Akerson v. United States

175 Ct. Cl. 551, 1966 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 255, 1966 WL 8869
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 13, 1966
DocketNo. 155-64; No. 156-64; No. 157-64; No. 158-64; No. 159-64; No. 160-64; No. 161-64
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 175 Ct. Cl. 551 (Akerson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Akerson v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 551, 1966 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 255, 1966 WL 8869 (cc 1966).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

These consolidated actions are brought ,by some 1,800 plaintiffs to recover additional retired pay for the period June 1, 1958 to October 1, 1963. Each plaintiff is a retired officer, or legal representative of a deceased officer, of one of the Armed Forces, the Public Health Service or the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Prior to June 1, 1958, each officer represented here was receiving retired pay computed as a percentage of the “monthly basic pay” of his retired grade. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §3991 (Army), §6325 (Navy), §8991 (Air Force) (1958 Ed.). As a general rule, the retired grade was equivalent to the active duty grade held on the date of retirement, so each officer benefited from any pay increase given to an officer of like rank serving on active duty. See 10 TT.S.C. § 3961 (1958 Ed.) (Army); Career Compensation Act of 1949, § 201, ch. 681, 63 Stat. 802, 805-807, as amended, 37 TJ.S.C. § 232(a) (Supp. IV, 1952 Ed.) (all services). In 1958, legislation was enacted which amended the Career Compensation Act of 1949. Act of May 20, 1958, 72 Stat. 122. Included in the new legislation were certain provisions relating to retirement pay which defendant interpreted as meaning that officers retired before the effective date of the Act were entitled only to their pre-effective date retirement pay plus six percent. Sections 3-4, 6-7. Plaintiffs received retirement pay computed in this manner until October 1, 1963, when they became entitled to retirement pay based on the active duty pay rates that became effective on June 1, 1958. Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963, § 5, 77 Stat. 210, 212-215. Plaintiffs concede that the 1963 legislation was prospective only; they base their claims on the 1958 legislation, alleging that it preserved the retirement-pay-based-on-active-duty-pay scheme.

In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant argues that section 3 (a) of the 1958 Act expressly prohibits the increased retired pay claimed by plaintiffs. Part of this argument is that section 4(b) does not except plaintiffs from 3(a)’s broad scope. Plaintiffs, of course, argue the contrary and have filed with their motion for summary judgment a long and confusing brief setting forth their answer to defendant’s [554]*554argument and making other arguments as well. We view the dispute over sections 3 (a) and 4(b) as the primary issue.

The disputed sub-sections provide as follows:

Sec. 3. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except sections 4 and 1 of this Act and subsection (b) of this section, the changes in rates of basic pay made by this Act do not increase the amount of retired pay, retirement pay, retainer pay, or equivalent pay to which any person is entitled on the day before the effective date of this Act.
Sec. 4. (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member of a uniformed service retired under any provision of law, or transferred to the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, on the effective date of this Act shall have his retired pay or retainer pay computed on the basis of the rates of basic pay set forth in the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended by this Act, or on the rates of basic pay set forth in the Career Compensation Act of 1949 on the day before the effective date of this Act, plus 6 per centum of that pay, whichever is greater.

Defendant’s argument is quite simply that unless plaintiffs are excepted by section 4(b), their retirement pay must continue to be based on the “basic pay” rates in effect “before the effective date of this Act.”1 And the argument goes that section 4(b) cannot apply because plaintiffs were not “retired under any provision of law, or transferred to the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, on the effective date of this Act * * Plaintiffs argue that they were “retired * * * on the effective date of this Act.” They point out that defendant’s construction would limit section 4(b) to persons who actually retire on or become retired on the effective date of the Act which they say would be an absurd result. Either interpretation is possible; neither is completely satisfying. Thus, if defendant is correct, section 4(b) applies only to those persons who retire on June 1,1958. [555]*555If this is the legislative intent, we would prefer to have a provision unencumbered by ambiguity. If plaintiffs are correct, we would seem to be reading part of section 4(a) out of the statute. See footnote 1, supra. Only the legislative history can help us to carry out the purpose of the disputed provisions, and in this case the legislative history is very helpful indeed.

In recommending to the Senate that the 1958 military pay act be passed, the Committee on Armed Services reported that legislation was needed “to establish a career force for the military services.” The Committee prefaced the report with the following quote from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe there is a vital need to increase the overall attractiveness of the professional military career in relation to its civilian counterparts in private industry. It is believed that a program of long-range incentives designed to this end is a matter of the highest priority in order to obtain the requisite high professional level in our military force. [S. Eep. No. 1472, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2465 (1958).]

The report continued with a statistical survey which showed the low incidence of re-enlistment and the negative effect on military operations of the resulting shortage of experienced personnel. Under a heading entitled “Objective of the Bill” was the following statement:

The basic objective of this legislation is to provide a military pay system designed to attract and retain qualified personnel for active career service. [2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2467 (1958).]

In short, the Committee envisaged this as a bill to encourage able officers and enlisted men to stay in the uniformed services and to attract young men to become career officers and enlisted men.

Consistent with this purpose, the bill increased the basic pay which had previously been set by the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, supra. The minimum increase was six percent. This reflected the “cost-of-living in[556]*556crease since the enactment of the previous military pay legislation in 1955.” 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2473 (1958). The maximum increases were given to the higher ranking officers and enlisted men, “the aim * * * [being] to provide an incentive for young officers and enlisted men to aspire to higher grades.” 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2474 (1958). Immediately succeeding the discussion of the basic pay increases came the following explanation of the bill’s effect on persons already retired:

The bill as passed by the House provided in effect that members retired before the effective date of the act would receive a flat 6-percent increase except for those on the retired list in the grade of lieutenant general, or equivalent, or general, and equivalent.
The 'Senate committee amended the House provision by deleting the language permitting those on the retired list in 3- and 4-star rank to recompute their retired pay ■under the new rates of the bill.

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Bluebook (online)
175 Ct. Cl. 551, 1966 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 255, 1966 WL 8869, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/akerson-v-united-states-cc-1966.