AKNESHA MILLER SUHUBA BARUTI vs LEIGH ANN VINGLE

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 15, 2022
• Docket: 21-2785
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

AKNESHA MILLER SUHUBA BARUTI,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D21-2785 LT Case No. 2021-DR-039724-X

LEIGH ANN VINGLE,

Appellee.

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Opinion filed July 15, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, James H. Earp, Judge.

Geoffrey P. Golub, of Law Offices of Geoffrey P. Golub, P.A., Melbourne, for Appellant.

Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris Appellate Law Office, Mims, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Aknesha Miller Suhuba Baruti (“Baruti”) appeals the final judgment of

injunction for protection against stalking violence entered against her. She argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred by issuing an injunction without

competent, substantial evidence of two incidents of stalking. 1 We agree and

reverse for dissolution of the injunction.

Baruti and her estranged husband were in the midst of an acrimonious

marital dissolution proceeding, during which Baruti believed that the

appellee, Leigh Ann Vingle, was her husband’s paramour. Vingle filed a

petition for protection against stalking against Baruti, alleging two pertinent

incidents. The first concerned an occasion when Baruti came to the

restaurant where Vingle worked, interrupted her while she was serving

customers, and stared at her, which made her “uncomfortable.”

The second incident was more serious. Vingle alleged a road rage

encounter, where Baruti cornered Vingle in her car, followed her onto a

highway ramp, intentionally collided with her vehicle, and approached her

1 Given our disposition, it is unnecessary to address Baruti’s arguments regarding service of process. That said, while we do not disagree with the trial court’s assessment that Baruti was evading service, the document delivery was ineffective, because there was no testimony rebutting Baruti’s claim that the deputy failed to announce he was drop-serving the documents at the location of their encounter. Olin Corp. v. Haney, 245 So. 2d 669, 670– 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (holding that when person flees from process server in attempt to evade service, “the delivery requirement . . . may be satisfied if the process server leaves the papers at a place from which such person can easily retrieve them and takes reasonable steps to call such delivery to the attention of the person to be served”).

2 aggressively afterward. Vingle believed that Baruti was trying to kill her. Both

vehicles had to be towed and a criminal investigation ensued. The day after

this incident, Vingle filed the instant petition. Because Baruti did not appear

at the initial or rescheduled hearing due to alleged insufficient service of

process, the trial court found consent by default and entered final judgment

against her. Once served with the injunction, Baruti filed a motion to vacate

and/or dissolve the final judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed.

We review entry of an injunction against stalking for competent,

substantial evidence. See Packal v. Johnson, 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2017). Under section 784.048, “[a] person who willfully, maliciously,

and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the

offense of stalking[.]” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). “‘Harrass’ means to

engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes

substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate

purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021). “[B]y its statutory definition,

stalking requires proof of repeated acts”—i.e., a minimum of two. Laserinko

v. Gerhardt, 154 So. 3d 520, 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citation omitted); see

also Chiu v. Adams, 327 So. 3d 889, 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). Additionally,

each incident must cause substantial emotional distress under an objective

standard. See Laserinko, 154 So. 3d at 522. Substantial emotional distress

3 “is greater than ordinary distress,” and “[u]nder Florida law, a reasonable

person does not suffer substantial emotional distress easily.” Venn v.

Fowlkes, 257 So. 3d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citation omitted).

Here, the road rage incident meets that high threshold, as a reasonable

person would suffer substantial emotional distress from vehicular pursuit by

a known adversary resulting in an intentional collision. But the same cannot

be said of the encounter at Vingle’s workplace, because simply feeling

“uncomfortable” does not constitute substantial emotional distress. See

Klenk v. Ransom, 270 So. 3d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“It is not

enough to be ‘weirded out’ or uncomfortable.” (citation omitted)). In other

words, a “mean stare” does not suffice. See Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d

986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding insufficient evidence of stalking when

respondent, while “creeping” around utSility meters, stared at petitioner

sunbathing but made no accompanying threats or gestures); see also Smith

v. Melcher, 975 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that circling

restaurant where petitioner was eating, looking and pointing at petitioner

while shaking head, was not harassment).

Because there was insufficient evidence of two incidents of

harassment, we reverse and vacate the injunction. We do so without

prejudice for Vingle to re-file should sufficient grounds exist.

4 REVERSED.

EVANDER, COHEN and WALLIS, JJ., concur.