Al Wirghi v. Obama

54 F. Supp. 3d 44, 2014 WL 3057559, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91835
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJuly 7, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 2005-1497
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 54 F. Supp. 3d 44 (Al Wirghi v. Obama) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Al Wirghi v. Obama, 54 F. Supp. 3d 44, 2014 WL 3057559, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91835 (D.D.C. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Judge United States District Court for the District of Columbia

Petitioner Adil Bin Muhammad Al Wir-ghi has been detained as an enemy belligerent at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for more than eleven years. Two Presidents have cleared petitioner for transfer from Guantanamo; however, the complex diplomatic negotiations to effectuate that transfer have been ongoing for six years. The petitioner has moved this Court for an order of release. Upon consideration of that motion [206] and the government’s Opposition thereto [208], and for the reasons stated in Ahjam v. Obama, Civ. No. 09-745, 37 F.Supp.3d 273, 2014 WL 1399021 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2014), the Court DENIES the petitioner’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Following the events of September II, 2001, Congress granted the President authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks ... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such ... persons.” Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF], The President’s authority under the AUMF is limited by the privilege of habeas corpus, which “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In addition to this judicial check on the President’s detention authority, the two most recent Presidents have, in their *46 own discretion, determined that continued detention of certain detainees is not in the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

President George W. Bush established Administrative Review Boards to assess “annually the need to continue to detain each enemy combatant.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 821, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Each assessment resulted in a recommendation to “release, transfer, or continue to detain each enemy combatant.” Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Revised Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/ Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo. pdf (last visited May 16, 2014). Significantly, a decision to release or transfer a detainee “does not equate to a determination that [the detainee] is not an enemy combatant, nor is it a determination that [the detainee] does not pose a threat to the United States or its allies.” Pet’r Mot. for Order of Release, ECF No. 206, Ex 1.

President Barack Obama replaced the Administrative Review ' Boards with the Guantanamo Review Task Force (“Task Force”), which was charged with determining the propriety of transfer, release, or criminal prosecution for each Guantanamo detainee. Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed.Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009). On January 22, 2010, the Task Force published its final report identifying 126 detainees as candidates for transfer to receiving countries. Guantanamo Review Task Force, Final Report, at ii (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf (last visited May 16, 2014). The Report warned that the transfer process involves “lengthy and complicated” diplomatic negotiations and “often has been influenced by political and other issues in potential resettlement countries (e.g., public perceptions of current and past U.S. detention policies), third-country views (and sometimes pressure) with respect to detainee resettlement, and public views of the Guantanamo detention facility generally.” Id. at 27.

A. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition & Transfer Negotiations

Mr. Al Wirghi petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention in 2005. In 2008, an Administrative Review Board cleared the petitioner for transfer, and the Task Force made the same determination in 2009. In May 2009, hopeful that his transfer was forthcoming, the petitioner joined with the government in a motion to stay the habeas proceedings. Joint Mot. for Stay, ECF No. 151. The Court granted that motion. The petitioner has not requested that the court reopen those proceedings to examine the legality of his detention under the AUMF. Rather, the petitioner filed the present motion for an order of release, arguing that, in light of his clearance for transfer, his detention (1) violates due process because it is arbitrary and indefinite, and (2) is not permitted by the AUMF because the government has acknowledged that he no longer poses a threat to the United States. For the reasons stated below, the Court disagrees.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court’s decision in this matter is controlled by its recent opinion in Ahjam v. Obama, Civ. No. 09-745, 37 F.Supp.3d 273, 2014 WL 1399021 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2014). There, the Court held that a Guantanamo detainee cleared for transfer by the Task Force lacked standing to challenge the 2013 and 2014 National Defense Authorization Acts, which ’imposed prerequisites for transfers, as un *47 constitutional interferences by Congress into the President’s control of foreign affairs. Standing requires invasion of a judicially cognizable interest, and lawfully detained enemy belligerents have no such interest in whether or how the President exercises his discretion to transfer detainees. As such, although Mr. A1 Wirghi raises a different substantive challenge to his detention — namely, a violation of the Due Process Clause rather than the unconstitutional infringement on the President’s control of foreign affairs alleged in Ahjam — he lacks standing for the same reason. The Court therefore denies the petitioner’s motion for the reasons stated in Ahjam. For the sake of comprehensiveness, however, the Court will briefly address the two main arguments raised by the petitioner’s motion.

First, Mr. A1 Wirghi’s detention is not unconstitutionally indefinite. Barring a judicial or Executive finding that his detention is inconsistent with the AUMF, the petitioner may be properly detained “for the duration of the relevant conflict.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 544 (D.C.Cir.2013) (“Detention under the AUMF may last for the duration of hostilities.”). And, as recently as December of 2013, the Court of Appeals held that

The war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces obviously continues. Congress and the President may choose to make long-term military detention subject to different, higher standards.

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Bluebook (online)
54 F. Supp. 3d 44, 2014 WL 3057559, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91835, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/al-wirghi-v-obama-dcd-2014.