Airborne Freight v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (3-6-2007)

2007 Ohio 943
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 29, 2006
DocketNo. 06AP-122.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2007 Ohio 943 (Airborne Freight v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (3-6-2007)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Airborne Freight v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (3-6-2007), 2007 Ohio 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Airborne Freight Corporation, filed this original action requesting a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), *Page 2 to vacate its order awarding to respondent, David A. Paskalik ("claimant"), temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation beginning February 17, 2004, and to enter an order denying that compensation.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this court referred this matter to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying the requested writ. (Attached as Appendix A.) Relator has filed objections to the magistrate's decision, as follows:

[1.] The Magistrate erred when he concluded the Industrial Commission's MMI finding did not include the condition of "Degenerative Disc Disease L4-S1."

[2.] The Magistrate erred when he ruled that the Commission did not abuse its discretion under State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203.

[3.] The Magistrate erred when he concluded that Dr. Hernandez's C-84s provide some evidence supporting the TTD award.

{¶ 3} No party has objected to the magistrate's findings of fact, and we adopt them as our own. In brief, claimant sustained a work-related injury on April 20, 1998. Relator certified the claim for that injury using the code "722.93 lumbar disc." By letter dated December 23, 2002, relator recognized an additional claim for "Degenerative Disc Disease L4-S1." The commission allowed the additional claim for "L4-5 DISC PROTRUSION and RIGHT L4-5 FORAMINAL STENOSIS[.]"

{¶ 4} Based on reports by Dr. Elizabeth Mease, and following a hearing on January 20, 2004, a district hearing officer ("DHO") terminated TTD compensation. The DHO's order listed "LUMBAR DISC" as the allowed condition and found "that claimant's allowed conditions herein have reached a level of maximum medical improvement" *Page 3 ("MMI"). A staff hearing officer ("SHO"), listing "LUMBAR DISC" as the allowed condition, affirmed the order.

{¶ 5} Claimant also moved for TTD compensation based on the medical reports of Dr. Juan M. Hernandez. Following a July 26, 2005 hearing, a DHO issued an order granting TTD compensation beginning February 17, 2004. Following a September 9, 2005 hearing, an SHO vacated the DHO order and issued an order that also granted TTD compensation beginning February 17, 2004. The SHO expressly found "that the disability is caused by the allowed conditions in this claim." The SHO also found "that injured worker has new and changed circumstances to justify the payment of [TTD] compensation. This portion of the order is based on the C-84s of Dr. Hernandez[.]"

{¶ 6} By its first objection, relator argues that the magistrate erred in concluding that the commission's finding of MMI did not include degenerative disc disease. However, we agree with the magistrate's consideration and resolution of this issue. As the magistrate stated, this issue is largely a factual one, and the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that the MMI finding was limited to claimant's claim for "lumbar disc." Therefore, we overrule relator's first objection.

{¶ 7} By its second objection, relator argues that the SHO's order granting TTD compensation violates State ex rel. Noll v. Indus.Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, that is, the commission did not adequately explain the basis for its decision. Before the magistrate, relator argued that the SHO's "most obvious error is that she failed to state what in the C-84 forms constituted a new or changed circumstance." Instead, relator argued, the SHO's order made a general finding of changed circumstances with reference only to the C-84s. However, the commission and claimant argued that the *Page 4 SHO's finding of new and changed circumstances was not an abuse of discretion, and the SHO's order did not violate Noll. They relied on Dr. Hernandez's reference to claimant's "disabling back condition at present" and to "low back pain extends J, [right] leg." In any event, respondents argued, the SHO's order included the additional conditions of L4-5 disc protrusion and right L4-5 foraminal stenosis, which constitute independent grounds for TTD.

{¶ 8} In his decision, the magistrate acknowledged that the SHO "never actually explains what the new and changed circumstances might be." (Magistrate's Decision at ¶ 54.) The magistrate concluded, however, that claimant had no responsibility to prove, and the commission had no obligation to find, new and changed circumstances because claimant did not seek to revive the "lumbar disc" claim allowance as a basis for reinstatement of TTD compensation. Therefore, the magistrate found there was no error.

{¶ 9} Relator argues that the magistrate's resolution of this point simply compounds the Noll violation. "By effectively vacating the SHO's order, the Magistrate substituted his factual conclusions on the issue of new and changed circumstances and the existence of the disabling conditions." In response, claimant and the commission argue that the SHO's order does not violate Noll, but they do not address the magistrate's conclusion that a finding of new and changed circumstances was unnecessary and, therefore, irrelevant.

{¶ 10} Under certain circumstances, the commission has continuing jurisdiction to reconsider a previous decision. Under R.C. 4123.52, the commission can invoke that jurisdiction where one of five pre-conditions exists, including the presence of new and *Page 5 changed circumstances. "The presence of one of these prerequisites must be clearly articulated in any commission order seeking to exercise reconsideration jurisdiction. [State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus.Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 454]; State ex rel. Foster v. Indus.Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 320 * * * This means that the prerequisite must be both identified and explained." State ex rel. Gobich v. Indus.Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 585, 2004-Ohio-5990, at ¶ 15.

{¶ 11} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the temporary worsening or exacerbation of a claimant's condition can constitute new and changed circumstances, thus entitling a claimant to TTD compensation. SeeState ex rel. Bing v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 424; State exrel. Conrad v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 413. Where new and changed circumstances support the commission's reinstatement of TTD, the commission has "a duty to state that there were new and changed circumstances and to identify them." State ex rel. Wheeler v. Indus.Comm., Franklin App. No. 02AP-865, 2003-Ohio-3120, at ¶ 49.

{¶ 12}

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Related

State ex rel. Airborne Freight Corp. v. Indus. Comm.
868 N.E.2d 278 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2007)

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2007 Ohio 943, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/airborne-freight-v-indus-comm-unpublished-decision-3-6-2007-ohioctapp-2006.