1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TRUTH AKINS, et al., Case No. 21-CV-1824-BAS-WVG
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DISMISSING ACTION 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF 15 Defendants. No. 1); AND
16 (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF 17 TRUTH AKINS’ MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 18 PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2) 19
21 Before the Court is Plaintiff Truth Akin’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma 22 Pauperis (“IFP Motion”). (ECF No. 2.) In light of the information in that Motion, the 23 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request. However, upon an initial pre-answer screening of 24 Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT 25 PREJUDICE this action. (ECF No. 1.) 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 I. IFP MOTION 2 Plaintiff Truth Akins filed this action pro se on October 27, 2021 against Defendants 3 United States of America, the State of Alabama, and an individual by the name of Judge S. 4 Williams. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)1 In addition, Plaintiff filed an IFP Motion. (IFP Mot., 5 ECF No. 2.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant who, because of indigency, is unable to 6 pay the required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to 7 proceed without making such payment. The determination of indigency falls within the 8 district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 9 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (holding that “Section 1915 typically 10 requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the 11 affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement on indigency”). It is well-settled that a party 12 need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 13 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an 14 affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay 15 or give security for costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the 16 necessities of life.” Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339. However, “the same even-handed care must 17 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public 18 expense . . ., the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in part, to 19 pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 20 District courts, therefore, tend to reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay 21 the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses. See Skyler v. Saul, No. 19-CV- 22 1581-NLS, 2019 WL 4039650, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019). Moreover, “in forma 23 pauperis status may be acquired and lost during the course of litigation.” Wilson v. Dir. of 24 Adult Insts., No. CIV S-06-0791, 2009 WL 311150, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009). Finally, 25 the facts as to the affiant’s poverty must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness, 26 27 1 The Complaint lacks enumerated paragraphs. Thus, citations thereto refer to the pagination 28 1 and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 2 Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960)). 3 Here, Plaintiff represents that her monthly income during the last twelve months 4 averaged $3,000. Due to disability, her spouse does not have any income. (IFP Mot. 1.) 5 Based on Plaintiff’s attestations, her household has a positive monthly cash flow of around 6 $50 after paying for necessities and other expenses, namely $1,500 for rent, $300 for 7 utilities, $100 for home maintenance, $100 for food, $100 for clothing, $100 for 8 transportation, $200 for renter’s insurance, $100 for credit-card payments, $400 for motor- 9 vehicle payments, and $50 for recreational purposes. (Id. 4–5.) Plaintiff attests that she 10 and her spouse have $16 in cash and bank accounts. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that she and her 11 spouse do not own any assets of value. (Id.) 12 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring Plaintiff to pay the court 13 filing fees would impair her ability to obtain the necessities of life. Thistle v. La Rose, No. 14 21-CV-1414-JLS (MDD), 2021 WL 4150381, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2021) (granting 15 IFP status where plaintiff had positive monthly cashflow of approximately $850 and owned 16 assets valued at approximately $20,000); Girley v. Ratekin, No. 20-CV-01930-WQH- 17 AHG, 2020 WL 5877834, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020) (granting IFP status where plaintiff 18 had approximately $240 in cash and bank accounts and a vehicle valued at $1,000); Ngaiwe 19 v. Cty. of San Diego Child Support Servs., No. 20-CV-1356-WQH-RBB, 2020 WL 20 4365902, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (granting IFP status where plaintiff had monthly 21 positive cash flow of approximately $500 per month). 22 Considering the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. (ECF 23 No. 2.) 24 II. PRE-ANSWER SCREENING 25 A. Legal Standard 26 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, her Complaint also requires a pre-answer 27 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, 1 not just those filed by prisoners.”). Under this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss 2 a plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 3 claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Id. at 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 4 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 5 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 6 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 7 Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 8 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief 9 under which one can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 10 [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)12(b)(6)] standard for failure to state a claim.” 11 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 12 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 13 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under 14 [Rule] 12(b)(6)”). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 15 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 16 suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Determining whether a complaint 17 states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the court to 18 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of 19 misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short 20 of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain 21 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 22 face.” Id. 23 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of h[er] ‘entitlement to relief’ 24 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) 26 (alteration in original). “‘[A]llegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions 27 of fact, or unreasonable inferences’ are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and ‘are 28 insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.’” Jones v. Medtronic 1 Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528 (D. Ariz. 2019) (quoting Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 2 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)). Furthermore, despite the deference the court must pay 3 to a plaintiff’s allegations, particularly where, as here, the plaintiff is pro se, it is not proper 4 for the court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [she] has not alleged or that 5 defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. 6 Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 7 B. Analysis 8 Plaintiff asserts on behalf of herself, along with ten relatives whom she names as co- 9 Plaintiffs in the Complaint,2 a single claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a), Forced Labor 10 (“Section 1589(a)”), against Defendants. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Section 1589(a) makes 11 it a federal crime for any person to: 12 knowingly provid[e] or obtai[n] the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means— 13
14 (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; 15
16 (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; 17
18 (3) by means of abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
19 (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person 20 to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical 21 restraint. 22 23 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). 24 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), Congress has authorized “any individual who is a 25 victim of a violation of [Section 1589(a)]” to “bring a civil action against the perpetrator 26 (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from 27 2 Plaintiff’s co-Plaintiffs are Betty Akins, Caleb Lowery, Betty Akins, Kavan Akins, Joshua Akins, 28 1 participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an 2 act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may 3 recover damages and reasonable attorney[’s] fees.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). This civil suit 4 provision does not define the terms “victim,” “perpetrator,” or “person,” as those terms are 5 deployed in the statute. Id. 6 In support of her claim, Plaintiff alleges that on December 20, 1851, Defendant, 7 Judge S. Williams of Barbour, Alabama purchased for $600 at a slave auction “Jane” and 8 her “one-year old [child] Henry.” Plaintiff alleges that she and her co-Plaintiff relatives 9 “are the direct descendants of Henry.” Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of 10 $46,811,250 for restitution, emotional and mental anguish, and “loss of . . . heritage.” 11 (Compl. 5–6.) Reading the pro se Complaint generously, the Court sua sponte dismisses 12 this action without prejudice for the following reasons. 13 First, the proscription that a non-lawyer, pro se plaintiff may not represent others 14 applies to co-plaintiff relatives. Parties appearing in a federal court “may plead and 15 conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. “It is well 16 established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by [Section 1654] is 17 personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.” Simon v. Hartford 18 Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 19 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966)). A plaintiff appearing pro se has no authority to represent anyone 20 other than herself. Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962). That 21 prohibition applies with equal force when the person whom a non-lawyer pro se plaintiff 22 seeks to represent is her relative. See, e.g., Toro v. DYFS, 857 F. App’x 106, 106 n.1 (3d 23 Cir. 2021) (Mem.) (“Toro’s complaint named some of her relatives as co-plaintiffs; 24 however, none of those relatives signed the complaint or otherwise participated in the case, 25 and Toro, as a pro se litigant could not represent them.” (citing Murray ex rel. Purnell v. 26 City of Philadelphia, 901 F.3d 169, 170 (3d Cir. 2018)); Celestin v. U.S. Dep’t State Bureau 27 of Consular Affairs, No. 20-CV-947-AMD-LB, 2020 WL 6901081, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28 23, 2020) (holding “plaintiff could not represent his brother because non-lawyers can only 1 represent themselves; they cannot represent other people, even their relatives”); Sonnik v. 2 Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:18-CV-00366-TLN-CKD, 2019 WL 2339570, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 3 3, 2019) (similar); Quimby v. Vallance, CV05-202-AS, 2005 WL 2007877, at *2 (D. Or. 4 Aug. 16, 2005) (similar). 5 The Court observes that the Complaint is affixed only with Plaintiff Truth Akins’ 6 signature. From the absence of the other ten co-Plaintiffs’ signatures, it appears that 7 Plaintiff Truth Akins seeks to engage in the unauthorized practice of law by representing 8 her relatives in federal court. See Downing v. Wolfson, No. 2:16-CV-02131-APG-PAL, 9 2017 WL 3382562, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2017) (inferring pro se plaintiff sought to 10 represent family members from the absence of relatives’ signature on the pleading); 11 Quimby, 2005 WL 2007877, at *2 (same). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert 12 claims on behalf of anyone other than herself, those claims must be dismissed without 13 prejudice.3 See Qassimyar v. Children’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 05-CV-00350-JAH- 14 CAB, 2006 WL 8455345, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2006) (holding “plaintiff is not 15 entitled to appear pro se” on behalf of family members); Hutchison v. Live Well 16 Counseling, 1:21-CV-2973-SCJ, 2021 WL 3714006, at*1 n.2 (N.D. Ga. July 27, 2021) 17 (“In light of Plaintiff[’s] . . . pro se and non-attorney status, he cannot represent his family 18 members in federal court.”); Villone v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No. CV-09-8213-PCT- 19 LOA, 2009 WL 4824796, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2009) (similar). Accordingly, the Court 20 finds dismissal without prejudice of claims asserted by Plaintiff on behalf of her relatives 21 is appropriate. See, e.g., C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697–98 22 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal of suit brought by pro se on behalf of trust on ground 23
24 3 Given the absence of factual allegations in the Complaint, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is suing 25 in a representative capacity on behalf of her ancestors “Jane” and “Henry” or whether she claims that she is a “victim” under the civil suit provision, see 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). To the extent Plaintiff by this action 26 seeks to assert claims on behalf of her forebears, she may not do so for the reasons stated above. C.f. William v. United Staes, 477 F. App’x 9, (3d Cir. 2012) (holding daughter could not represent deceased 27 father pro se in federal court to prosecute Federal Tort Claims Act cause of action); Powerserve Int’l, Inc. v. Lavi, 239 F.3d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 2001) (“attorney-in-fact” for daughter not permitted to litigate pro se 28 1 pro se plaintiff lacked authority to represent entity in federal court); Downing, 2017 WL 2 3382562, at *3; Schwartz v. Snohomish Cty., No. C05-732P, 2005 WL 8172683, at *3 3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2005). 4 Second, Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendants who are immune from suit. See 5 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1226–27 (interpreting 28 U.S.C § 1915 as requiring sua sponte dismissal 6 of suits against immune defendants). The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial 7 power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 8 commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 9 by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend XI. That is, states “are 10 entitled to sovereign immunity from damages actions unless the state waives that immunity 11 by consenting to suit.” Bass v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 08-CV-2135-MMA-NLS, 2008 WL 12 11337429, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2008) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 13 Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–102 (1984)). “Waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by 14 a state will be found ‘only where stated by the most express language or by such 15 overwhelming implication from the text [of a statute] as [will] leave no room for any other 16 reasonable construction.’” Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1995) 17 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239–40 (1985)). To find that 18 Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity, a court must locate “unmistakably 19 clear” or “unequivocal” language in the statute that does so. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 20 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). 21 Plaintiff does not allege, nor is it apparent to the Court, that in enacting Sections 22 1589 and 1595, Congress intended to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. Although this 23 is a novel issue in the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit undertook a fulsome and robust 24 analysis of the pertinent statutes in Mojsilovic v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for the 25 Univ. of Okla., 841 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Mojsilovic”) and found absent from these 26 laws an unmistakably clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate sovereign 27 immunity. The Court agrees with the reasoning set forth in Mojsilovic. Section 1595(a) 28 creates a private cause of action against a “perpetrator” or “whoever” violates Section 1 1589(a). However, as mentioned above, Section 1595(a) does not define those terms. It is 2 well-settled that the mere creation of a private cause of action by Congress, without more, 3 is neither an unequivocal nor unmistakable abrogation of sovereign immunity. Atascadero, 4 473 U.S. at 245–46; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 5 527 U.S. 627, 631–32 (1999) (observing that previously undefined statutory language 6 creating liability for “whoever” violated patent laws failed to abrogate sovereign 7 immunity). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant State of Alabama cannot 8 proceed. 9 For similar reasons, Plaintiff’s suit against Defendant United States may not 10 continue. Although derived from a different source than state sovereign immunity, see 5 11 Kenneth Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 6–7 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining the principle 12 of sovereign immunity of the United States is borne from English law as opposed to the 13 Eleventh Amendment), the principle that the United States may not be sued unless it 14 consents to such suit is equally long-standing and well-established, see Cohens v. Virginia, 15 19 U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally received opinion is that no suit can be 16 commenced or prosecuted against the United States[.]”). “It is axiomatic that the United 17 States can only be sued to the extent that it has waived its sovereign immunity.” Cato v. 18 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 19 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987)). Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suits against the United 20 States to which the United States has not consented. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 21 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as 22 it contends to be sued.”). “It is likewise well settled that a waiver of the government’s 23 sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” Cato, 70 24 F.3d at 1107 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1983)) (quotation 25 marks and citation omitted). Based upon the analysis above, the Court finds that the United 26 States similarly has not unequivocally consented to suit under Section 1595(a) and, thus, 27 is immune from suit. See Mojsilovic, 841 F.3d at 1129. 28 1 Third, Plaintiff instituted this action against a deceased Defendant. See Cavanaugh 2 v. County of San Diego, 18-CV-2557-BEN-LL, 2020 WL 8838234, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3 24, 2020) (holding plaintiff could not pursue claims against a defendant who had died prior 4 to initiation of the action); see also House v. Mitra QSR KNE LLC, 796 F. App’x 783, 788 5 (4th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases); Lacy v. Tyson, No. 1:07-cv-00381, 2012 WL 4343837, 6 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (collecting cases in the Rule 25 context). The transaction 7 giving rise to this action occurred in December of 1851. Although Plaintiff is entitled to 8 the assumption of truthfulness concerning the facts alleged in her Complaint and all 9 reasonable inferences therefrom, Plaintiff is not entitled to “unreasonable inferences” or 10 “unwarranted deductions of fact,” even considering the liberalities to which she is afforded 11 as a pro se litigant. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 12 2001). Because it is inconceivable Defendant Williams was alive when Plaintiff 13 commenced this action, her claims against him must be dismissed.4 14 Fourth, the Complaint lacks factual statements that give rise to liability under 15 Section 1589(a), and instead consists only of legal conclusions, which this Court cannot 16 credit as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all 17 of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”); Bell Atl. 18 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (“[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal 19 conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]” (quotations omitted)). The Complaint 20 alleges only that Defendant Williams purchased at a slave auction in 1851 two of her 21 ancestors. (Compl. 6.) While heinous, this assertion is unaccompanied by a scintilla of 22 factual content directed towards a single requisite element of Section 1589(a). See 18 23 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4) (delineating circumstances of forced labor that must be present for 24
25 4 To provide a point of reference, the Court observes that the oldest known living person was born 26 in 1903, approximately 52 years after the transaction upon which this action is premised occurred. World’s Oldest Person Marks 118th Birthday in Fukuoka, THE JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 2, 2021, 27 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/02/national/worlds-oldest-person-marks-118th-birthday- fukuoka/. 28 1 criminal and/or civil liability to arise under the statute). Furthermore, with respect to the 2 government Defendants, Plaintiff does not specify how she was abused by a public official 3 or even identify a public official connected to the wrongful acts in question. See McHenry 4 v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Complaint must “fully set[] 5 forth who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide 6 discovery”). Because the Complaint lacks a sufficient factual material to state a claim 7 against any Defendant, it is subject to dismissal. 8 Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege either constitutional or statutory standing. See 9 McFalls v. Alonzo, No. 21-CV-849-MMA-RBB, 2021 WL 2577149, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 10 23, 2021) (dismissing sua sponte plaintiff’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for failure to 11 establish standing). Those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must 12 satisfy the threshold requirement of showing an actual case or controversy under Article 13 III of the U.S. Constitution. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). To do so, a 14 plaintiff must allege the irreducible constitutional minimum of: (1) an injury in fact via 15 “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 16 actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) causation, i.e., the injury is “fairly 17 traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) redressability, i.e., it is “likely, 18 as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 19 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and quotations 20 omitted). “Each element of standing must be supported with the manner and degree of 21 evidence required at the successive stage of litigation.” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 22 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). At the pleading stage, a trial court must accept as true all 23 material allegations of the complaint, including those that relate to standing, and construe 24 the complaint in favor of the complaining party. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 25 General factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice 26 because the trial court presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts 27 necessary to support a claim. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. A failure to establish Article III 28 1 standing results in dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Steel 2 Co. v. Citizens for Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). 3 Plaintiff’s precise theory of standing is unclear on the face of her Complaint. On the 4 one hand, it appears as though Plaintiff asserts standing derivatively from the injury 5 suffered by her ancestors under a third-party standing theory. However, construing the 6 Complaint liberally as this Court must, Plaintiff’s allegations might also be interpreted as 7 asserting injury on a continuing basis in so far as she alleges “emotional and mental 8 damages from loss of heritage.” (Compl. 6.) Neither theory satisfies the “injury-in-fact” 9 requirement of Article III. 10 “As a general rule, a litigant must assert h[er] own legal rights and cannot assert the 11 legal rights of a third-party.” In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. 12 Supp. 2d 721, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)); see 13 also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 14 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (holding plaintiff must “show that he personally has suffered 15 some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the 16 defendant” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 17 This Court agrees with the third-party standing analysis applied by the Honorable 18 Charles R. Norgle of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 19 who, in In re African-America Slave Descendants Litig., a multi-district suit involving 20 nearly identical claims supported by more fulsome factual allegations than presented here, 21 held that 22 Plaintiffs cannot establish a personal injury by merely identifying tort victims and alleging a genealogical relationship. The illegal conduct at issue here, the 23 institution of slavery, is alleged to have directly affected Plaintiffs’ ancestors.[] 24 Plaintiffs now, more than a century later, point to that horrific institution as the source of their derivative injury. However . . . Plaintiffs fail to allege that 25 they have personally suffered a concrete and particularized injury as a result 26 of Defendants’ putatively illegal conduct; rather, Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is derivative of the injury inflicted upon enslaved African-Americans over a 27 century ago . . . . This is insufficient to establish standing, and contrary to 28 centuries of well-settled legal principles requiring that a litigant demonstrate 1 a personal stake in an alleged dispute. See, e.g., Tyler [v. Judges of Ct. of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406–07, 21 S. Ct. 206 (1900)] (stating that a 2 plaintiff must “aver an injury particular to himself, as distinguished from the 3 great body of his fellow citizens”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (stating that a “plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of 4 a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized.”); Raines 5 [v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997)] (stating that “a plaintiff’s complaint must establish that he has a ‘personal stake’ in the alleged dispute, and that the 6 alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him”); see also Antonin Scalia, 7 The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 881–82 (1983) (“I suggest that courts need 8 to accord greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional 9 requirement that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one . . . .”). To recognize Plaintiffs’ standing in this case “would transform the federal 10 courts into ‘no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of 11 concerned bystanders.’” Allen [v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)] (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 12 (1973). 13 375 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (alterations added). 14 Nor does Plaintiff’s continuing-injury theory satisfy Article III standing 15 requirements. In so holding, this Court cannot deny the similarities between Plaintiff’s 16 allegations here and those of plaintiffs in Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 17 1995), in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs who alleged injuries traceable 18 to the institution of slavery and lasting over the course of several generations proffered in 19 the eyes of the law “a generalized, class-based grievance” that is “‘more appropriately 20 addressed in the representative branches [of the United States government than in the 21 federal courts].’” Cato, 70 F.3d at 745 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751). The “loss of 22 heritage” Plaintiff alleges is insufficiently particularized for the same reasons. (See Compl. 23 6.) 24 In so holding, this Court notes that it is not unsympathetic to what it construes as 25 Plaintiff’s allegation that she has suffered intergenerational trauma directly and discernably 26 traceable to the institution of slavery. (Compl. 6 (alleging “emotional/mental damages 27 from loss of our heritage”).) Indeed, recent studies within the psychiatric community 28 1 suggest that trauma affects not only the victims of such trauma, but, through epigenetic 2 mechanisms, causes victims’ offspring to be more susceptible to trauma-related disorders.5 3 However, even if this Court were to credit Plaintiff’s intergenerational trauma as 4 sufficiently particularized to confer her constitutional standing, Plaintiff still fails to show 5 statutory standing. 6 To ascertain whether a plaintiff has statutory standing, the Court must determine 7 whether “a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 8 invoked.” Cato, 70 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751). “Courts determine 9 whether a plaintiff is within the zone of interests ‘using traditional tools of statutory 10 interpretation.’” Chen v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 393 F. Supp. 3d 850, 852 (N.D. Cal. 11 2019) (citing Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 12 (2017)). A plaintiff who lacks statutory standing under the law invoked by her complaint 13 is said to have failed to state a claim for relief. Vaughn v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 14 1021, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008). Even construing the Complaint generously, Plaintiff’s claim 15 that she suffers from intergenerational trauma falls well outside the zone of interests 16 protected by Sections 1589 and 1595. Section 1589(a) is a federal criminal statute that 17 protects persons from being forced to provide their labor to another through unlawful 18 physical or legal means by making such conduct punishable with criminal sanctions. 19
20 5 Rachel Yehuda, PhD., Professor of Psychiatry and Neuroscience and the Director of the 21 Traumatic Stress Studies Division at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine “has spearheaded a number of studies on different victim groups using different empirical methods, the results of which all indicate that 22 women can pass down an increased chance of [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”)] to their children if they experience prenatal PTSD.” Elizabeth Topolosky, The Horror in Our Heads: Cultural Trauma 23 Expert Testimony in U.S. Courts, 52 AKRON L. REV. 91, 115–16 (2018) (citing Yehuda, R., et al., Maternal, Not Paternal PTSD, is Related to Increased Risk for PTSD in Offspring of Holocaust Survivors, 24 42 PSYCHIATRIC RES. 1104 (2008) (finding children of women who developed PTSD as a result of the 25 Holocaust were more likely to exhibit PTSD symptoms than children whose mothers were not diagnosed with PTSD) and Yehuda, R., et al., Transgenerational Effects of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Babies 26 of Mothers Exposed to the World Trade Center Attacks During Pregnancy, J. OF CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 4115–18 (2005) (finding newborns of women who were pregnant and 27 present at or near the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 had significantly decreased levels of cortisol—a stress-related hormone that aids the body in shutting down non-essential functions to conserve 28 1 }|Section 1595(a) protects victims of violations under Section 1589(a) by providing them 2 || with the right to seek to hold liable perpetrators and collect from them the fruits of their 3 stolen labor. Neither Sections 1589(a) nor Section 1595(a) can be interpreted fairly to 4 ||extend their protections to a victim’s entire genealogical lineage. 5 Because Plaintiff (1) seeks to represent others, (2) seeks to sue immune defendants; 6 ||(3) seeks to sue a deceased individual; (4) fails to state a claim for relief; and (5) lacks 7 || constitutional or statutory standing, the Court finds dismissal appropriate under U.S.C. § 8 || 1915(e)(2) (41). 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP Motion and 11 |] DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1). 12 || The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in her Complaint. 13 ||If she decides to do so, she must file an amended complaint titled “First Amended 14 Complaint” no later than December 9, 2021. Failure to timely file an amended complaint 15 || will result in dismissal of this action with prejudice. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 /) yoy 18 || DATED: November 9, 2021 Cypillg (Ayphaars 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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