Al-Sammarraie v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 27, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-3099
StatusPublished

This text of Al-Sammarraie v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Al-Sammarraie v. Federal Bureau of Investigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Al-Sammarraie v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ARKAN AL-SAMMARRAIE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cv-3099 (DLF) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Arkan Al-Sammarraie, proceeding pro se, seeks to enforce certain rights under the Crime

Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has filed a

motion to dismiss. Dkt. 30. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) “instructs the court to dismiss or transfer a case

if venue is improper or inconvenient in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.” Sanchez ex rel.

Rivera-Sanchez v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2009); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(3). The Court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations regarding venue as true and

draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. See Abraham v.

Burwell, 110 F. Supp. 3d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2015). “The court need not, however, accept the

plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true . . . and may consider material outside of the pleadings.” Id.

(citation modified). “The plaintiff has the burden to establish that venue is proper since it is his

obligation to institute the action in a permissible forum.” Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons,

453 F. Supp. 3d 404, 414 (D.D.C. 2020) (citation modified), aff’d, No. 20-cv-5103, 2021 WL

2525679 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2021). Al-Sammarraie alleges that he is “a victim, complainant, and principal cooperating

witness” in an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by the FBI. Pl.’s Mot. to Enforce

Crime Victims’ Rights 1, Dkt. 4. He alleges that he has “fully cooperated with federal authorities

in a national security case involving an American woman with documented ties to [a] terrorist

militia” that has been “designated as an Iranian proxy.” Id. Al-Sammarraie seeks “enforcement

of [his] statutory rights as a victim, complainant, and principal cooperating witness” pursuant to

the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). Id. He complains that he has

not received (1) “official written acknowledgement of [his] victim status”; (2) “appointment of a

Victim-Witness Coordinator”; (3) a “secure and documented channel for evidence submission”;

and (4) “[r]egular updates regarding the progress of the case.” Id. As “[a]dditional [h]arm,” he

also alleges that his phone “was seized and searched without a judicial warrant” and that he has

suffered “mental and emotional strain” requiring him to seek treatment at a hospital. Id. at 2.

A victim of a crime seeking to enforce his rights under the CVRA must file his motion for

relief “in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no

prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3771(d)(3).

Al-Sammarraie “has neither alleged that any criminal prosecution is pending in this district,

nor shown that any crime occurred here.” Walsh v. Hagee, 900 F. Supp. 2d 51, 61 (D.D.C. 2012)

(dismissing CVRA claim), aff’d, No. 12-5367, 2013 WL 1729762 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2013). In

fact, his filings do not allege that any criminal prosecution is ongoing, nor does he specify a

location where the alleged crime occurred. In response to the FBI’s motion to dismiss noting the

requirements of § 3771(d)(3) and pointing out that the plaintiff has failed to allege relevant facts,

Al-Sammarraie notes that he has “engaged with multiple FBI offices and personnel,” with

2 meetings taking place in 2024 in Houston, Texas; in July 2025 in Fayetteville, North Carolina; and

in August 2025 in Washington, D.C. Pl.’s Opp’n 2, Dkt. 31. He again fails to provide any facts

indicating that either (1) a criminal prosecution is underway in this District or (2) that any alleged

crime occurred in this District. See Def.’s Reply 2, Dkt. 33.

Instead of addressing the requirements of § 3771(d)(3), Al-Sammarraie contends that

venue is proper in this District because he is “currently residing” here, Pl.’s Mot. to Enforce Crime

Victims’ Rights 2, and because the defendant is a federal agency headquartered in Washington,

D.C., id. at 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)); see also Pl.’s Opp’n 4 (contending that a “substantial

part of the events” occurred in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)). But while § 1391(e)

generally governs venue in a “civil action in which a defendant is . . . an agency of the United

States,” it applies “except as otherwise provided by law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). So too for

§ 1391(b)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (Provision applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by

law.”). Here, the CVRA itself provides its own, more stringent limitations on where a motion

seeking to enforce rights under the CVRA may be brought, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and Al-

Sammarraie has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that this provision is satisfied in this

District.

For these reasons, venue in this District is improper, and because Al-Sammarraie does not

allege facts concerning either prong of § 3771(d)(3), the Court lacks the information necessary to

transfer this case to a proper federal district. The Court will therefore dismiss this case without

prejudice, and Al-Sammarraie remains free to file his CVRA claim in a proper district pursuant to

§ 3771(d)(3). 1

1 The FBI also contends that this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because Al-Sammarraie is not a “crime victim” under the CVRA’s definition of the term.

3 Finally, before the Court are several motions filed by Al-Sammarraie. The Court will deny

without prejudice his Emergency Motion to Appoint Counsel, Dkt. 5, because it does not find that

“exceptional circumstances” warrant appointment of counsel in this civil case, Pinson v. DOJ, 55

F. Supp. 3d 80, 83 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that “[p]laintiffs in civil cases do not have a constitutional

or statutory right to counsel” and that “the district court has the discretion to decide whether to

appoint an attorney for a pro se litigant in a civil case”). And because the Court will dismiss Al-

Sammarraie’s sole claim under the CVRA, it will dismiss as moot his Motion to Enforce Crime

Victims’ Rights, Dkt. 4; his Motion for Expedited Hearing, Dkt. 6; and his Motion to Enforce

Crime Victims’ Rights and Request for Full Judicial Supervision, Dkt. 9.

CONCLUSION

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Related

Sanchez Ex Rel. Rivera-Sanchez v. United States
600 F. Supp. 2d 19 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Walsh v. Hagee
900 F. Supp. 2d 51 (District of Columbia, 2012)
Pinson v. U.S. Department of Justice
55 F. Supp. 3d 80 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Abraham v. Burwell
110 F. Supp. 3d 25 (District of Columbia, 2015)

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