Akkawi v. Sadr

Opinion

DIANA AKKAWI, et al., No. 2:20-cv-01034-DC-AC Plaintiffs, v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE KASRA SADR, et al., SUCCESSIVE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. (Doc. Nos. 238, 239) This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for leave to file a successive motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 238.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion on April 25, 2025. (Doc. No. 245.) For the reasons explained below, the court will deny Defendants’ motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not limit the number of summary judgment motions that a party may file. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Ninth Circuit has held that “district courts have discretion to permit successive motions for summary judgment,” and that doing so may “foster[ ] the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ resolution of suits.” Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “A renewed or successive summary judgment motion is appropriate especially if one of the following grounds exists: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) [the] need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Brazill v. Ca. Northstate Coll. of Pharm., LLC, No. 2:12-cv-1218-WBS, 2013 WL 4500667, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (citation omitted). However, due to the potential for abuse, district courts retain discretion to “weed out frivolous or simply repetitive motions.” Hoffman, 593 F.3d at 911 (citing Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997)). Defendants seek leave to file a successive motion for summary judgment “based on new and additional facts.” (Doc. No. 238 at 2.) Having reviewed Defendants’ proposed successive motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 239), the court finds Defendants’ arguments repetitive of their prior motion for summary judgment and permitting Defendants to file a successive motion for summary judgment would be frivolous. Similar to their prior motion (Doc. No. 207), Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor on Plaintiffs’ Driver Protection Privacy Act claim because no evidence exists that Defendants obtained Plaintiffs’ personal information through the California Department of Motor Vehicles’ (“California DMV”) records. (Doc. Nos. 238 at 2–3, 11–13; 239 at 4). Defendants’ argument is unavailing in large part because it is inaccurate. Defendants cite to the deposition testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Larry Londre, who they contend is unable to identify the source of each individual Plaintiffs’ personal information. (Doc. Nos. 238 at 4–10; 239 at 5–11.) However, as detailed in the court’s August 22, 2024 order denying Defendants’ prior motion for summary judgment, Defendants’ evidence does not conclusively show that Plaintiffs cannot establish the sourcing of Defendants’ data, as is required to prevail on their Driver Protection Privacy Act claim. (Doc. No. 217 at 4.) Even the new evidence relied upon by Defendants falls short of conclusively establishing that Plaintiffs could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants obtained their personal data from the California DMV. Indeed, as Plaintiff’s emphasize in their opposition to the pending motion, their expert Londre opines that the marketing information containing Plaintiffs’ personal information was most likely sourced from the California DMV. (See Doc. No. 245 at 4.) Thus, here too, “Defendants fail[] to carry their initial burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact,” specifically as to whether Defendants obtained Plaintiffs’ personal information through California DMV records. (Doc. No. 217 at 4.) ///// Accordingly, 1. Defendants’ motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 238) is DENIED; and 2. Defendants’ proposed motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 239) shall be IT IS SO ORDERED. □ Dated: _May 20, 2025 RVI <—_ Dena Coggins United States District Judge