Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. United States

55 F.3d 684, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 119, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 41001, 1995 WL 310025
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedApril 24, 1995
Docket93-5254
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 55 F.3d 684 (Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 55 F.3d 684, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 119, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 41001, 1995 WL 310025 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Opinion

55 F.3d 684

312 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 75 A.F.T.R.2d 95-2068,
95-1 USTC P 50,279

NOTICE: D.C. Circuit Local Rule 11(c) states that unpublished orders, judgments, and explanatory memoranda may not be cited as precedents, but counsel may refer to unpublished dispositions when the binding or preclusive effect of the disposition, rather than its quality as precedent, is relevant.
AIRLIE FOUNDATION, INC., Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF America, Appellee.

No. 93-5254.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

April 24, 1995.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON AND TATEL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This case was heard on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs and arguments by counsel. The court has accorded the arguments full consideration and has determined the issues presented occasion no need for a published opinion. See D.C. Cir. Rule 36(b). For the reasons set out in the accompanying memorandum, it is

ORDERED that the judgment from which this appeal has been taken be affirmed.

The clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C. Cir. Rule 41(a)(1).

ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

Airlie Foundation, Inc. (AFI) appeals the grant of summary judgment to the government in AFI's declaratory judgment action challenging the Internal Revenue Service's revocation of its tax-exempt status. The district court upheld the revocation because AFI operated for non-exempt purposes and for private inurement. AFI contends that the district court improperly considered certain evidence and grounds for revocation and maintains that the district court misapplied the standard for revocation. We affirm the district court.

AFI was organized in 1960 as a not-for-profit educational resource center. In 1963, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted AFI an exemption from federal income tax as a section 501(c)(3) organization.1 In 1979, Dr. Murdock Head (Head), the founder and executive director of AFI, was convicted of bribery of a public official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201, and of conspiracy to commit tax fraud and to bribe public officials, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Secs. 7201, 7206 and 18 U.S.C. Secs. 201, 371.2 AFI and Raven's Hollow, Ltd., another corporation controlled by Head, had been named as unindicted co-conspirators in that prosecution. Following the criminal case, the IRS initiated an investigation of AFI's tax-exempt status for the years 1976 through 1980. At the conclusion of the investigation, the IRS determined that AFI did not operate exclusively for exempt purposes because it operated for the private benefit of Head.3 In 1988, the IRS issued a notice of determination which revoked, effective January 1, 1976, AFI's tax-exempt status as a section 501(c)(3) organization.

AFI brought a declaratory judgment action under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7428(a) challenging the revocation of its tax-exempt status.4 The district court rejected the challenge and granted summary judgment to the government. Airlie Found., Inc. v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1993). The district court agreed with the IRS that "AFI was not operated exclusively for an exempt purpose but for the private benefit of Dr. Head and his family." Id. at 553.5

We do not reach AFI's claim that the district court improperly relied on evidence from Head's criminal trial. As set forth below, we base our decision solely upon representations made by AFI to the IRS in the course of the administrative proceedings. In its briefs before this Court, AFI does not dispute these facts but contests only the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from these facts by the IRS and the district court. This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We hold that revocation was proper because undisputed facts establish that AFI did not operate exclusively for tax-exempt purposes but for private inurement.

AFI erroneously contends that the applicable test for revocation of tax-exempt status is whether the tax-exempt organization is actually harmed by the transactions at issue; the Internal Revenue Code, however, establishes two requirements, neither of which requires a showing of harm to the organization.

First, the organization must "operate exclusively" for tax-exempt purposes. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 501(c)(3); 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d). An organization's tax-exempt status will not be revoked for providing "incidental" while serving an exempt purpose. American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053, 1066 (1989). But a single substantial non-exempt purpose served by the organization does nullify the organization's tax exemption regardless of the quantity or substance of its tax-exempt purposes. Id. at 1065; see also 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (same). An organization does not operate exclusively for tax-exempt purposes if it serves a private rather than a public interest. Easter House v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 476, 487 (1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 78 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 907 (1988); see also 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (same). This requirement applies to the organization's actual, not purported, purposes. American Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. at 1064.

Second, "no part of the net earnings" of the organization may "inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 26 U.S.C. Sec. 501(c)(3) (emphasis added); see also 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (same). Thus the extent of the inurement is immaterial. Orange County Agric. Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1990); Freedom Church of Revelation v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 693, 698 (D.D.C. 1984). "Private shareholder or individual" has been construed broadly by the courts as any person "having a personal or private interest in the activities of the organization," including the organization's founder and family. Presbyterian & Reformed Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 26 C.F.R. Sec. 1.501(a)-1(c).

These two requirements, "though separate, frequently overlap." Church by Mail, Inc. v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985). Failure to satisfy either requirement results in revocation of the organization's tax-exempt status. Orange County Agric. Soc'y, 893 F.2d at 532-34. The burden is on the organization to establish that it meets the statutory requirements for tax-exempt status. Basic Unit Ministry v.

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55 F.3d 684, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 119, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 41001, 1995 WL 310025, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/airlie-foundation-inc-v-united-states-cadc-1995.