NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-1067
AL-KARIM DHANJI
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' SERVICES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Al-Karim Dhanji, appeals under G. L. c. 30A,
§ 15, from a judgment on the pleadings that affirmed a decision
by the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), in which
DALA concluded that the defendant, the Department of Veterans'
Services (DVS), correctly denied Dhanji's application for an
annuity benefit under G. L. c. 115, § 6B. We affirm.
Background. From 1992 to 2017, Dhanji served in the United
States Public Health Service (USPHS) as a medical officer and a
commander. At the time of his honorable discharge, the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) determined that
Dhanji was one hundred percent disabled. In 2018, Dhanji
applied for a Massachusetts veterans' annuity under G. L.
c. 115, § 6B. DVS denied his application, stating that Dhanji
did not "meet the military service requirements contained in" G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third, inferentially, because he did not
fall within the statutory definition of "veteran." Dhanji
appealed the denial of his application, and a DVS hearing
officer upheld the decision after a hearing, stating that Dhanji
did not meet the definition of "veteran" under G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Forty-third. Dhanji then appealed to the DALA, and an
administrative magistrate granted a summary decision upholding
DVS's determination. Dhanji sought review by a judge of the
Superior Court. The judge allowed DVS's motion for judgment on
the pleadings and denied Dhanji's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and Dhanji appealed.
Discussion. 1. Meaning of "veteran" under the statute.
On appeal from the allowance of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, each issue is a question of law subject to de novo
review. Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,
492 Mass. 696, 707 (2023). We therefore review DALA's decision
in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "[W]e may set aside
or modify [the] decision . . . if it is, among other things, in
violation of constitutional provisions, [b]ased upon an error of
law, [a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law" (quotations and citation
omitted). Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Acting Director
of the Dept' of Unemployment Assistance, 493 Mass. 591, 595
(2024). "We give substantial deference to a reasonable
2 interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged
with its administration enforcement, but the duty of statutory
interpretation rests in the courts" (citation omitted).
Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481
(2006).
"In interpreting a statute, we begin with its plain
language, as the best indication of legislative intent." 135
Wells Ave., LLC v. Housing Appeals Comm., 478 Mass. 346, 354
(2017). "Beyond plain language, [c]ourts must look to the
statutory scheme as a whole, so as to produce an internal
consistency within the statute" (quotation and citation
omitted). Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019). "Even clear statutory
language is not read in isolation." Id.
Under G. L. c. 115, § 6B, a veteran whom the VA has
determined to be one hundred percent disabled is entitled to a
$2,000 annual annuity. According to G. L. c. 115, § 6A, the
word "veteran" is defined by G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. A
veteran is, subject to other statutory limitations, a person who
has "served in the army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, or air
force of the United States, or on full time national guard
duty." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third.
3 Dhanji does not claim that USPHS falls within one of the
branches expressly identified in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. 1
Nonetheless, Dhanji contends that his honorable discharge from
USPHS means that he is a "veteran" under the statute. 2 Because
the statute's plain language does not incorporate those who
served in USPHS into the definition of veteran, this argument
fails. 3 See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 557 (2020) ("If the
language [of a statute] is clear and unambiguous, it must be
interpreted as written").
2. Federal preemption. We review de novo the DALA's
determination that the Commonwealth's definition of veteran is
not preempted by Federal law. See Robinhood Fin. LLC, 492 Mass.
at 707. "The 'ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis is
congressional intent, which is discerned primarily from the
language of the preemption statute and its framework." Marsh v.
Massachusetts Coastal R.R. LLC, 492 Mass. 641, 648 (2023),
1 Dhanji correctly points out that service in USPHS creates entitlement to certain Federal veterans' benefits. See 37 U.S.C. § 101(3) (defining "uniformed services"). The Massachusetts statute, however, contains different definitions.
2 Dhanji also argues that his detail to the army from 1997 to 2000 means that he "served in the army." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. He has not provided us with persuasive authority to support that conclusion and we are not aware of any.
3 Because the statute's plain language is clear, we need not reach Dhanji's arguments regarding the statute's legislative history. See Six Bros., Inc. v. Brookline, 493 Mass. 616, 628 n.20 (2024).
4 quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1996).
Besides express and field preemption, State law may be preempted
by Federal law when "the State law actually conflicts with the
Federal law (conflict preemption)." Marsh, supra. Dhanji
asserts that State law is conflict preempted by Federal law such
that DVS must conclude that he is a veteran under G. L. c. 4,
§ 7, Forty-third. 4
"Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both [S]tate and [F]ederal
requirements, . . . or where [S]tate law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" (quotation and citation omitted).
Marsh, 492 Mass. at 648 n.18. Dhanji does not point to any
Federal requirement or law that is in conflict with the statute.
Instead, he argues that his ineligibility for the annuity under
G. L. c. 115, § 6B, conflicts generally with the Federal policy
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-1067
AL-KARIM DHANJI
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' SERVICES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Al-Karim Dhanji, appeals under G. L. c. 30A,
§ 15, from a judgment on the pleadings that affirmed a decision
by the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), in which
DALA concluded that the defendant, the Department of Veterans'
Services (DVS), correctly denied Dhanji's application for an
annuity benefit under G. L. c. 115, § 6B. We affirm.
Background. From 1992 to 2017, Dhanji served in the United
States Public Health Service (USPHS) as a medical officer and a
commander. At the time of his honorable discharge, the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) determined that
Dhanji was one hundred percent disabled. In 2018, Dhanji
applied for a Massachusetts veterans' annuity under G. L.
c. 115, § 6B. DVS denied his application, stating that Dhanji
did not "meet the military service requirements contained in" G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third, inferentially, because he did not
fall within the statutory definition of "veteran." Dhanji
appealed the denial of his application, and a DVS hearing
officer upheld the decision after a hearing, stating that Dhanji
did not meet the definition of "veteran" under G. L. c. 4, § 7,
Forty-third. Dhanji then appealed to the DALA, and an
administrative magistrate granted a summary decision upholding
DVS's determination. Dhanji sought review by a judge of the
Superior Court. The judge allowed DVS's motion for judgment on
the pleadings and denied Dhanji's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and Dhanji appealed.
Discussion. 1. Meaning of "veteran" under the statute.
On appeal from the allowance of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, each issue is a question of law subject to de novo
review. Robinhood Fin. LLC v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,
492 Mass. 696, 707 (2023). We therefore review DALA's decision
in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "[W]e may set aside
or modify [the] decision . . . if it is, among other things, in
violation of constitutional provisions, [b]ased upon an error of
law, [a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law" (quotations and citation
omitted). Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Acting Director
of the Dept' of Unemployment Assistance, 493 Mass. 591, 595
(2024). "We give substantial deference to a reasonable
2 interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged
with its administration enforcement, but the duty of statutory
interpretation rests in the courts" (citation omitted).
Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481
(2006).
"In interpreting a statute, we begin with its plain
language, as the best indication of legislative intent." 135
Wells Ave., LLC v. Housing Appeals Comm., 478 Mass. 346, 354
(2017). "Beyond plain language, [c]ourts must look to the
statutory scheme as a whole, so as to produce an internal
consistency within the statute" (quotation and citation
omitted). Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019). "Even clear statutory
language is not read in isolation." Id.
Under G. L. c. 115, § 6B, a veteran whom the VA has
determined to be one hundred percent disabled is entitled to a
$2,000 annual annuity. According to G. L. c. 115, § 6A, the
word "veteran" is defined by G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. A
veteran is, subject to other statutory limitations, a person who
has "served in the army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, or air
force of the United States, or on full time national guard
duty." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third.
3 Dhanji does not claim that USPHS falls within one of the
branches expressly identified in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. 1
Nonetheless, Dhanji contends that his honorable discharge from
USPHS means that he is a "veteran" under the statute. 2 Because
the statute's plain language does not incorporate those who
served in USPHS into the definition of veteran, this argument
fails. 3 See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 557 (2020) ("If the
language [of a statute] is clear and unambiguous, it must be
interpreted as written").
2. Federal preemption. We review de novo the DALA's
determination that the Commonwealth's definition of veteran is
not preempted by Federal law. See Robinhood Fin. LLC, 492 Mass.
at 707. "The 'ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis is
congressional intent, which is discerned primarily from the
language of the preemption statute and its framework." Marsh v.
Massachusetts Coastal R.R. LLC, 492 Mass. 641, 648 (2023),
1 Dhanji correctly points out that service in USPHS creates entitlement to certain Federal veterans' benefits. See 37 U.S.C. § 101(3) (defining "uniformed services"). The Massachusetts statute, however, contains different definitions.
2 Dhanji also argues that his detail to the army from 1997 to 2000 means that he "served in the army." G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-third. He has not provided us with persuasive authority to support that conclusion and we are not aware of any.
3 Because the statute's plain language is clear, we need not reach Dhanji's arguments regarding the statute's legislative history. See Six Bros., Inc. v. Brookline, 493 Mass. 616, 628 n.20 (2024).
4 quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1996).
Besides express and field preemption, State law may be preempted
by Federal law when "the State law actually conflicts with the
Federal law (conflict preemption)." Marsh, supra. Dhanji
asserts that State law is conflict preempted by Federal law such
that DVS must conclude that he is a veteran under G. L. c. 4,
§ 7, Forty-third. 4
"Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both [S]tate and [F]ederal
requirements, . . . or where [S]tate law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" (quotation and citation omitted).
Marsh, 492 Mass. at 648 n.18. Dhanji does not point to any
Federal requirement or law that is in conflict with the statute.
Instead, he argues that his ineligibility for the annuity under
G. L. c. 115, § 6B, conflicts generally with the Federal policy
area of "veterans' benefits" that provides veterans' benefits to
members of USPHS. Because preemption is "not favored," and the
"burden is on the party seeking to displace the State action to
show preemption with hard evidence of conflict based on the
record," Dhanji's preemption argument fails. Commonwealth Elec.
4 Dhanji raises the issue of field preemption for the first time on appeal. Thus, the argument is waived. See Central Transp., Inc. v. Package Printing Co., 429 Mass. 189, 193 (1999).
5 Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 397 Mass. 361, 375-376 (1986).
Regardless, the annuity does not conflict with any Federal
veterans' benefits policy, as the Commonwealth offers the
annuity in addition to any Federal benefits.
3. Equal protection. Dhanji contends that the statute, as
applied to him, violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because
it creates an invidious distinction between people who served in
the armed forces and people who served in USPHS. We apply
strict scrutiny "[w]here a statute either burdens the exercise
of a fundamental right . . . or discriminates on the basis of a
suspect classification." Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81,
86 (2022), quoting Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector
Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 668-669 (2011), S.C., 461 Mass. 232
(2012). Dhanji does not have a fundamental right to receive the
annuity in addition to Federal VA benefits, and the class of
people who served in USPHS is not suspect. "Accordingly, we
apply a rational basis level of judicial scrutiny to the
[plaintiff's] equal protection claims." Roman, supra at 88-89.
"[T]he rational basis test requires that 'an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would
serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to
the members of the disadvantaged class.'" Roman, 489 Mass. at
89, quoting Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass.
6 309, 330 (2003). Because "the Legislature may afford some
classes of veterans a greater preference than others," Greeley
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 754 (1974), we
conclude that this requirement is met, and hold that G. L.
c. 115, § 6B, is constitutional as applied to Dhanji.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Englander, Hand & Brennan, JJ. 5),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: May 6, 2024.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.