Al-Sadhan v. Twitter Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided June 14, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-02369·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AREEJ AL-SADHAN, et al., Case No. 23-cv-02369-EMC

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SERVICE BY 10 TWITTER INC., et al., ALTERNATIVE MEANS

11 Defendants. Docket No. 75 12 13 14 Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for service by alternative means. 15 Specifically, Plaintiffs ask for leave to serve four individual defendants (Ahmad Abouammo, Saud 16 Al-Qahtani, Ali Alzabarah, Ahmed Almutairi, and Bader Al-Asaker) by means such as service on 17 U.S.-based counsel and service on the embassy for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (“KSA”). 18 Having considered Plaintiffs’ motion and supporting papers, the Court hereby GRANTS in part 19 and DENIES in part the request for relief. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) 22 The four individual defendants all reside in the KSA. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) 23 addresses service of an individual in a foreign country. It provides as follows:

24 Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country. Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual – other than a minor, an 25 incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed – may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United 26 States:

27 (1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is and Extrajudicial Documents; 1 (2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an 2 international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give 3 notice:

4 (A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general 5 jurisdiction; (B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter 6 rogatory or letter of request; or (C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law, by: 7 (i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or 8 (ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that 9 requires a signed receipt; or

10 (3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders. 11 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). 13 In the instant case, Plaintiffs are invoking Rule 4(f)(3). The Ninth Circuit has held that 14 Rule 4(f)(3) simply requires that service by ordered by a court and that service not be prohibited 15 by an international agreement. “No other limitations are evident from the text. In fact, as long as 16 court-directed and not prohibited by an international agreement, service of process ordered under 17 Rule 4(f)(3) may be accomplished in contravention of the laws of the foreign country.” Rio Props. 18 v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002). 19 In the same case, the Ninth Circuit rejected the proposition that Rule 4(f) “create[s] a 20 hierarchy of preferred methods of service,” i.e., requiring an attempt at service by the means 21 identified in Rule 4(f)(1) and (2) before a party can ask for alternative relief under (3). Id. at 1014. 22 “No such requirement is found in the Rule's text, implied by its structure, or even hinted at in the 23 advisory committee notes.” Id.; see also id. at 1015 (stating that “service of process under Rule 24 4(f)(3) is neither a ‘last resort’ nor ‘extraordinary relief’”). A district court has discretion to 25 determine “when the particularities and necessities of a given case require alternate service of 26 process under Rule 4(f)(3).” Id. at 1016. 27 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that service under Rule 4(f)(3) can be accomplished 1 service including publication, ordinary mail, mail to the defendant's last known address, delivery 2 to the defendant's attorney, telex, and most recently, email.” Id. See, e.g., id. at 1018 (noting that 3 “we leave it to the discretion of the district court to balance the limitations of email service against 4 its benefits in any particular case”). That being said, service authorized under Rule 4(f)(3) must 5 still comport with due process. “To meet this requirement, the method of service crafted by the 6 district court must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 7 parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” 8 Id. at 1017. 9 B. Service of Process in the KSA 10 Although Rule 4(f) does not create a hierarchy of preferred methods of service, Plaintiffs 11 have explained why they are seeking service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3). For example, the KSA is 12 not a party to the Hague Convention. Plaintiffs also assert that the KSA does not accept letters 13 rogatory. Although Plaintiffs do not provide authority to support that assertion, using the letter 14 rogatory process would likely be time consuming. See Oueiss v. Mohammed Bin Salman Bin 15 Abdulaziz Al Saud, No. 1:20-cv-25022-KMM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217068, at *20 (S.D. Fla. 16 Jan. 17, 2021) (crediting attorney declaration that “‘service via Letters Rogatory would be very 17 time consuming and could potentially take over a year . . . [and] Plaintiff would incur a charge of 18 approximately $6,000.00’ from the process server retained by Counsel's firm[;] [t]he time- 19 consuming nature of Letters Rogatory is supported by United States Department of State 20 publications attached to the Declaration”). Finally, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that they 21 contacted two different international service providers regarding service on the individual 22 defendants, but the providers essentially declined for safety reasons. See generally Larson Decl. 23 Based on the above, Plaintiffs have established that they have a factual basis for their 24 request under Rule 4(f)(3). 25 C. Service on Mr. Almutairi 26 Plaintiffs ask for permission to serve Mr. Almutairi by: (1) substitute service on the KSA 27 Ambassador in Washington, D.C. and (2) certified mail at the KSA Embassy in Washington, D.C. 1 have failed to establish that service by such means meets due process. There is no allegation or 2 concrete evidence that Mr. Almutairi is a KSA government employee, let alone one of such 3 significance that notice to the KSA Ambassador or Embassy would likely be conveyed to Mr. 4 Almutairi. Although Plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants worked in conjunction with 5 the KSA to violate their rights, see, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 18-19 (alleging that Mr. Almutairi and Mr. Al- 6 Asaker were charged by federal indictment as acting as agents of KSA), that is only an allegation. 7 D. Service on Mr. Al-Qahtani 8 Plaintiffs propose that Mr. Al-Qahtani be served via the KSA Ambassador and Embassy, 9 plus his U.S.-based counsel (representing him in different litigation). 10 “[S]everal courts have permitted foreign defendants to be served under Rule 4(f)(3) by 11 substituted service on a domestic attorney for the defendant.” Moore’s Fed. Prac. – Civ. § 4.52. 12 This has happened even when the attorney has not been authorized to accept service of process, or 13 when the attorney is representing the defendant in a different litigation. See, e.g.: 14 • Compania De Inversiones Mercantiles, S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua 15 S.A.B. de C.V., 970 F.3d 1269, 1295 (10th Cir. 2020) (indicating that service on 16 U.S. counsel is permissible under Rule 4(f)(3) even though counsel is in the U.S.

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