Akil Bey v. RRHA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: October 24, 2014
• Docket: 14-1750
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1750

AKIL RASHIDI BEY, Ex rel Aikdo Graves, Moorish American Moslem National, in full life, All Rights Reserved, Without Prejudice, Tscnocmoco Territory,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

RICHMOND REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

WILLITTE C. WILLIAMS, in her official and personal capacity; TAMMY L. GRUBB, in her official and personal capacity; CALANDRA M. TROTTER, in her official and personal capacity; GENESIS PROPERTIES, in their official and personal capacity; JEFFERSON TOWNHOMES, in their official and personal capacity; VANESSADIETERLY, in their official and personal capacity; JOYWARFIELD, in their official and personal capacity,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:13-cv-00464-HEH)

Submitted: October 22, 2014 Decided: October 24, 2014

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Akil Rashidi Bey, Appellant Pro Se. Steven George Popps, Brian Emory Pumphrey, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM:

Akil Bey appeals the district court’s order dismissing

his complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Bey

argues that the district judge should have recused himself,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). Because Bey never presented

a motion for recusal to the district court, we review his claim

under the plain error standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b); see

United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 535-36 (3d Cir. 1979)

(holding that where § 455 recusal was not raised before trial

judge, the standard of review is plain error). Our review of

the record reflects no bias or conflicts of interest on the part

of the district judge. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED