NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 29 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AJEENAH CRITTENDON; EZ E-FILE No. 23-16205 TAX PREPARERS, INC., a California corporation, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-09153-RS
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
ANGELICA MULDROW, AKA Angelica Ivana,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 20, 2024 San Francisco, California
Before: BRESS and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District Judge.
EZ E-File Tax Preparers, Inc. (EZ), and its CEO, Ajeenah Crittendon
(collectively, “Crittendon”), appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. against Crittendon’s niece, Angelica Muldrow, for defamation and the filing of false
police reports. The district court concluded that this lawsuit was barred by res
judicata on account of a prior lawsuit filed by Muldrow in Georgia alleging that
Crittendon and EZ had issued Muldrow certain fraudulent tax forms. See
Muldrow v. EZ E-File Tax Preparers, Inc., 2022 WL 2349204 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22,
2022). In the district court’s view, Crittendon either could have raised or did raise
her current claims as compulsory counterclaims in the Georgia case.
We review the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) de novo. Pardini v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 65 F.4th 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.
2023). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s
decision dismissing Crittendon’s claims, except as to Muldrow’s acts that occurred
after the Georgia court issued its judgment. As to the latter, we reverse.
1. We agree with the district court that the Georgia lawsuit precludes
Crittendon’s defamation and false reporting claims premised on conduct that
occurred before the Georgia court issued its judgment, because these claims were
compulsory counterclaims in the prior lawsuit. Under Georgia law, “there are three
requirements which must be satisfied in order for res judicata to apply: there must
be identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties or their privies, and previous
adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Bostick v. CMM
Props., Inc., 772 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 2015); see also Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v.
2 Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a federal court
assessing the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by another federal court
sitting in diversity “must apply preclusion principles according to the law of the
initial court’s state”).
Crittendon does not dispute that the two lawsuits involve the same parties.
We further agree with the district court that the “same claim” requirement is satisfied
(except insofar as the claims are premised on Muldrow’s conduct occurring after the
Georgia decision, which we discuss below). Although the Georgia lawsuit related
to Muldrow’s tax fraud claim, the “same claim” requirement is met if Crittendon
either (1) actually raised her defamation and false reporting claims in the Georgia
lawsuit, or (2) should have raised them then as compulsory counterclaims. See, e.g.,
Setlock v. Setlock, 688 S.E.2d 346, 385–86 (Ga. 2010).
Here, Crittendon did raise, and should have raised, her then-existing claims
against Muldrow in the prior Georgia lawsuit. Crittendon’s answer in the Georgia
case generally alleged that Muldrow committed the same acts for which she now
seeks relief in this case. Further, based on the answer, Crittendon herself understood
the tax returns as inherently related to her allegations that Muldrow had previously
made false statements about her. Indeed, and among other things, in the Georgia
answer Crittendon requested a “Motion to Demand – Plaintiff Muldrow to remove
the Harassing, Malicious, Defaming Facebook & Google Posts against Defendants.”
3 In substance, these are the same claims she advances here.
Crittendon’s answer thus itself demonstrates “a logical
relationship . . . between the respective claims asserted by the opposing parties.”
Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Sams & Cole, LLC, 729 S.E.2d 540, 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Steve A. Martin Agency, Inc. v. PlantersFIRST Corp., 678 S.E.2d 186, 188
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009)). Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court
that even if the Georgia answer did not sufficiently raise the defamation and false
reporting claims as counterclaims, they were compulsory counterclaims that are now
precluded. See OCGA § 9-11-13(a) (indicating that a counterclaim is compulsory if
it “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim”).
The third requirement for res judicata under Georgia law is likewise met
because the Georgia decision operated as an “adjudication on the merits” for all
claims that were actually at issue or that “‘might have been put in issue,’” including
the counterclaims as discussed above. See Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v.
Gwinnett County, 903 S.E.2d 55, 62–63 (Ga. 2024) (quoting OCGA § 9-12-40).
Crittendon has waived any argument that the Georgia court was not competent to
adjudicate these claims by failing to raise this issue below. See United States v.
Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (issues not raised below are waived).
Finally, we reject Crittendon’s arguments that any policy-based concerns justify not
4 applying res judicata here.
2. We disagree with the district court that the same reasoning applies to
Crittendon’s claims premised on Muldrow’s conduct that occurred on or after April
2022, which was after the district court in Georgia issued its decision. Under
Georgia law, res judicata does not apply to a claim “where the merits were not and
could not have been determined under a proper presentation and management of the
case . . .” Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 498 S.E.2d 255, 256 (Ga. 1998);
see also Bigley v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 29 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AJEENAH CRITTENDON; EZ E-FILE No. 23-16205 TAX PREPARERS, INC., a California corporation, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-09153-RS
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
ANGELICA MULDROW, AKA Angelica Ivana,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 20, 2024 San Francisco, California
Before: BRESS and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District Judge.
EZ E-File Tax Preparers, Inc. (EZ), and its CEO, Ajeenah Crittendon
(collectively, “Crittendon”), appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. against Crittendon’s niece, Angelica Muldrow, for defamation and the filing of false
police reports. The district court concluded that this lawsuit was barred by res
judicata on account of a prior lawsuit filed by Muldrow in Georgia alleging that
Crittendon and EZ had issued Muldrow certain fraudulent tax forms. See
Muldrow v. EZ E-File Tax Preparers, Inc., 2022 WL 2349204 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22,
2022). In the district court’s view, Crittendon either could have raised or did raise
her current claims as compulsory counterclaims in the Georgia case.
We review the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) de novo. Pardini v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 65 F.4th 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.
2023). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s
decision dismissing Crittendon’s claims, except as to Muldrow’s acts that occurred
after the Georgia court issued its judgment. As to the latter, we reverse.
1. We agree with the district court that the Georgia lawsuit precludes
Crittendon’s defamation and false reporting claims premised on conduct that
occurred before the Georgia court issued its judgment, because these claims were
compulsory counterclaims in the prior lawsuit. Under Georgia law, “there are three
requirements which must be satisfied in order for res judicata to apply: there must
be identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties or their privies, and previous
adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Bostick v. CMM
Props., Inc., 772 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 2015); see also Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v.
2 Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a federal court
assessing the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by another federal court
sitting in diversity “must apply preclusion principles according to the law of the
initial court’s state”).
Crittendon does not dispute that the two lawsuits involve the same parties.
We further agree with the district court that the “same claim” requirement is satisfied
(except insofar as the claims are premised on Muldrow’s conduct occurring after the
Georgia decision, which we discuss below). Although the Georgia lawsuit related
to Muldrow’s tax fraud claim, the “same claim” requirement is met if Crittendon
either (1) actually raised her defamation and false reporting claims in the Georgia
lawsuit, or (2) should have raised them then as compulsory counterclaims. See, e.g.,
Setlock v. Setlock, 688 S.E.2d 346, 385–86 (Ga. 2010).
Here, Crittendon did raise, and should have raised, her then-existing claims
against Muldrow in the prior Georgia lawsuit. Crittendon’s answer in the Georgia
case generally alleged that Muldrow committed the same acts for which she now
seeks relief in this case. Further, based on the answer, Crittendon herself understood
the tax returns as inherently related to her allegations that Muldrow had previously
made false statements about her. Indeed, and among other things, in the Georgia
answer Crittendon requested a “Motion to Demand – Plaintiff Muldrow to remove
the Harassing, Malicious, Defaming Facebook & Google Posts against Defendants.”
3 In substance, these are the same claims she advances here.
Crittendon’s answer thus itself demonstrates “a logical
relationship . . . between the respective claims asserted by the opposing parties.”
Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Sams & Cole, LLC, 729 S.E.2d 540, 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Steve A. Martin Agency, Inc. v. PlantersFIRST Corp., 678 S.E.2d 186, 188
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009)). Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court
that even if the Georgia answer did not sufficiently raise the defamation and false
reporting claims as counterclaims, they were compulsory counterclaims that are now
precluded. See OCGA § 9-11-13(a) (indicating that a counterclaim is compulsory if
it “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim”).
The third requirement for res judicata under Georgia law is likewise met
because the Georgia decision operated as an “adjudication on the merits” for all
claims that were actually at issue or that “‘might have been put in issue,’” including
the counterclaims as discussed above. See Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v.
Gwinnett County, 903 S.E.2d 55, 62–63 (Ga. 2024) (quoting OCGA § 9-12-40).
Crittendon has waived any argument that the Georgia court was not competent to
adjudicate these claims by failing to raise this issue below. See United States v.
Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (issues not raised below are waived).
Finally, we reject Crittendon’s arguments that any policy-based concerns justify not
4 applying res judicata here.
2. We disagree with the district court that the same reasoning applies to
Crittendon’s claims premised on Muldrow’s conduct that occurred on or after April
2022, which was after the district court in Georgia issued its decision. Under
Georgia law, res judicata does not apply to a claim “where the merits were not and
could not have been determined under a proper presentation and management of the
case . . .” Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 498 S.E.2d 255, 256 (Ga. 1998);
see also Bigley v. Mosser, 509 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
libel claims were not precluded by a prior libel lawsuit where the subsequent claims
were “based upon a different statement, made at a different time and in a different
publication”). Muldrow offers no substantive response to this point, nor does she
identify any authority that required Crittendon to seek further relief from the Georgia
court after March 2022. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Crittendon’s claims to the extent they are premised on Muldrow’s April 2022 actions
or any other actions after March 2022.
3. We reject Crittendon’s argument that Muldrow’s motion to dismiss was
untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. That Muldrow had previously
moved to strike a prior version of the complaint does not render untimely her
subsequent Rule 12 motion with respect to a new complaint.
4. The lawsuits between these parties appear to be part of a broader familial
5 dispute over the care of a relative. At oral argument, counsel indicated that the
parties’ animosity toward each other may impede the resolution of this case. The
parties are cautioned that the federal courts are not the forum for litigating personal
grievances that do not involve meritorious claims for legal relief. Unending
litigation for litigation’s sake is not a proper use of judicial resources. The district
court has ample discretion to ensure that the parties abide by court rules and to
encourage the prompt resolution of the remaining claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.1
1 The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.