24CA1450 Aircomm v DISH Wireless 12-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1450 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV32353 Honorable Sarah B. Wallace, Judge
Aircomm of Avon, LLC; Atlantic Coast Communications, LLC; CCATT, LLC; CCTMO, LLC; CCTM1, LLC; CCTM2, LLC; Coverage Plus Antenna Systems, LLC; Crown Atlantic Co., LLC; Crown Castle GT Co., LLC; Crown Castle MU, LLC; Crown Castle South, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 05, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 06-2, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 09, LLC; Crown Communication, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions III, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions IV, LLC; Goldenstate Towers, LLC; High Point Management Co., LLC; ICB Towers, LLC; Interstate Tower Communications, LLC; Intracoastal City Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers Acquisition, LLC; Pinnacle Towers Asset Holding, LLC; Pinnacle Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers III, LLC; Radio Station WGLD, LLC; Shaffer & Associates, Inc.; Sierra Towers. Inc.; Tower Development Corporation; Tower Systems, Inc.; Tower Technology Co. of Jacksonville, LLC; Tower Ventures III, LLC; WCP Wireless Lease Subsidiary, LLC; and TVHT, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DISH Wireless LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 31, 2025 Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Kendra N. Beckwith, Nathan B. Thoreson, Denver, Colorado; Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP, Daniel A. Richards, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Frederick R. Yarger, Miranda B. Worthington, Rebekah L. Nickel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee ¶1 Plaintiffs, which we refer to collectively as Crown,1 appeal the
trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant, DISH Wireless L.L.C.
(DISH). The dispute centers around whether a master lease
agreement (MLA) and related site lease acknowledgments (SLA)
required DISH to pay additional rent for space beyond the exterior
of DISH’s equipment needed to comply with the National Electric
Code (Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n 2023) (NEC).
¶2 We conclude that (1) the trial court properly determined that
the MLA was ambiguous and therefore properly allowed the jury to
1 There are thirty-seven Crown-related entities named as plaintiffs,
which all asserted the same claims and arguments on appeal: Aircomm of Avon, LLC; Atlantic Coast Communications, LLC; CCATT, LLC; CCTMO, LLC; CCTM1, LLC; CCTM2, LLC; Coverage Plus Antenna Systems, LLC; Crown Atlantic Co., LLC; Crown Castle GT Co., LLC; Crown Castle MU, LLC; Crown Castle South, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 05, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 06-2, LLC; Crown Castle Towers 09, LLC; Crown Communication, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions III, LLC; Global Signal Acquisitions IV, LLC; Goldenstate Towers, LLC; High Point Management Co., LLC; ICB Towers, LLC; Interstate Tower Communications, LLC; Intracoastal City Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers Acquisition, LLC; Pinnacle Towers Asset Holding, LLC; Pinnacle Towers, LLC; Pinnacle Towers III, LLC; Radio Station WGLD, LLC; Shaffer & Associates, Inc.; Sierra Towers. Inc.; Tower Development Corporation; Tower Systems, Inc.; Tower Technology Co. of Jacksonville, LLC; Tower Ventures III, LLC; WCP Wireless Lease Subsidiary, LLC; and TVHT, LLC.
1 determine the scope of the parties’ agreement; (2) the jury’s verdict
is supported by evidence in the record; and (3) the trial court
appropriately entered a declaratory judgment in DISH’s favor based
on the jury’s findings and the court’s independent assessment of
the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. Deal Overview and Subsequent Relationship Breakdown
¶3 In 2019, DISH entered into an asset purchase agreement with
T-Mobile U.S., Inc. and Sprint Corporation to obtain the assets and
liabilities of Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and other mobile service
providers. As a condition of the merger, the Federal
Communications Commission required DISH to make its 5G2
broadband network available to 20% or more of the United States
population by June 2022 and 75% by 2025.
¶4 To meet these aggressive deadlines, in spring 2020 DISH
negotiated with Crown, which owns and maintains an extensive
nationwide infrastructure to facilitate wireless communications.
2 5G is a wireless standard for mobile devices that supports data
transfers for complex home networks and internet-enabled appliances. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4MKJ- UU9X.
2 Wireless network operators, such as DISH, enter into lease
agreements with Crown to obtain access to its towers and adjacent
ground space to install network carrying equipment on and near
the tower. Wireless operators must install equipment on both the
ground and the tower for their networks to operate.
¶5 Between the spring and summer of 2020, DISH discussed
plans with Crown to install its network equipment platforms on the
ground space at thousands of Crown’s tower sites. As part of their
negotiations, Crown and DISH coordinated and discussed DISH’s
template plans for the platforms. Crown provided comments to
DISH concerning the proposed configurations. The template for the
equipment platforms included a cabinet with doors that opened and
closed to allow service of DISH’s equipment (door swings). During
their negotiations, both parties were aware that NEC safety
requirements mandate three feet of unobstructed space adjacent to
some of DISH’s equipment (NEC workspace). See NEC
§ 110.26(A)(1). The parties were also aware that the doors on part
of DISH’s equipment occasionally need to be opened and closed to
service the components. Despite this knowledge, the MLA and SLAs
3 failed to expressly address whether DISH would be required to pay
additional rent for the NEC workspace and door swings.
¶6 In November 2020, the parties signed the MLA, which
permitted DISH to lease space on up to 20,000 communication
towers across the United States in exchange for a single monthly
access fee. The monthly access fee was the only rent provision that
DISH was explicitly required to pay for access to Crown’s sites,
provided DISH’s equipment was within the standard equipment
configuration (SEC) laid out in the MLA. The SEC defined the
leased ground space as “not to exceed 5’ x 7’, inclusive of any
required set-back, buffer or spark radius which must be contained
entirely within such 5’ x 7’” (5’ x 7’ area). The MLA did not define
the phrase “set-back, buffer or spark radius,” or any of the
individual terms therein.
¶7 Crown and DISH entered into an SLA for each new site on
which DISH placed its equipment. Each SLA required the parties to
acknowledge whether the equipment configuration on that site was
consistent with the SEC or, rather, required an expanded
configuration. For all but a handful of leases, the parties
4 acknowledge that the equipment configuration complied with the
SEC.
¶8 Under the MLA,
[t]he full execution and delivery of an SLA shall grant to [DISH] a lease for the exclusive use of the Leased Property described in such SLA and the non-exclusive use, for access purposes, of the portions of the Site not leased or licensed to third parties or restricted to Lessor’s use on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the SLA and [the MLA].
The MLA also gives DISH a “non-exclusive right to access . . . each
Leased Property . . . to enable [DISH] to install . . . remove, operate,
repair, replace, maintain and/or monitor [DISH’s] equipment.” If
DISH needs to lease space beyond the SEC, it is required to pay
additional rent in accordance with the MLA.
¶9 Between November 2020 and July 2021, the parties executed
thousands of SLAs. Around September 2021, Crown informed
DISH that it thought DISH needed to pay additional rent for the
NEC workspace and door swings space for thousands of SLAs.
Shortly thereafter, DISH submitted various equipment designs in an
effort to address the parties’ disagreements. The parties re-entered
5 negotiations to resolve the dispute but their efforts were
unsuccessful.
B. Litigation and Trial
¶ 10 In August 2022, Crown filed a complaint asserting three
claims for relief: (1) breach of the MLA and SLAs regarding the door
swings; (2) breach of the MLA and SLAs regarding the NEC
workspace; and (3) declaratory relief from the court to compel DISH
to pay additional rent for each alleged breach. Crown subsequently
removed its door swing claim through an amended complaint.
¶ 11 In response, DISH asserted multiple counterclaims including,
as relevant on appeal, a claim for declaratory judgment that the
MLA and SLAs do not require DISH to pay additional rent to
accommodate the NEC workspace and door swings. The court set
the matter for trial.
¶ 12 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on
whether the MLA and SLAs require DISH to pay additional rent for
the NEC workspace or the door swings. After a hearing, the trial
court ruled that the MLA is ambiguous because it is “susceptible to
multiple readings.” Specifically, it concluded that Crown had
presented a reasonable argument that the 5’ x 7’ area does not
6 include the additional area needed to accommodate the NEC
workspace or the door swings. Conversely, the court also agreed
with DISH that it was not clear that the “setback, buffer or spark
radius” language in section 1(D) of the MLA includes the NEC
workspace needed for maintenance. Because the MLA is
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the court
concluded that it is ambiguous and the resolution of that ambiguity
was “an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.”
¶ 13 With respect to the door swings issue, the court rejected
Crown’s argument that DISH’s claim for declaratory relief was
rendered moot by Crown’s dismissal of its claim related to the door
swings because Crown had never disavowed its right to bring such
a claim in the future. But the court also declined to grant DISH’s
motion for summary judgment on the door swings issue, reasoning
that “whether the [door swings require] extra rent is ambiguous for
the same reason [that] . . . whether DISH must pay extra rent for
the NEC [workspace] is ambiguous.”
¶ 14 After the evidentiary portion of the trial, Crown moved for a
directed verdict by renewing its argument that the MLA’s language
is unambiguously in Crown’s favor and additionally argued that
7 DISH had failed to present any evidence supporting its
interpretation. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the
case to the jury. The jury returned a split verdict, finding that
Crown failed to prove its breach of contract claim related to the NEC
workspace and DISH failed to prove its breach of contract
counterclaim. In view of its findings, the jury declined to award
either party damages.
¶ 15 After the trial, the court addressed DISH’s request for a
declaratory judgment related to the door swings dispute. The court
concluded that the jury’s verdict included an implied finding that
the door swings do not trigger any requirement for DISH to pay
additional rent. Thus, the court entered judgment declaring that
DISH is not obligated to pay additional rent for the door swings, “so
long as the door swings are reasonably placed on the 5’ x 7’ [area].”
II. The Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Order and Directed Verdict Ruling
¶ 16 Crown argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the
MLA is ambiguous about whether DISH is required to pay
additional rent for the NEC workspace. We are unpersuaded.
8 A. Standard of Review
¶ 17 We review questions of law, such as a trial court’s
determination that a contract is ambiguous, de novo. Am. Fam.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 23. We also review a trial
court’s denial of a directed verdict de novo. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Goddard, 2021 COA 15, ¶ 26. In assessing the propriety
of a directed verdict, “we must consider all the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a
reasonable jury could have found in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Id.
B. Applicable Law
1. Contract Interpretation
¶ 18 “In interpreting a contract, our primary goal is to give effect to
the parties’ intent.” French v. Centura Health Corp., 2022 CO 20,
¶ 25. When a contract is complete and unambiguous, we enforce it
according to its plain language. Klun v. Klun, 2019 CO 46, ¶ 18. In
ascertaining whether contract provisions are ambiguous, we review
“the instrument’s language and construe it consistent with the
plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed.” Id.
“The meaning of a contract is found by examination of the entire
9 instrument and not by viewing clauses or phrases in isolation.”
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 842 P.2d 208,
213 (Colo. 1992).
¶ 19 If the operative contract terms “are susceptible of more than
one reasonable interpretation, . . . the terms are ambiguous, and
evidence beyond the four corners of the contract is admissible to
establish the parties’ intent.” French, ¶ 25. Mere disagreement
between the parties concerning the meaning of contract terms does
not establish a contract ambiguity. Id. In assessing whether an
ambiguity exists, the court may conditionally admit extrinsic
evidence. Pepcol. Mfg. Co. v. Denv. Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310,
1314 n.3 (Colo. 1984). “If the court, after considering the extrinsic
evidence, determines that there is no ambiguity, then the extrinsic
evidence must be stricken.” Id.; see also Sandstone Invs. I, LLC v.
A. Everett Williams 1963 Tr., 53 P.3d 687, 690 (Colo. App. 2001) (“In
deciding whether a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider
extrinsic evidence bearing upon the meaning of the written terms.
10 However, the court may not consider the parties’ own extrinsic
expressions of intent.”).3
2. Motion for a Directed Verdict
¶ 20 Under C.R.C.P. 50, a party may move for a directed verdict at
the close of evidence. A court properly grants a motion for directed
verdict if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, compels a conclusion that reasonable people
could not disagree with and “no evidence, or legitimate inference
therefrom, has been presented upon which a jury’s verdict against
the moving party could be sustained.” Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. HIVE
Constr., Inc., 2025 CO 17, ¶ 20 (quoting Burgess v. Mid-Century Ins.
Co., 841 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. App. 1992)).
3 We acknowledge that there may be some tension between Pepcol
Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1984), and its progeny, and the supreme court’s later statement that “extrinsic evidence cannot create ambiguity; it is an aid to ascertaining the intent of the parties once an ambiguity is found.” Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 CO 46, ¶ 4. But we need not address any tension that may exist between these cases because the operative contract provisions of the MLA and SLAs are ambiguous based on their plain terms, and also ambiguous when considered in the context of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ contractual discussions and course of performance.
11 C. Analysis
¶ 21 Crown argues that the plain meanings of “set-back” and
“buffer” are clear and unambiguous, and, therefore, section 1(D)’s
requirement that “any required set-back or buffer must be entirely
contained within the 5’ x 7’ [area]” unambiguously required DISH to
pay additional rent if the NEC workspace does not fit within the
5’ x 7’ area. Crown points to a dictionary definition of setback that
includes, as one meaning of the word, “the distance of a structure
or other feature (such as a well or septic system) from the property
line or other feature.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://perma.cc/B3G3-59XV. This definition, Crown argues,
means that “set-back,” as it appears in the MLA, refers to the
distance between two physical objects or features. In addition,
Crown points to a definition of “buffer” that includes “something
that serves as a protective barrier.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://perma.cc/T7DM-B7B6. From this definition, Crown posits
that the use of “buffer” in section 1(D) “refers to the space necessary
to safely operate something or perform a task.”
¶ 22 Crown also argues that DISH’s interpretation of the MLA and
SLAs would render the language of section 1(D) superfluous. Thus,
12 Crown contends, section 1(D)’s terms must be construed, as a
matter of law, to mean that the NEC workspace is not part of the
area encompassed by the base rent, and therefore DISH must pay
additional rent for that space.
¶ 23 DISH responds that the trial court properly determined that
the MLA is ambiguous because the plain meanings of “set-back”
and “buffer” do not unambiguously encompass the NEC workspace.
For example, DISH notes that the MLA does not provide or reference
any definition of set-back or buffer, much less Crown’s proffered
definitions.
¶ 24 DISH also notes that the MLA does not equate buffer or set-
back with NEC workspace. Furthermore, DISH notes that the MLA
and SLAs do not describe a set-back or buffer by reference to a
property line, any physical feature, or a protective barrier. DISH
also points to trial testimony from an NEC expert who stated that
he has never heard or used the term set-back or buffer when
referring to the NEC workspace or other NEC requirements.
¶ 25 Relatedly, DISH argues that section 7 of the MLA grants it a
nonexclusive easement to access its equipment for purposes of
maintenance and monitoring. Specifically, it grants DISH
13 a non-exclusive right to access, from a public right-of-way, each Leased Property to the extent reasonably deemed necessary by [DISH] to enable [DISH] to install, photograph, remove, operate, repair, replace, maintain and/or monitor [DISH’s] Equipment and to otherwise utilize each Leased Property for the Purpose, in each case, to such extent, and in such means and manners (including, without limitation, on foot or by motor vehicle, including trucks and other heavy equipment . . . )as [DISH] deems reasonably necessary.
¶ 26 These provisions, according to DISH, at a minimum create
ambiguity regarding whether the NEC workspace requirements
trigger additional rent under the MLA.
¶ 27 In further support of its position, DISH points to evidence that,
when they negotiated the MLA, all parties were aware of the NEC
workspace requirements, and that the NEC workspace would
extend beyond the 5’ x 7’ area, but that neither the MLA nor the
SLAs contain an express provision requiring DISH to pay Crown
additional rent for that additional space. In addition, Crown
worked with DISH in agreeing upon the SEC and approved the
configuration — whether based on the SEC or otherwise — used by
DISH for each SLA.
14 ¶ 28 DISH also points to testimony from one of DISH’s negotiators
that during the MLA negotiations, Crown’s deputy counsel said,
“We’re not going to charge you for door swings, let’s move on.”
Finally, DISH points out that the parties executed thousands of
SLAs before Crown first indicated that DISH might owe additional
rent for the NEC workspace. And it was not until late 2021 that
Crown first notified DISH that it was reserving the right to pursue
additional rent for the NEC workspace and door swings. This
extrinsic evidence, DISH argues, supports its contention that when
the agreements were executed, the parties did not intend that DISH
would be charged additional rent for either the NEC workspace or
the door swings. See Sandstone, 53 P.3d at 690.
¶ 29 We are persuaded by DISH’s arguments. Recall that for a
contract to be ambiguous, the language in question must be
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. French,
¶ 25. Both parties presented reasonable interpretations that a jury
could accept when assessing the meaning of section 1(D).
¶ 30 While “set-back” and “buffer” do not have any defined meaning
in the MLA and SLAs, as the trial court noted, the analysis does not
end there. Based solely on the language of the MLA, it is unclear
15 whether section 1(D) was meant to include the NEC workspace,
considering that the NEC requirements, at least in part, are in place
to allow for maintenance and monitoring of the equipment. This
uncertainty is amplified by section 7 of the MLA, which gives DISH
a nonexclusive right to access the leased property to install,
operate, and repair DISH’s equipment.
¶ 31 Moreover, the parties do not dispute that, despite their
awareness of the need for the NEC workspace, no provision of the
MLA or the subsequent SLAs definitively or directly requires DISH
to pay additional rent for the NEC workspace. In the absence of an
express designation in the parties’ agreement, and because there is
record support for both parties’ interpretations, the trial court
properly found that this was an issue of fact for a jury to resolve.
¶ 32 Nor are we persuaded by Crown’s arguments that the terms
“set-back” and “buffer” necessarily refer to the NEC workspace. As
the complete definitions of the terms relied on by Crown make clear,
the specific meanings Crown attributes to these terms are not their
only meanings. Moreover, as DISH points out, the definitions
emphasized by Crown contain terms — such as boundary, feature,
and protective barriers — that the MLA and SLAs do not further
16 reference or define. Finally, the jury heard testimony that the
interpretation urged by DISH does not render the terms of section
1(D) meaningless because DISH presented evidence that these
terms are not intended to encompass the NEC workspace, but,
rather, specialized equipment DISH installed on the sites —
including generators, gas tanks, and fuel cells. For a directed
verdict to be appropriate, it was Crown’s burden to demonstrate
that the presented evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
DISH, compelled the conclusion that DISH’s defenses failed. See
Mid-Century, ¶ 20. But we conclude that reasonable jurors could
have found in DISH’s favor based on the evidence.
¶ 33 In reaching this conclusion, we do not need to assess which of
the parties’ arguments we find more persuasive. Instead, we must
determine whether DISH presented reasonable interpretations of
the disputed provisions, and whether DISH offered evidence at trial
to support those interpretations. Because both occurred, it was the
jury’s responsibility to resolve that factual dispute. See E. Ridge of
Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 974
(Colo. 2005) (“When an ambiguity has been determined to exist, the
meaning of its terms is generally an issue of fact to be determined
17 in the same manner as other factual issues.”); see also People v.
Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 33 (“An appellate court may not serve as a
thirteenth juror and consider whether it might have reached a
different conclusion than the jury.”).
¶ 34 For similar reasons, we reject Crown’s alternative argument
that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict
on the breach of contract claim because DISH failed to present any
evidence at trial supporting its interpretation of section 1(D).
Consistent with its argument that section 1(D)’s language is
unambiguous, Crown argues that DISH failed to present any
evidence supporting its interpretation of section1(D). Therefore,
Crown argues, the extrinsic evidence that DISH presented at trial —
including the templates that DISH shared with Crown prior to
executing the MLA, witness testimony about how the parties
intended section 1(D) to function, and evidence related to Crown’s
failure to immediately enforce the MLA — did not create a factual
dispute.
¶ 35 DISH responds that Crown was not entitled to a directed
verdict because Crown erroneously insisted that its reading of the
MLA is the only reasonable interpretation. Furthermore, DISH
18 notes that Crown failed to object to the admission of any of the
contested evidence during trial and the court instructed the jury
that it was permitted to consider evidence, including “the parties’
negotiations” and “earlier dealings,” in discerning the parties’ intent
concerning the meaning of these terms.4
¶ 36 Because we have already determined that the trial court did
not err by finding that the MLA is ambiguous, the court properly
allowed the admission of extrinsic evidence. See E. Ridge, 109 P.3d
at 974. Crown does not appear to challenge a single piece of
evidence that was admitted; rather, it seems to be challenging
allowing the matter to proceed to trial at all because, it argues,
there is no reasonable alternative reading of section 1(D).
¶ 37 Crown accurately points out that it presented evidence
supporting its interpretation of section 1(D). But that does not lead
to a conclusion that the interpretation urged by DISH was
untenable. Indeed, we have already determined that section 1(D)’s
plain meaning does not unambiguously compel DISH to pay
4 This instruction was based on Colorado’s model civil jury
instruction for determining the parties’ contractual intent, CJI-Civ. 30:31 (2025), which Crown does not challenge on appeal.
19 additional rent for NEC workspace. And DISH presented the jury
with evidence supporting its urged interpretation. It necessarily
follows that Crown’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach of
contract claim could not be granted.
¶ 38 DISH also presented evidence in support of its interpretation
of section 7 of the MLA, which gives DISH a nonexclusive right to
access its equipment for repairs and maintenance, including
testimony from an NEC expert that NEC workspace can be in a
“general open space” and it “does not need to be cordon[ed] off at all
times.”5
¶ 39 Moreover, the jury’s verdict on the NEC workspace claim, and
the trial court’s and our independent assessment of the evidence,
lead to the conclusion that reasonable minds could construe the
direct and circumstantial evidence to support DISH’s interpretation
of the MLA relative to the NEC workspace dispute. Thus, the trial
5 Illustrative of their competing interpretations of the various
contractual terms and the evidence, at oral argument Crown argued that NEC workspace could not be used for any shared purpose. True, the jury heard evidence to support Crown’s interpretation. But the jury also heard evidence that the NEC workspace did not need to be dedicated for DISH’s exclusive use. This is simply another illustration of ambiguous language and conflicting evidence that the court properly allowed the jury to resolve.
20 court did not err by concluding that DISH presented sufficient
evidence to defeat Crown’s motion for a directed verdict.
III. Declaratory Judgment on the Door Swings
¶ 40 Finally, Crown contends that the trial court clearly erred by
granting DISH’s request for declaratory relief on its door swings
claim because it lacked record support for its findings. We, again,
discern no error.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 41 Declaratory judgments are intended to resolve disputes
between parties concerning their respective rights under a law,
relationship, or controlling instrument — such as a contract. § 13-
51-106, C.R.S. 2025; C.R.C.P. 57. In resolving a declaratory
judgment dispute, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Saxe v. Bd. of Trs.
of Metro. State Coll. of Denv., 179 P.3d 67, 72 (Colo. App. 2007) (“A
trial court’s decision to accept jurisdiction to enter a declaratory
judgment is a matter we review de novo.”); Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n
v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 24 (“We review findings of
fact for clear error, meaning that we won’t disturb such findings if
21 there is any evidence in the record supporting them.”), aff’d, 2021
CO 56.
¶ 42 C.R.C.P. 57, which governs declaratory judgments, is
“remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to ‘afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status,
and other legal relations.’” City of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.,
2018 CO 59, ¶ 28 (quoting Toncray v. Dolan, 593 P.2d 956, 957
(Colo. 1979)); see generally §§ 13-51-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2025 (the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Law). A court may fashion a
remedy in proceedings where declaratory relief is sought and the
judgment or decree will “terminate the controversy or remove an
uncertainty.” § 13-51-109, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 43 When a jury decides factual issues incident to its resolution of
claims related to a request for declaratory relief, a trial court “is
bound by the jury’s determination” where there are “essential
factual issues that are central to both” the jury verdict and the
declaratory judgment claim. Marquardt v. Perry, 200 P.3d 1126,
1130-32 (Colo. App. 2008) (applying this concept in the context of a
court’s resolution of equitable contract claims after a jury trial on
the legal claims). “In determining this issue, we must analyze what
22 findings were actually made by the jury or were necessarily implicit
in its verdict, and whether the trial court’s subsequent findings and
conclusions conflict with the jury’s determination.” Id. at 1132.
B. Analysis
¶ 44 After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court addressed the
competing declaratory judgment claims and found that “the parties
intended DISH to be able to use space beyond its exclusive 5’ x 7’
[area] for its door swings, without triggering [a]dditional [r]ent under
the MLA so long as the door swings are reasonably placed on the
5’ x 7’ [area].”
¶ 45 Crown argues on appeal that if it prevails on either of its
arguments with respect to the NEC workspace, reversal of the
court’s order on the door swings issue is required. But we have
concluded that Crown’s NEC workspace arguments fail, so this
contention fails as well.
¶ 46 Crown also argues there was no controversy or uncertainty for
the court to resolve through the entry of declaratory relief because it
had previously dismissed its door swings claim. We disagree. As
evidenced by Crown’s continued pursuit of the issue on appeal,
Crown’s dismissal of the door swings claim did not resolve the
23 dispute. Rather, absent resolution through a declaratory judgment,
DISH continued to face the prospect of future claims based on the
door swings. The resolution of this uncertainty was clearly within
the purpose of a declaratory judgment claim. See § 13-51-106,
C.R.S. 2025; Cmty. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Heather Corp., 677 P.2d
330, 334 (Colo. 1984) (“The purpose of this statute is to afford relief
from the uncertainty surrounding legal rights and legal relations; it
is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed and
administered.”).
¶ 47 Next, Crown argues that the trial court’s declaratory judgment
must be reversed because the court misconstrued the verdict and
the evidence. It asserts that the trial court’s conclusion — that “the
jury verdict controls its determination with respect to the door
swing[s]” — has no basis in fact because the claims resolved by the
jury did not expressly address DISH’s use of additional space when
opening and closing its cabinet doors.
¶ 48 DISH disagrees, reasoning that the trial court properly entered
a declaratory judgment in its favor because Crown cannot show
that granting the motion was clear error. DISH also argues that the
trial court properly ensured that Crown could not relitigate the door
24 swings controversy because the two claims (the door swings and
whether Crown proved that DISH violated the MLA) were directly
related.
¶ 49 We conclude that Crown’s contentions misconstrue the full
factual basis for the trial court’s judgment on the door swings claim
and ignore evidence that DISH presented in support of its position.
¶ 50 As Crown argues, the trial court did make clear its view that
the jury’s resolution of the NEC workspace claim was not limited to
a particular configuration of DISH’s equipment, as Crown had
argued. And the court stated that Crown had argued at trial that
the NEC workspace and door swings needed to be within the 5’ x 7’
area. Moreover, the court concluded that the jury rejected Crown’s
argument “when it specifically held that NEC working space did not
need to be within the 5’ x 7’ [area].” Similarly, the court concluded
that, “consistent with the jury verdict and the evidence presented at
trial, the parties intended DISH to be able to use space beyond its
exclusive 5’ x 7’ [area] for its door swings without triggering
additional rent under the MLA.” Thus, as Crown argues, the trial
court’s entry of declaratory relief on the door swings was based, in
25 part, on the jury’s findings with respect to the NEC workspace
issue.
¶ 51 But the trial court’s declaratory judgment was not based solely
on the jury’s implied findings. To the contrary, as the court
repeatedly made clear, it also independently reviewed the evidence
and independently concluded that the parties contemplated that the
door swings would not trigger additional rent. By way of
illustration, the trial court stated as follows:
As discussed below, this [c]ourt finds that DISH is entitled to the requested relief on this claim: declaratory judgment in DISH’s favor is required by the factual findings necessarily implicit in the jury’s verdict and by this Court’s factual findings based on the evidence presented at trial.
....
Thus, consistent with the jury verdict and the evidence presented at trial, the [c]ourt finds the parties intended DISH to be able to use space beyond its exclusive 5’ x 7’ [area] for its door swings without triggering [a]dditional [r]ent under the MLA so long as the door swings are reasonably placed on the 5’ x 7’ space.
(Emphases added.)
¶ 52 Between these statements, the court conducted an extensive
independent review of the evidence. Among other things, the court
26 found that “Crown knew both before and at the time the parties
signed the MLA that DISH’s standard configuration required DISH’s
cabinet doors to extend beyond the 5’ x 7’ Lease Area when
opened.” And the court found that
the intent of the parties when signing the MLA was that under the [monthly access fee (MAF)] “it would be the exception, not the rule, for DISH to get additional ground space at a site” because the MAF represented what Crown was going to charge DISH for [the SEC]. Requiring DISH to pay [a]dditional [r]ent for its door swings at virtually all Crown sites would be inconsistent with that intent.
¶ 53 As these findings illustrate, the court did not rely solely on the
implied findings associated with the jury’s verdict when concluding
that the parties intended to permit DISH to open and close the
equipment doors without triggering any additional rent. And
though Crown presented contrary evidence in support of its
interpretation of the parties’ agreements, DISH also presented
competent evidence to support its interpretation. Ultimately, the
trial court — consistent with the jury’s verdict — found DISH’s
evidence more persuasive. Thus, we discern no error in the trial
court’s entry of declaratory relief in favor of DISH on the door
swings dispute.
27 IV. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.