AL WARAFI v. Obama

821 F. Supp. 2d 47, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126798, 2011 WL 5190140
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedSeptember 1, 2011
DocketCivil Action 09-2368 (RCL)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 821 F. Supp. 2d 47 (AL WARAFI v. Obama) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
AL WARAFI v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 47, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126798, 2011 WL 5190140 (D.D.C. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court is to consider only one issue here— whether petitioner was permanently and exclusively engaged as a medic within the meaning of Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention and § 3 — 15(b)(1)—(2) of Army Regulation 190-8. Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs on remand, the replies thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court will GRANT respondents’ Renewed Motion on Remand for Judgment on the Record and DENY petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2010, this Court denied petitioner Mukhtar Al Warafí’s habeas petition. Based on its review of the evidence as a whole, the Court concluded that petitioner was more likely than not part of the Taliban at the time of his capture. See Unclassified Mem. Op., 704 F.Supp.2d 32, 40-44 (D.D.C.2010) [16]. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that petitioner “more likely than not served as a medic on an as needed basis within the command structure of the Taliban.” Id. at 43. Petitioner argued in the alternative that even if he was part of the Taliban, he is not detainable beeáuse he was permanently and exclusively engaged as a medic under Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention. The Court rejected that argument under § 5 of the Military Commissions Act, which provides that “[n]o person may invoke the Geneva Conventions ... as a source of rights” in a habeas proceeding. Id. at 44 (citing Pub.L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Note)). The Court thus held that its determination that petitioner was more likely than not part of the Taliban ended its inquiry into whether petitioner’s detection is lawful.

On February 22, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s holding that petitioner was more likely than not part of the Taliban at the time of his capture. Judgment, 409 Fed.Appx. 360, 360-61 (D.C.Cir.2011) [39]. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the Court “did not explicitly address whether A1 Warafi was permanently and exclusively medical personnel within the meaning of Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention and Army Regulation 190-8, § 3 — 15(b)(1)—(2), assuming arguendo their applicability.” Id. The Court of Appeals was uncertain whether the Court’s conclusion that petitioner more likely than not served as a medic on an as needed basis “was tantamount to finding that A1 Warafi served only as auxiliary medical personnel within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention,” or whether that conclusion related only to the Court’s determination that AI Warafi was part of the Taliban. Id. at 361. The Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to this Court to “consider (or reconsider) AI Warafi’s argument that he was permanently and exclusively engaged as a medic and to make a finding on this issue.” Id. On August 26, 2011, having received the parties’ briefs and reply briefs, this Court held a merits hearing on the issue.

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Evidence Previously Submitted to the Court

The Court need not provide a complete factual background here, as such informa *49 tion can be found in its Memorandum Opinion denying petitioner’s habeas petition. See Unclassified Mem. Op., 704 F.Supp.2d at 34-87 [16]. For the narrow purposes of this opinion, it suffices to restate the relevant factual findings that the Court made in determining that petitioner was more likely than not part of the Taliban. The Court of Appeals has affirmed these findings, and thus they are the law of the case.

After weighing the evidence in the record — namely, reliable statements that petitioner himself made to his interrogators— the Court found that petitioner more likely than not traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Id. at 35-36, 41. The Court further found that petitioner went to the Khoja Khar line — the front line where the Taliban was fighting the Northern Alliance — with the help of officials at a Taliban center in Quetta, Pakistan. Id. at 41-42. On the basis of the record, the Court concluded that petitioner more likely than not went to the front line to fight against the Northern Alliance and that he more likely than not received weapons training there. Id. The Court also found, however, that “petitioner likely did not engage in combat in Afghanistan.” Id. at 42; see also id. at 36 (stating that petitioner received weapons training but did not engage in any active combat).

The Court then found that petitioner, after spending one to two weeks on the front line, volunteered for medic training when a superior asked for volunteers. Id. at 36, 42-43. The Court found, and respondents did not dispute, that petitioner worked in two clinics run by Dr. Abdullah Aziz, a Saudi doctor. Id. at 42. Petitioner was first transferred to a clinic in Dastareshi, located approximately twenty miles from the Khoja Khar line, for first aid training. Id. at 36, 42-43. Dr. Aziz taught petitioner how to clean wounds, draw blood, and recognize the symptoms of malaria. Id. at 36. Petitioner remained there for approximately twenty-five days and treated six to seven sick or wounded Taliban fighters per day. Id. When the Northern Alliance advanced toward the Khoja Khar line, he was transferred to Dr. Aziz’s clinic in Konduz. Id. at 36, 43. After one month of treating Taliban fighters there, petitioner left to work at a hospital because the area in which the clinic was located had become too dangerous as the Northern Alliance advanced toward Konduz. Id. at 36-37.

In making the above findings, the Court considered petitioner’s argument that he immediately went to work for Dr. Aziz in Konduz upon arriving in Afghanistan. Petitioner claimed that he then worked at the Dastereshi clinic before returning to the Konduz clinic. Id. at 42. The Court rejected these assertions, finding them contrary to petitioner’s prior reliable statement that he had been stationed on the Khoja Khar line before serving in a clinic. Id.

In November 2001, the Taliban agreed to surrender to coalition forces. Id. at 36-37, 43. As part of the surrender, petitioner’s Taliban commander, Thakker, negotiated a safe passage from Konduz to Kandahar via Mazar-e-Sharif for the troops under his command. Id. at 36-37, 43. The Court found that both petitioner and Dr. Aziz were with Thakker’s troops when they were captured by the Northern Alliance outside of Mazar-e-Sharif. Id. at 36-37, 43. Petitioner was captured with a weapon, which he was forced to surrender, and transported to Qala-i-Jangi prison with Thakker’s troops. Id. at 43.

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Related

Al-Warafie v. Obama
District of Columbia, 2015
Makhtar Al-Wrafie v. Barack Obama
716 F.3d 627 (D.C. Circuit, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
821 F. Supp. 2d 47, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126798, 2011 WL 5190140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/al-warafi-v-obama-dcd-2011.