A.J. Long v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA & Z. Jiangyang

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 23, 2025
Docket89 C.D. 2023
StatusPublished

This text of A.J. Long v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA & Z. Jiangyang (A.J. Long v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA & Z. Jiangyang) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
A.J. Long v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA & Z. Jiangyang, (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Adam J. Long, : Appellant : : v. : : City of Pittsburgh Zoning : Board of Adjustment and Zhang : No. 89 C.D. 2023 Jiangyang : Submitted: February 4, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: April 23, 2025

Adam J. Long (Appellant) appeals from the December 20, 2022 Order (Trial Court Order) of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) that affirmed the decision of the City of Pittsburgh (City) Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board). The Board denied Appellant’s appeal of a zoning application to construct a new four-unit residential structure on the same lot with an existing single-unit residential structure (Application). Upon review, we reverse the Trial Court Order. I. Background and Procedural Posture Zhang Jiangyang (Intervenor) owns a property located at 6633 Northumberland Street in the City (Property). See Board Decision dated June 13, 2022 (Board Decision) at 2, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion dated December 20, 2022 (Trial Court Opinion) at 1, R.R. at 135a. The Property, which totals 9,600 square feet in a single parcel, is a “double lot” consisting of two combined 4,800-square-foot parcels originally laid out in a 1908 recorded subdivision plan. See Board Decision at 2, R.R. at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 1, R.R. at 135a. There is no dispute that the property is being treated as a single lot for purposes of the Application. See R.R. at 119a-20a (statement by Appellant that “[t]he two recorded lots have been designated as one zoning lot for purposes of this development”) & 130a-31a (statement by Intervenor’s counsel that the two lots “have been held in single ownership as a combined two lots . . . and they are being treated correctly as a single zoning lot”1). The Property is in the City’s Residential Multi-Family Medium Density Zoning District (RM-M District), which permits by right both Single-Unit Detached and Multi-Unit Residential uses. See Board Decision at 2, R.R. at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 1-2, R.R. at 135a-36a. Currently, the Property’s only primary structure is a two-story house. See Board Decision at 2, R.R. at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 1, R.R. at 135a. In June 2020, Intervenor filed the Application seeking approval to construct a new four-unit residential structure on the Property as part of a Unit Group Development, with the existing single-unit structure to remain on the Property as a fifth residential unit. See Board Decision at 2, R.R. at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 1, R.R. at 135a. In January 2022, the City’s Department of Planning (Department) approved the Application and issued a Record of Zoning Approval. See Board Decision at 2, R.R. at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 136a. Appellant timely appealed to the Board. See Board Decision at 2, R.R. at 80a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 136a. The Board conducted a

1 The Zoning Code of the City of Pittsburgh (Zoning Code) defines a “zoning lot” as “a parcel of land that is designated by its owner at the time of applying for a building permit as one (1) lot, all of which is to be used, developed or built upon as a unit under single ownership.” Zoning Code § 926.134.

2 hearing on the appeal in April 2022, after which it denied the appeal and affirmed the Department’s approval of the Application. See Board Decision at 2 & 5, R.R. at 80a & 83a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 136a. Appellant appealed the Board Decision to the Trial Court. See Trial Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 136a. Following oral argument, the Trial Court affirmed the Board Decision and denied and dismissed Appellant’s appeal by order dated December 20, 2022. See Trial Court Opinion at 4, R.R. at 138a. Appellant then appealed to this Court. II. Issues Appellant raises several issues on appeal.2 First, Appellant claims the Board erred by finding that the Zoning Code of the City of Pittsburgh3 (Zoning Code) permits Unit Group Development in the RM-M District. Second, Appellant argues that the Board abused its discretion by determining that Intervenor’s proposed development amounted to two or more “related” primary buildings as required for compliance with the Zoning Code. Appellant’s Br. at 4 & 11-13. Third, Appellant claims that the Board erred by ignoring the phrase “within a single building” in relation to the term “multi-unit residential” as used in the Zoning Code. Appellant’s Br. at 4 & 13-16. Intervenor counters that a Unit Group Development is permitted in the RM-M District. Further, Intervenor contends that, to the extent that Appellant argued in his brief that the proposed development does not qualify as a Unit Group Development because the buildings are different styles, that argument is waived

2 Where the trial court has taken no additional evidence, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether a zoning board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence or whether the zoning board made an error of law in rendering its decision. Twp. of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 962 A.2d 653, 659 (Pa. 2009).

3 Pittsburgh, Pa., Zoning Code (1999), as amended.

3 because it was not raised previously. Intervenor also maintains that the Board properly considered all relevant provisions of the Zoning Code in rendering its decision. III. Discussion Appellant’s claims present questions of statutory interpretation. When interpreting the meaning of a zoning ordinance, we apply the principles of statutory construction with the primary objective of determining the intent of the legislative body that enacted the ordinance. See THW Grp., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.3d 330, 336 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”). As this Court has observed: [A] statute’s plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. See Com. v. McClintic, 909 A.2d 1241 (Pa. 2006). Thus, statutory construction begins with examination of the text itself. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Holmes, 835 A.2d 851 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). In reading the plain language of a statute, “words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). Further, every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions so that no provision is “mere surplusage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Moreover, although we must “listen attentively to what a statute says[,] one must also listen attentively to what it does not say.” Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955, 962 (Pa. 2001). We may not insert a word the legislature failed to supply into a statute.

“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).

4 Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 298 A.3d 1181, 1187-88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (emphasis and brackets omitted). Moreover, a statute – or ordinance – is not ambiguous “merely because two conflicting interpretations may be suggested.” Id. at 1188 (quoting Tri-Cnty. Landfill, Inc. v.

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A.J. Long v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA & Z. Jiangyang, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aj-long-v-city-of-pittsburgh-zba-z-jiangyang-pacommwct-2025.