Akansa v. United States Department of Commerce

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-0505
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AIYOBA SARA’MAMY AKANSA,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cv-505

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Aiyoba Sara’mamy Akansa, proceeding pro se, brings claims under the Alien Tort

Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;

the law of nations; the treaties of the United States; and customary international law.

Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 18. She sues the United States Department of Commerce; Secretary of

Commerce Howard W. Lutnick; the United States Census Bureau (collectively, the “Federal

Defendants”); the State of Illinois; Governor J.B. Pritzker; the Illinois Department of Public Health

and its director, Sameer Vohra (collectively, the “State Defendants”); Judge Charles Ashley Royal,

a senior district court judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia

(“Judge Royal”); Putnam County, Georgia; the Putnam County Sheriff’s Department; and Putnam

County Sheriff Howard R. Sills. Id. Federal Defendants (who also represent Judge Royal) and

the Illinois Department of Public Health separately filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Fed. Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss at 6–10, ECF No. 11; State Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4–6, ECF No. 4. Plaintiff then

moved for leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 16. The Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s

Page 1 of 8 Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and treat the motions to dismiss as directed at

the Amended Complaint. See Azabdaftari v. Mayer, 734 F. Supp. 2d 51, 52 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2010).

For the following reasons, the court will also GRANT Federal Defendants’ and the Illinois

Department of Public Health’s Motions to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that she is “an Indigenous descendant of the Arawak people” and a “citizen

of the Maipuri Arauan Nation” and therefore “an alien and non-citizen to the United States.”

Am. Compl. ¶ 5. She contends that, in listing her race in a manner inconsistent with her tribal

identity and failing to correct the misclassification, Federal and State Defendants “sever[ed] her

from her tribal identity and federal rights associated with Indigenous classification.” Id. ¶ 18. In

particular, she alleges that “the Inspector General of the Department of Commerce . . . referred the

matter for correction” but that such correction “never occurred.” Id. ¶ 22. But the letter attached

to her Amended Complaint, addressed to “Mr. Xelup,” merely notes that the Office of the Inspector

General “decided to refer” an unspecified complaint “to management officials at the U.S. Census

Bureau and . . . requested that they take any action they deem appropriate.” Ex. D at 32, ECF. No.

18-1. Plaintiff “asserts that her forced racial misclassification” and “identity erasure” constitute

“violations of jus cogens norms and peremptory international law obligations” and brings claims

for crimes against humanity, constructive fraud, ethnic cleansing, environmental racism, apartheid,

and violation of Indigenous sovereignty. Id. ¶ 1. She also claims that Judge Royal “acted without

jurisdiction and in a non-judicial capacity” by “issuing and affirming . . . orders” displacing

Plaintiff and other tribal members from land in Putnam County, Georgia. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35. She seeks

a declaration that Judge Royal’s rulings were void, correction of her racial and tribal records,

Page 2 of 8 injunctive relief “to prevent further misclassification or land dispossession,” and $10 million in

compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). In evaluating a motion to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating

subject matter jurisdiction.” Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008). If the

plaintiff is unable to do so, the court must dismiss the action. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Both a lack of Article III standing and sovereign immunity are

grounds for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Haase v.

Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Geronimo v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185

(D.D.C. 2010).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is appropriate when “it is ‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail

based on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

Under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the complaint as true. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249,

1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “Because the court has ‘an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting

within the scope of its jurisdictional authority,’ however, the factual allegations in the complaint

Page 3 of 8 ‘will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for

failure to state a claim.’” Nat’l Ass’n for Latino Cmty. Asset Builders v. Consumer Fin. Prot.

Bureau, 581 F. Supp. 3d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of

Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001)).

“The pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally construed,’ and a pro se complaint,

‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.’” James v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This benefit is not, however, a license to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F.Supp.2d 135, 137 (D.D.C.

2009). “[E]ven a pro se plaintiff must meet his burdens of proving subject matter jurisdiction and

stating a claim for relief.” James, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 63.

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief

and damages based on alleged racial misclassification because she has failed to allege that she

suffered concrete harm necessary for Article III standing.

Plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of

relief that they seek” by alleging “a concrete and particularized injury caused by the defendant and

redressable by the court.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431, 423 (2021). At the

motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff is “required only to state a plausible claim that each of the

standing elements is present.” Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned

up). Plaintiff alleges that she suffered direct harm from the mere fact that government actors

misclassified her race in census databases and failed to correct the error. See, e.g.,

Am. Compl. ¶ 25. But misclassification, absent evidence that the erroneous information was

Page 4 of 8 disclosed to third parties, is not a concrete injury. See TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 434 (“[T]here

is ‘no historical or common-law analog where the mere existence of inaccurate information, absent

dissemination, amounts to concrete injury.’” (quoting Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc.

v. Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 344–345 (D.C. Cir. 2018))). Plaintiff does not allege any

disclosure of her erroneous racial classification; indeed, any such disclosure is “unlikely . . . given

federal law’s extensive privacy protections that prohibit sharing individuals’ information obtained

through the Census.” Angeni v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 24-cv-2006 (CRC), 2024 WL 4582972,

at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2024); see Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 361 (1982) (“[T]he Census

Act embod[ies] explicit congressional intent to preclude all disclosure of raw census data reported

by or on behalf of individuals.”). Absent allegations that government actors shared her information

or that any other concrete harm followed from the alleged misclassification, Plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible claim that she suffered a concrete injury.

Even assuming Plaintiff could demonstrate a concrete injury, her claims for money

damages against Federal and State Defendants are barred by sovereign immunity. 1

Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature and protects the federal government, its

agencies, and its employees acting in their official capacities from suit. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “[P]laintiff bears the burden of establishing that sovereign immunity has

been waived or abrogated.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 38 (D.D.C. 2014); see Tri–State

Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Based on principles of

federalism and comity, the Eleventh Amendment also bars private federal suits against states and

1 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages from Secretary of Commerce Howard W. Lutnick, Governor J.B. Pritzker, and the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, Sameer Vohra in their individual capacities, sovereign immunity does not bar such claims. See Clark v. Libr. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But those claims nonetheless fail because Plaintiff has not alleged a concrete injury necessary for Article III standing.

Page 5 of 8 agencies operating as “arms of the State” unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has

abrogated such immunity by exercising its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); see id. at 726–27; Ali v. D.C., 278 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.

2002). The Eleventh Amendment also bars damages claims against state officials in their official

capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Plaintiff fails to establish any federal waiver of sovereign immunity. The Alien Tort Statute

grants original jurisdiction over civil actions filed by non-citizens for torts committed in violation

of international law or U.S. treaties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1350, but does not confer any waiver of

sovereign immunity, see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985). And

to the extent Plaintiff asserts common law torts claims against Federal Defendants under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA is

limited to the United States and does not extend to agencies or government officials. See Cox v.

Sec’y of Lab., 739 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1990). Further, while Plaintiff broadly states that she

“attempted to seek redress through administrative and federal channels,” Am. Compl. ¶ 32, she

does not otherwise allege that she exhausted her administrative remedies under the FTCA, a

mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.

106, 113 (1993).

Sovereign immunity also bars Plaintiff’s damages suit against the State of Illinois, the

Illinois Department of Public Health, and Governor Pritzker and Vohra in their official capacities.

It is undisputed that the Illinois Department of Public Health is a state agency that operates as an

arm of the state. See Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir.

2008) (“Courts have held that state entities as varied as universities, transportation authorities, and

port authorities can be arms of the State immune from suit.”). And Plaintiff neither argues that

Page 6 of 8 Illinois has waived its sovereign immunity from tort actions in federal court nor pleads a cause of

action under a federal statute that abrogates it. See Ali, 278 F.3d at 6.

As to Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief voiding Judge Royal’s decisions, a “federal

district court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of other federal courts.” Smalls v. United States,

471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Because Plaintiff’s claim is “wholly premised on h[er] view

that the[] prior orders were erroneous,” dismissal is appropriate. Xelup v. Dep’t of Com., No. 1:24-

CV-1241 (CJN), 2025 WL 785218, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2025). “[R]elief through an appeal to

an appellate court” is the proper “remedy available to a litigant who seeks to challenge the legality

of decisions made by a judge in her judicial capacity.” Jafari v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 277,

279 (D.D.C.) (cleaned up). To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages from Judge Royal, judges “enjoy

absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge’s

judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)

(per curiam). Beyond conclusory allegations of “judicial overreach,” Plaintiff pleads no specific

facts suggesting that Judge Royal acted outside of his official capacity. Am. Compl. ¶ 34. In fact,

the actions about which Plaintiff complains—“issuing and affirming the displacement orders,”

id. ¶ 33—are “quintessential official judicial acts . . . protected by absolute judicial immunity,”

Jafari, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 280.

Finally, the court lacks jurisdiction over claims in the Amended Complaint that are “so

attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.

528, 536 (1974) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)),

including allegations that Federal and State Defendants have committed “crimes against

humanity,” “racial apartheid,” “identity erasure,” “ethnic cleansing,” “forced nationality,” and

Page 7 of 8 “constructive fraud,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–40. Even if the court were to reach the merits of these

claims, it would conclude that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and

12(b)(6) because she has not alleged specific facts sufficient to provide adequate notice of the

operative facts and her entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 16; Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF. No. 11; and the Illinois

Department of Public Health’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4. The Amended Complaint is

dismissed as to Federal Defendants, State Defendants, and Judge Royal. A separate order will

accompany this opinion.2

Date: November 24, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

2 As to Plaintiff’s claims against Putnam County, Georgia; the Putnam County Sheriff’s Department; and Putnam County Sheriff Howard R. Sills, the court notes that it is unclear from the record whether Plaintiff properly served these defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). A separate order to show cause will accompany this opinion.

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