to grant the plaintiffs an easement to use a portion of

Haag's property was supported by the evidence and was a valid, legal

remedy. Ray v. Robinson, 388 So. 2d 957, 963 (Ala. 1980) (citing Kirby v.

Jones, 370 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1979)). But this case presents an opportunity

to consider other remedies in a land dispute to achieve the most just

result under the equities of the case. Trial courts must use their prowess

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and carefully consider the remedies available under the facts to supply a

solution that achieves a just result.