Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States

153 F. Supp. 397, 139 Ct. Cl. 642, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 115
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1957
DocketNo. 206-53
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 153 F. Supp. 397 (Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 397, 139 Ct. Cl. 642, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 115 (cc 1957).

Opinion

MaddeN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff sues for damages for an alleged breach of contract by the United States. It made a contract with the United States on June 21, 1941, licensing the United States to “make, use and have made in the United States” a type of 40 mm. anti-aircraft gun which the plaintiff had developed. It claims that its contract, properly interpreted, contained an agreement on the part of the United States not to export such guns and thus compete with the plaintiff’s interest in [644]*644selling guns, or licenses to manufacture them, to other countries.

As we have said, the contract was made in 1941. The exporting of the guns by the United States began in 1942 and has apparently continued down to recent years. The plaintiff’s original petition was filed on May 15, 1958. The Government says that the cause of action is barred by our six-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff says that, in any event, its cause of action for such export of guns as occurred not more than six years before the filing of the petition is not barred. We think the plaintiff is right. The agreement not to export, if we conclude that there was such an agreement, was without limit of time, and each act of violation, whenever it occurred, would constitute a violation of the agreement. There would be no way to measure, at any given time, the total damages which might result from violations then past and those which might occur in the future, and thus include them all in one suit.

The contract contained an agreement to arbitrate disputes which might arise under it. The instant dispute as to the meaning of the contract arose in 1942. Not until May 23, 1947 did the plaintiff request arbitration. That request was promptly rejected by a letter from the General Counsel of the Navy Department “in view of the absence of authority of an executive agency of the Government to consent to the resolution of disputes by arbitration.” The plaintiff says that its right to sue did not arise until its request for arbitration had been rejected, and that its suit filed within six years after that rejection is effective for all breaches of the contract, whenever they occurred.

The Government says that the running of the statute of limitations was not affected by the arbitration provision. We think the Government is right. The arbitration agreement is a provision for extrajudicial resolution of disputes, analagous to administrative remedies which are often available. A party may be barred from suit for failure to exhaust such remedies, but normally, the statute of limitations runs while he is pursuing them. In the case of arbitration agreements, with no time limit, it would be intolerable that a party should prevent the statute of limitations from even [645]*645beginning to run, merely by delaying his request for arbitration.

The plaintiff says that the Government’s refusal, in 1947, to arbitrate was a breach of contract, and that the instant suit includes that breach and is therefore timely,- since it was filed within six years after that refusal. Whether the agreement to arbitrate was invalid, as the General Counsel of the Navy Department wrote, or not, we do not decide. See George J. Grant Construction Co. v. United States, 124 C. Cls. 202. Even if valid, we think its breach does not give rise to a cause of action against the United States. In the absence of special circumstances such as that one has been misled, to his damage, by the repudiation of an agreement to arbitrate, the only effective judicial remedy for such a refusal is a decree for specific performance. That remedy is not available against the United States, since it has not consented. to such suits. A suit for damages for the violation of an agreement to arbitrate can, in the absence of the special circumstances above referred to, result in no more than the award of nominal damages, since a court cannot know what arbitrators would have decided, if there had been arbitration. The cases in this court in which contracting officers have failed to make decisions entrusted to them by Government contracts are not in point. The court decides those cases on their merits, not as it surmises that the contracting officer would have decided them, if he had decided them. The plaintiff must seek the contracting officer’s decision in order to exhaust his available extrajudicial remedy. But his recovery hei’e, if any, is based on the substantive provisions of the contract, and not on the refusal to arbitrate.

Our conclusion then is that the plaintiff’s suit is not barred by the statute of limitations, but recovery, if any, may be had only for violations of the alleged agreement which occurred not more than six years before the filing of the petition.

We now consider the contentions of the parties as to whether there was, in fact, an agreement by the United States that it would not export Bofors type guns.

The wording of the contract as signed was agreed upon after preliminary events and negotiations, which will be [646]*646described only briefly in this opinion. American Army officers witnessed a demonstration of the Bofors gun at the plaintiff’s plant in 1987. In that year the plaintiff was asked by our military attache in Berlin to quote prices on a quantity of the guns and ammunition. The plaintiff suggested that our War Department purchase a license to manufacture the guns in the United States. The War Department advised the plaintiff in 1938 that it did not care to do that. In the fall of 1939 the Bofors gun was called to the attention of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of our Navy, by a person who had seen the gun fired in Sweden. In 1940, that official decided to obtain one of the guns, with ammunition, for testing purposes. In 1940 a gun was purchased, for $40,000, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition at $10 each. The contract provided that it did not grant to the United States a license to manufacture the gun or have it manufactured, and that the gun would be used only for testing purposes. The gun was so used in October 1940.

In August 1940, two officers of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy were sent to the West Indies to witness the firing of Bofors guns on a Dutch ship. They made a favorable report on the gun, but an unfavorable report on its fire-control system. Following the report of these officers, and the test-firing of the purchased gun, the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy decided, in effect, to adopt the Bofors gun in place of the 1.1 inch gun which had been developed by the Navy itself, and initiated procedures looking toward the manufacture of the Bofors gun. It obtained from Dutch authorities prints of drawings of the gun. These prints were made from drawings furnished by the plaintiff to the Government of the Netherlands before the German occupation. The set of prints so obtained was virtually complete, and from them the Navy was able to undertake the manufacture of the gun.

The drawings needed some changes, to adapt them for mass production, and such changes were made. The Bureau of Ordnance was not satisfied with the plaintiff’s mount for the gun, and a drastically different mount was developed. In 1941 a contractor began to manufacture the guns for the Navy. Early in 1941 the Navy obtained from a British [647]*647source some drawings of the Bofors gun. It made no use of these drawings because its reworking of the prints it had obtained from the Dutch gave it all the material it needed.

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153 F. Supp. 397, 139 Ct. Cl. 642, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 115, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aktiebolaget-bofors-v-united-states-cc-1957.