Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Crump

804 So. 2d 208, 2000 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 232, 2000 WL 337568
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
DecidedMarch 31, 2000
Docket2980632
StatusPublished

This text of 804 So. 2d 208 (Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Crump) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Crump, 804 So. 2d 208, 2000 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 232, 2000 WL 337568 (Ala. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinions

On Application for Rehearing

YATES, Judge.

The opinion of December 3, 1999, is ■withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

This is a workers’ compensation case.

Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association (“AIGA”) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its petition to alter, amend, or vacate a judgment. That petition was filed pursuant to § 25-5-57(a)(4)b., Ala.Code 1975, which provides:

“b. ... At any time, the employer may petition the court that awarded or approved compensation for permanent total disability to alter, amend, or revise the award or approval of the compensation on the ground that as a result of physical or vocational rehabilitation, or otherwise, the disability from which the employee suffers is no longer permanent total disability and, if the court is so satisfied after a hearing, it shall alter, amend, or revise the award accordingly.”

The burden of proof is on the employer filing a petition under § 25-5-57(a)(4)b. Mayfield Trucking Co. v. Napier, 724 So.2d 22 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), citing Cerrock Wire & Cable Co. v. Johnson, 533 So.2d 622 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the term “employer” includes an insurer (such as AIGA) entitled to the employer’s rights and remedies. § 25-5-1(4). After hearing the evidence, the trial court reapplies the test for permanent total disability in order to determine whether the earlier disability is no longer present. Mayfield. “Permanent total disability” is the inability to perform one’s trade and to find gainful employment. Mead Paper Co. v. Brizen-dine, 575 So.2d 571 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). “Total disability” does not mean entire physical disability or absolute helplessness. Genpak Corp. v. Gibson, 534 So.2d 312 (Ala.Civ.App.1988).

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that AIGA had not met its burden of proving that Crump was no longer permanently and totally disabled.

On March 24, 1988, the court entered a judgment in favor of Violet Crump on her workers’ compensation claim filed against her former employer, Carbon Hill Manufacturing Company. The court found that Crump was permanently and totally disabled as a result of an on-the-job injury and awarded compensation benefits.

At the time, Carbon Hill Manufacturing Company was insured by Midland Insurance Company. Midland later filed for bankruptcy protection. Pursuant to § 27-42-1, Ala.Code 1975, AIGA assumed the duties and responsibilities of Midland, and it has been paying Crump’s workers’ compensation benefits and medical expenses.

On December 3, 1996, AIGA petitioned to alter, amend, or vacate the 1988 judgment entered in favor of Crump. In its motion, AIGA alleged that the physical impairments that had rendered Crump disabled in 1988 had improved or had become less debilitating, to such an extent that she could work and be retrained for gainful employment.

Following a hearing at which witnesses testified and depositions and other evidence, including videotapes of Crump, were admitted, the trial court denied AIGA’s petition. At trial, Dr. Rex Harris testified by deposition on behalf of AIGA. He stated that Crump had been referred to him by AIGA for an independent medical examination and that he had examined [210]*210her one time. Dr. Harris testified that he had reviewed the medical records provided to him concerning Crump’s history. After his examination, Dr. Harris wrote that it was his impression that Crump had chronic pain related to her earlier injury and that there was nothing he could do for her, other than to recommend that she continue treatment with her doctor for pain. He also stated that, in his medical opinion, Crump was not permanently and totally disabled and that she could perform some type of sedentary work. Dr. Harris also stated that he subsequently had viewed videotapes of Crump taken by investigators for AIGA and that the tapes led him to believe that when he examined her she had “grossly exaggerated]” her injuries.1

The family of Mamie Woods, now deceased, had paid Crump to sit with Mamie. AIGA introduced evidence of certain checks made payable to Crump, drawn on Mamie’s bank account from March 1992 to February 6, 1994, totaling approximately $12,000 over that two-year period. Lucy Woods, Mamie’s daughter-in-law, testified by deposition that Crump’s duties were to see that Mamie ate and to assist her, if necessary, with dressing. Lucy stated that Crump was a companion to Mamie and did not clean or do household chores, because the family had hired someone else to clean the house.

Mrs. Mary Banks appeared at the hearing for AIGA. She stated that for a time she had paid Crump $35 every other week to clean her home. Banks stated that she had not been present while Crump worked and that she did not know how long it had taken Crump to complete the work.

Myrtice Carr, a vocational expert, also testified at the hearing on behalf of AIGA. Carr stated that she considered Crump to be mildly mentally handicapped. She said that Crump read at a third-grade level, spelled at a first-grade level, and could do arithmetic at a second-grade level. Carr stated that in her opinion Crump was employable and trainable, but that she was functionally illiterate. When Carr was asked what jobs would be available to Crump, she stated that Crump could work as a fast-food worker, a waitress, a cook, or a home attendant.

Jim Daniel, a private investigator, testified for AIGA at the hearing. Daniel stated that he was hired by AIGA and that he had taken photographs and videotapes of Crump. The videotapes were taken on eight days between January 6, 1994, and July 23, 1996. Those tapes and photographs showed Crump driving her car and filling it with gasoline, going shopping, and picking up pecans with a small child.

Crump introduced the deposition testimony of Dr. Daniel Scarbrough. He stated that he had treated Crump since 1993, at which time he saw her for evaluation of her work-related back injury. Crump was complaining of pain in her back, going down into her legs. Dr. Scarbrough stated that his records indicated that Crump had had two back surgeries in the late 1980s for her back pain resulting from the injury. He prescribed muscle relaxants, pain and anti-inflammatory medication, and he continued her on her antidepressant medication. After that visit, Dr. Scarbrough saw Crump on numerous occasions, until June 10, 1997. He stated that Crump [211]*211would have more pain on some visits than on others. He also stated that on some visits she would have a greater range of motion than on others. Dr. Scarbrough stated that, in addition to her back pain, Crump had a peptic ulcer and that she suffered from anxiety and depression, which he believed was contributed to by the limitations on her back. He also stated that she had arthritic-type pain in her back. Dr. Scarbrough stated, “I mean, people with back problems have good days and they have bad days.” He opined that Crump would not be able to work, because of her back pain, anxiety, and depression. Dr. Scarbrough disagreed with Dr. Rex Harris’s opinion that Crump was employable. The videotape surveillance of Crump did not change his opinion that Crump was both permanently and totally disabled. Dr. Scarbrough also stated that it would not be inconsistent with her complaints of pain for Crump to work as a sitter if she “sits there and maybe gives the patient some medication or gets up and fixes her a Coke or a bowl of soup.”

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Related

Ex Parte Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n
667 So. 2d 97 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1995)
Ex Parte Veazey
637 So. 2d 1348 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1993)
Cerrock Wire and Cable Co. v. Johnson
533 So. 2d 622 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1988)
Ex Parte Trinity Industries, Inc.
680 So. 2d 262 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1996)
Ex Parte Beaver Valley Corp.
477 So. 2d 408 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1985)
Bidermann Industries Corp. v. Peterson
655 So. 2d 997 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1994)
Genpak Corp. v. Gibson
534 So. 2d 312 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1988)
Sanders v. Green
726 So. 2d 715 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1998)
Mead Paper Co. v. Brizendine
575 So. 2d 571 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1990)
Mayfield Trucking Co. v. Napier
724 So. 2d 22 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1998)
Ex Parte Ellenburg
627 So. 2d 398 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
804 So. 2d 208, 2000 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 232, 2000 WL 337568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alabama-insurance-guaranty-assn-v-crump-alacivapp-2000.