Ajani Chappell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., an Oregon corporation

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided June 29, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-02685·Unknown

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 AJANI CHAPPELL, individually and CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02685-JNW 8 on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 9 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE Plaintiff, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 10 v. 11 NIKE RETAIL SERVICES, INC., an 12 Oregon corporation, Defendant. 13 14

15 1. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff Ajani Chappell, individually and on behalf of a putative class, sued 17 Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc., alleging that it violated various Washington 18 wage and hour laws and regulations. Dkt. No. 1-1. Chappell now asks the Court to 19 strike certain of Defendant’s affirmative defenses under Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 12(f). Dkt. No. 11. For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED IN 21 PART. 22 23 1 2. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Affirmative defenses need not contain extensive factual allegations; they

3 must only give the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense asserted. See 4 Baylis v. Valve Corp., No. C23-1653RSM, 2025 WL 2161451, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 5 30, 2025) (“An affirmative defense must be pled in such a way that plaintiffs have 6 ‘fair notice’ of the defense, which generally requires that defendants state the 7 nature and grounds for the affirmative defense.”). A party wishing to challenge the 8 sufficiency of an affirmative defense may move to “strike from a pleading an

9 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 10 matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the 11 expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by 12 dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 13 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). “Rule 12(f) motions to strike are 14 generally disfavored because the motions may be used as delay tactics and because 15 of the strong policy favoring resolution on the merits.” Advanced Hair Restoration

16 LLC v. Bosely Inc., No. C23-1031-KKE, 2023 WL 9024196, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17 29, 2023) (citing Chao Chen v. Geo Grp., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1132 (W.D. 18 Wash. 2018)). On a motion to strike, the court “must take the facts as alleged by the 19 non-moving party—here, the Defendants—as true for purposes of evaluating the 20 adequacy of the challenged defense.” Ehart v. Lahaina Divers, Inc., 92 F.4th 844, 21 855 n.1 (9th Cir. 2024) (Collins, J., dissenting).

22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 Defendant asserted twenty-two affirmative defenses in the answer it filed in

3 state court before removing the case to this Court. Dkt. No. 1-3. Plaintiff challenges 4 six of them—the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Twentieth affirmative 5 defenses—as insufficient, invalid, immaterial, impertinent, or redundant. Dkt. No. 6 11 at 1. 7 3.1 First and second affirmative defenses. 8 Defendant concedes that its first and second affirmative defenses—failure to 9 state a claim and failure to establish injury-in-fact—may be stricken because they 10 address whether Plaintiff has met her burden of proof rather than raising true 11 affirmative defenses. See Dkt. No. 12 at 3; Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 12 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defense which demonstrates that plaintiff has 13 not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”). Accordingly, the motion 14 is granted as to the first and second affirmative defenses. 15 3.2 Third affirmative defense. 16 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s third affirmative defense—failure to 17 mitigate—is irrelevant because mitigation is not required in Washington wage and 18 hour cases. Dkt. No. 11 at 6. The Court agrees. Courts have held that mitigation is 19 not an affirmative defense under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et 20 seq., and that reasoning applies equally to Plaintiff’s claims under the Washington 21 Minimum Wage Act, which Washington courts construe consistently with the FLSA. 22 See Bailon v. Seok AM No. 1 Corp., No. C09-05483-JRC, 2009 WL 4884340, at *2 23 1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 9, 2009). Defendant appears to concede the point, arguing only 2 that Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that Defendant “permitted its employees

3 to work.” Dkt. No. 12 at 4. The motion is therefore granted as to Defendant’s third 4 affirmative defense. 5 3.3 Sixth affirmative defense. 6 Defendant’s sixth affirmative defense mistakenly cites RCW 49.58.110, a 7 statute Plaintiff does not invoke in her complaint. Defendant concedes the error and 8 states that it intended to cite RCW 49.52.070. See Dkt. No. 12 at 5. Accordingly, the 9 motion is granted as to Defendant’s sixth affirmative defense. 10 3.4 Eighth and twentieth affirmative defense. 11 Defendant’s eighth and twentieth affirmative defenses raise the question 12 whether Defendant acted in good faith. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 17–18. Washington courts 13 recognize the defense as it relates to double-damages under RCW 40.52.070. See 14 Bennett v. Providence Health & Servs., 35 Wash. App. 2d 1073 (2025), review 15 granted, 587 P.3d 1039 (2026) (Under RCW 49.52.070, “an employer is liable for 16 double damages for willful wage violations unless it carries the burden of showing 17 that a statutory defense applies.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff concedes that the 18 defense is relevant to the “exception of the doubling of damages.” Dkt. No. 13 at 6. 19 Given the “strong policy favoring resolution on the merits,” see Advanced Hair, 2023 20 WL 9024196, at *5, the Court denies the motion as to Defendant’s eighth and 21 twentieth affirmative defenses without prejudice. 22 23 1 4. CONCLUSION 2 In sum, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant’s First, Second, Third,

3 and Sixth affirmative defenses are STRICKEN with leave to amend within fourteen 4 (14) days of this order. The motion is DENIED as to Defendant’s Eighth and 5 Twentieth affirmative defense. 6 7 Dated this 29th day of June, 2026. 8 A Jamal N. Whitehead 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Ajani Chappell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., an Oregon corporation, (W.D. Wash. 2026).

Ajani Chappell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., an Oregon corporation (Ajani Chappell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., an Oregon corporation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co.
618 F.3d 970 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Chen v. Geo Grp., Inc.
297 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (W.D. Washington, 2018)
William Ehart, Jr. v. Lahaina Divers, Inc.
92 F.4th 844 (Ninth Circuit, 2024)