BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
In the court below, the Philadelphia Storage Battery Company, a corporate citizen of Pennsylvania, brought suit against the Air Reduction Company, Inc., a corporate citizen of New York, for damages to its factory by a fire started by alleged negligence of the Air Company. The case, which was tried for four weeks by the late Judge MeKeehan, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, and on entry of judgment thereon this writ of error was taken. The questions involved in the case are:, First, was the defendant entitled to binding instructions in its favor? Second, did the court err in admitting certain evidence on the side of the plaintiff? And,
third, in rejecting certain evidence tendered by defendant.
Briefly stated, the pertinent facts are: On January 26, 1920, the Air Company, by written contract, undertook to supply, and the Storage Company to purchase, all the oxygen gas the latter required for three years.
The gas was to be
brought to the plant in the Air Company’s tanks, and their contents distributed to the Storage Company’s plant through what is termed an oxygen manifold. The valves of the tanks were to be operated by the Storage Company, but the manifold was constructed by, and remained the property of, the Air Company. The design and make of the manifold and the entire installation and operation of the apparatus was the design and work of the Air Company, the Storage Company having no part or knowledge thereof. The Air Company undertook to initially instruct the Storage Company’s men when the installation was completed, and did so, warning them not to use grease. Generally speaking, the manifold consisted of a square bar of steel a few feet long, with an interior chamber formed by drilling from end to end. Into the manifold the oxygen was charged from the tanks, and from it such gas was distributed to the Storage Company’s works. The Air Company brought its manifold, which was mounted on a plank, and left it for several days along the outside of the wall of the Storage Company’s plant. Thereafter it was put in place by the Air Company, and its oxygen tanks duly connected therewith by March 17, 1920. On that day, the Air Company’s installing agent instructed the Storage Company’s employees, who thereafter operated it, how to do so. This manifold was only the fifth the Air Company had installed for the purpose of discharging high pressure gas, the proofs being that it was then “practically commencing the business of furnishing appliances, or at any rate manifolds, for use by consumers.” The Storage Company operated the installation until March 24th, when, while gas from a fresh tank was being turned into the manifold, the latter exploded at a point directly in front of the tank, and threw out flames and sparks in all directions, from which
the factory
caught fire and was destroyed. The proof was the operatives had used no oil or grease in their work.
Under the charge of the court, the case narrowed to two charges of negligence, clearly and tersely stated therein, as follows: “The particular negligence that is charged in this ease is this: That in making this manifold for discharging purposes, what I will call this discharging manifold, out of steel, especially out of drilled steel, the defendant was negligent, in that it selected a material that it should have known was improper for that particular appliance; and the second ground of negligence charged is that, aside from the material of which the manifold was constructed, it was not properly made — it was not properly machined. The charge is that it was carelessly drilled. ’ ’
As to the duty of the Air Company to furnish a proper manifold, the court charged: “Of course, before you can decide whether a man fails to exercise due care, you must first get in your mind a standard of what duty he owes. What was due care ? What duty did this defendant owe this plaintiff? This defendant had undertaken to furnish this plaintiff with a discharging manifold, and it sent its men there and installed it. That meant, gentlemen of the jury, as a matter of law,.that the defendant ' owed this duty to the plaintiff: That in making and installing that manifold it would exercise due care under all the circumstances of the case, and this involved the selection of a proper material for the manifold, and a suitable design and suitable workmanship. As I recall it, there is no complaint made, at least no emphasis has been made, of the design of the manifold. The complaint, as averred in the statement and as disclosed in the testimony and in the arguments of counsel, is the complaint I have outlined — that they selected the wrong material, and that, secondly, in the workmanship and drilling of that steel bar they were careless.”
No
objection was made to the charge, or to the mode in which the court submitted these two issues; but the court was duly asked to give binding instructions in behalf of the defendant, and the first question now is whether it erred in refusing such request. [1] Assuming, for present purposes, that the testimony given by the Storage Company was properly received, it is clear the court would have committed error in taking the case from the jury. Without entering into a discussion of the testimony, pro and eon, which was some 40 days in its taking and covers some 1,300 pages, it suffices to say that it tended to show the manifold was not made of proper material and was actually constructed in a manner that made it dangerous to use. The oxygen here involved
was inflammable, and where delivered under high — 2,000-pound—pressure becomes of such high temperature that, when it comes in contact with such articles as coal dust, waste, oil, grease, or small steel clippings, will explode and burst into flame.
There was testimony that, in case of the explosion of oxygen gas in a closed chamber, such as a manifold, the walls of a copper or brass chamber would not burn, but the fire would burn itself out inside the chamber without harm; but in case of a steel chamber the fire would feed on the metal walls of the chamber, and perforate it and spread the flames abroad on the outside. It was also shown that the proper and usual practice was to use brass or copper, and not steel, in making manifolds, and that, when made of steel, those that were drilled were more susceptible to burn than those made of pipe.
From tbe citations referred to in tbe margin, wbicb are but a minor part of tbe many additional ones that could have been made, it will sufficiently appear that tbe court was constrained to submit to tbe jury tbe question first stated, namely, that in making tbe “manifold out of steel, especially out of drilled steel, tbe defendant was negligent, in that it selected a material that it should have known was improper for that particular appliance.” Finding, as we do, no error in tbe court's action in that regard, we turn to tbe next question submitted, namely, whether, “aside from tbe material of which tbe manifold was constructed, it was not properly made, it was not properly machined. ’ ’
In that respect it was contended tbe manifold was drilled from both ends; that tbe two drills did not center properly, but left a shoulder; that tbe drilling left rough plae
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BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
In the court below, the Philadelphia Storage Battery Company, a corporate citizen of Pennsylvania, brought suit against the Air Reduction Company, Inc., a corporate citizen of New York, for damages to its factory by a fire started by alleged negligence of the Air Company. The case, which was tried for four weeks by the late Judge MeKeehan, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, and on entry of judgment thereon this writ of error was taken. The questions involved in the case are:, First, was the defendant entitled to binding instructions in its favor? Second, did the court err in admitting certain evidence on the side of the plaintiff? And,
third, in rejecting certain evidence tendered by defendant.
Briefly stated, the pertinent facts are: On January 26, 1920, the Air Company, by written contract, undertook to supply, and the Storage Company to purchase, all the oxygen gas the latter required for three years.
The gas was to be
brought to the plant in the Air Company’s tanks, and their contents distributed to the Storage Company’s plant through what is termed an oxygen manifold. The valves of the tanks were to be operated by the Storage Company, but the manifold was constructed by, and remained the property of, the Air Company. The design and make of the manifold and the entire installation and operation of the apparatus was the design and work of the Air Company, the Storage Company having no part or knowledge thereof. The Air Company undertook to initially instruct the Storage Company’s men when the installation was completed, and did so, warning them not to use grease. Generally speaking, the manifold consisted of a square bar of steel a few feet long, with an interior chamber formed by drilling from end to end. Into the manifold the oxygen was charged from the tanks, and from it such gas was distributed to the Storage Company’s works. The Air Company brought its manifold, which was mounted on a plank, and left it for several days along the outside of the wall of the Storage Company’s plant. Thereafter it was put in place by the Air Company, and its oxygen tanks duly connected therewith by March 17, 1920. On that day, the Air Company’s installing agent instructed the Storage Company’s employees, who thereafter operated it, how to do so. This manifold was only the fifth the Air Company had installed for the purpose of discharging high pressure gas, the proofs being that it was then “practically commencing the business of furnishing appliances, or at any rate manifolds, for use by consumers.” The Storage Company operated the installation until March 24th, when, while gas from a fresh tank was being turned into the manifold, the latter exploded at a point directly in front of the tank, and threw out flames and sparks in all directions, from which
the factory
caught fire and was destroyed. The proof was the operatives had used no oil or grease in their work.
Under the charge of the court, the case narrowed to two charges of negligence, clearly and tersely stated therein, as follows: “The particular negligence that is charged in this ease is this: That in making this manifold for discharging purposes, what I will call this discharging manifold, out of steel, especially out of drilled steel, the defendant was negligent, in that it selected a material that it should have known was improper for that particular appliance; and the second ground of negligence charged is that, aside from the material of which the manifold was constructed, it was not properly made — it was not properly machined. The charge is that it was carelessly drilled. ’ ’
As to the duty of the Air Company to furnish a proper manifold, the court charged: “Of course, before you can decide whether a man fails to exercise due care, you must first get in your mind a standard of what duty he owes. What was due care ? What duty did this defendant owe this plaintiff? This defendant had undertaken to furnish this plaintiff with a discharging manifold, and it sent its men there and installed it. That meant, gentlemen of the jury, as a matter of law,.that the defendant ' owed this duty to the plaintiff: That in making and installing that manifold it would exercise due care under all the circumstances of the case, and this involved the selection of a proper material for the manifold, and a suitable design and suitable workmanship. As I recall it, there is no complaint made, at least no emphasis has been made, of the design of the manifold. The complaint, as averred in the statement and as disclosed in the testimony and in the arguments of counsel, is the complaint I have outlined — that they selected the wrong material, and that, secondly, in the workmanship and drilling of that steel bar they were careless.”
No
objection was made to the charge, or to the mode in which the court submitted these two issues; but the court was duly asked to give binding instructions in behalf of the defendant, and the first question now is whether it erred in refusing such request. [1] Assuming, for present purposes, that the testimony given by the Storage Company was properly received, it is clear the court would have committed error in taking the case from the jury. Without entering into a discussion of the testimony, pro and eon, which was some 40 days in its taking and covers some 1,300 pages, it suffices to say that it tended to show the manifold was not made of proper material and was actually constructed in a manner that made it dangerous to use. The oxygen here involved
was inflammable, and where delivered under high — 2,000-pound—pressure becomes of such high temperature that, when it comes in contact with such articles as coal dust, waste, oil, grease, or small steel clippings, will explode and burst into flame.
There was testimony that, in case of the explosion of oxygen gas in a closed chamber, such as a manifold, the walls of a copper or brass chamber would not burn, but the fire would burn itself out inside the chamber without harm; but in case of a steel chamber the fire would feed on the metal walls of the chamber, and perforate it and spread the flames abroad on the outside. It was also shown that the proper and usual practice was to use brass or copper, and not steel, in making manifolds, and that, when made of steel, those that were drilled were more susceptible to burn than those made of pipe.
From tbe citations referred to in tbe margin, wbicb are but a minor part of tbe many additional ones that could have been made, it will sufficiently appear that tbe court was constrained to submit to tbe jury tbe question first stated, namely, that in making tbe “manifold out of steel, especially out of drilled steel, tbe defendant was negligent, in that it selected a material that it should have known was improper for that particular appliance.” Finding, as we do, no error in tbe court's action in that regard, we turn to tbe next question submitted, namely, whether, “aside from tbe material of which tbe manifold was constructed, it was not properly made, it was not properly machined. ’ ’
In that respect it was contended tbe manifold was drilled from both ends; that tbe two drills did not center properly, but left a shoulder; that tbe drilling left rough plae
es, fins or splinters, all of which increased the manifold’s liability to combustion. It was also contended that the drilling was faulty, in that pockets were formed under the manifold’s intake valves, in which foreign combustible matter might gather, and, in addition thereto, these small and confined spaces were such that suddenly in-coming oxygen would therein rise to a higher temperature than elsewhere in the manifold, and that this latter proved to be the case in this particular manifold.
In view of the testimony noted in the margin, and without reference to other proofs to which reference might be made, we think there was sufficient evidence to warrant submission to the jury of negligence in making the manifold. And in doing so the court called attention to the proofs and contentions of the defendant, namely, that its material was safe, was in accord with the alleged common practice of others in the same line of work, and that its workmanship was not bad or faulty.
We here remark that in the court’s charge, and, as there was no exception to it, we assume the atmosphere and conduct of the case, by the understanding of counsel, centered the question of negligence on these two issues, and the verdict conclusively establishes the defendant’s negligence in both regards. So, also, the court, in its charge, submitted to the jury, in a form to which no exception was taken, the question of the cause of the fire and whether it resulted from the defendant’s negligence. So that no objection can now be made to the form of submission of that question. But this, of course, did not preclude the defendant from now raising the underlying question, which it did by its request for binding instructions, namely, that there was no evidence from which their responsibility for the fire could be inferred.
Addressing ourselves to that question, we think the proofs were such that the court was bound to submit the question to the jury, in view of certain proofs, of certain facts, viz. that the plaintiff’s plant was burned; that the fire which burned it emanated from the manifold; that fires in a manifold were of common occurrence; that, when such fires began, they were liable to be fed by, and to consume and perforate, the chamber walls of a steel manifold, and especially of one drilled as this one was; that after the fire the particular manifold here involved bore physical evidence that such had been the course of events. All of these proofs, and other facts, factors, and proofs of the plaintiff to which reference could be made, combined to make a situation which the court properly submitted to the jury in these discriminating words:
"So far as the particular cause of this fire is' concerned, you have heard a great deal of testimony on that. You have heard at least two, and perhaps more than two,
opinions advanced as to what caused it. You may think that some of those opinions show you what was the real cause of the fire. You may conclude that none of those opinions or theories advanced satisfactorily explain the fire. You may conclude that this fire is of a mysterious and unknown origin. Of course, a good many accidents happen that way. They would not be mysterious or unknown as to their causes, if you knew all of the facts. If you were in possession of every factor that entered into the situation, or every fact, you could always explain a phenomenon of this sort. The difficulty very often is that the known data, absolutely ascertainable and known data, are not sufficient to enable one to say with certainty that this, that, or the other was the cause of it. The main question in this ease is not for you to decide what was the cause of the fire. If you find that the defendant in using steel, and more particularly in using drilled steel, as a manifold, was negligent, or that, having selected the drilled steel, it made it in a negligent way, and that this negligence was the probable, natural, and reasonable explanation of the fire, then you should render a verdict in favor of tbe plaintiff. If, on tbe other band, you conclude that, under the evidence, tbe plaintiff has not shown that tbe defendant failed to use due care in making and installing this manifold, then that ends tbe case, and your verdict should be for tbe defendant. ’ ’
It goes without saying that there was weighty testimony before the jury on the part of the defendant to the contrary, and that the fire emanating from the manifold was due to other causes, and that our not citing it or discussing the conclusions drawn from it, does not mean we have overlooked or ignored it, or not appreciated its worth. We have confined our reference to the plaintiff’s proofs because, if they were such as constrained the court to submit the case to the jury, no error was committed in so doing, and the defendant’s ease then rested on its ability to satisfy the jury that the proofs on its side overmastered the plaintiff’s. We think the authorities warranted the court in submitting the ease to the jury.
Proximate cause is a question of fact. Did this manifold, which the verdict establishes as either made negligently, or of improper material, cause the fire? Was the
manifold one save for use of which, no fire would, have occurred? All these were questions fairly raised by the proofs, and if the jury found them in favor of the plaintiff, if they found that but for the presence of such a manifold as defendant furnished, no external communicating fire would have occurred, then they were justified in concluding that this manifold, which the defendant ought not to have furnished, and which was only there and in use by reason of defendant’s negligence, was, in the eyes of the law, the proximate, dominating cause of the external, communicating fire which followed.
Turning, next, to the alleged errors in' admitting testimony on the plaintiff’s side of the case, we note that the assignments, many in number, group themselves under a few heads, viz.: First, as to the cause of the fire. In taking up these questions, it is well to note the nature of the ease; its highly technical subject-matter; the consequent compelling necessity of' scientific information to enable the court and jurors to understand the situation; the character of materials used; the dangers incident to their use; the enlightening information given by highly skilled, technical men on these points, all of which enabled court and jury, and without which they could not, to intelligently understand and fairly decide the ease. Indeed, its unusual character is evidenced by the fact disclosed in the proofs, namely, that the Bureau of Mines of the Department of the Interior of the United States government detailed one of its scientific staff, Dr. Hersey, physicist in charge of the physical laboratory of the bureau, to attend this trial to hear the evidence, and with leave to give his testimony on the subject-matter, if called upon by either party.
In the course of the trial, Dr. R. T. Has-lam was asked-the question whether, “from your own experience and the experiments you have conducted, have you any opinion as to, or any explanation as to, how the fire occurred at the Philadelphia Storage Battery Company?” To which he replied he had such opinion, whereupon he was permitted to state his explanation, hereafter quoted, and such ruling is now assigned as error. It will be noted that theretofore testimony had been given showing that Dr. Haslam was professor of chemical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; that he had a high-grade technical training, had large experience in gas engineering, and had the practical supervision in such elements in the practice, management, and supervision of the plants of large companies; that he had made extensive experiments, as to the nature of all of which he testified before the jury — subjecting steel manifolds, such as here involved, to the effects of oxygen gas suddenly admitted under high pressure, into a manifold, and that he had attended the trial and heard all the testimony.
It will be noted that, in making these experiments, Dr. Haslam had had the manifold the defendant installed reproduced; two analyses of its steel made by independent chemists; then obtained in the open market steel answering such analyses, and reproduced the manifold’s exact size and shape. As showing the correctness of the manifold and the fairness of the experiments, the witness was asked if he had such experimental apparatus in a room adjoining the place of trial, and an offer was then made and permission asked to submit it to the experimental tests. As the defendant, by its objection, thus prevented fairness and fullness of .the experiments being subjected to scrutiny, test, and cross-examination, we think the court Was justified in receiving the testimony as to the experiments the witness had made in the use of oxygen gas on the manifold and the results thereof.
The evidence of substantial identity, fairness, and duplication were such as to admit such testimony for the consideration of the jury, and it will be noted that, in making the objection hereafter noted, the court’s attention was not called to any fact, which was proved or not proved, or any article, used or unused, which made either the experiments unfair or the results shown by them undependable. Under these conditions, Dr. Haslam testified as follows:
“A. Going to the testimony, as I heard it, Mr. Berrera, I believe his name was, was connecting a cylinder to the second valve away from the King valve. Q. Was connecting a cylinder ? A. He just connected it. Q. Had connected it? A. Yes, sir; prior to the time I am speaking about. Q. Yes. A. He opened the valve, at least partly, allowing the oxygen to rush into the manifold. The period of time after that oxygen rushed into the manifold and the time of the fire appears to be rather short, namely, Mr. Riley, I believe, had not time to hand him a wrench, to get a wrench and hand it to him, when he noticed fire breaking out. That would correspond in time to the time of our fires. Q. When you speak
of 'our fires,’ what do you mean? A. The fires we had with this same manifold, experimentally. I think the oxygen rushing into this manifold produced certain heat at this end of this section here (indicating), this section that is burned, and where it connects to the brass section; that joins this further section with the burnt section. Q. Joins the section farthest from the King valve with the section nearest to the King valve? A. Nearest to the King valve. I think at that point, or else in the pockets underneath the valve, between the second valve, away from the King valve, and the end of this (indicating) drilled steel bar, there were a small amount of easily ignitable materials, such as I have enumerated. The oil, for example, might have got in from drilling the holes, might not be thoroughly cleaned off, because it is extremely difficult to clean off lard oil from metal. The coal dust might have gotten in from the manifold setting around the yard, as has been testified, and the cotton waste might have gotten in from drilling out this roughly drilled manifold. This easily ignitable material was, in my opinion, ignited by the inrush of oxygen, and that little, incipient fire inside of the manifold communicated itself to the steel manifold, and then the steel manifold burned, sending molten metal down onto the other oxygen cylinders that were there, liberating the oxygen within the little shed outside of the Philadelphia Storage Battery Company’s building. This molten metal, scattering around, particularly in the presence of all this oxygen blowing into the shed, caused the shed to catch on fire, and the uprush of the flames blew the hot oxygen and flame into the building. * *
"Q. In your opinion, Professor Haslam, if that manifold had been made of brass, that same material as the connecting tubes between the different sections of the manifold and of the valves on top of the manifold, could that fire have occurred? A. In my opinion, the fire could not have occurred, and that information is based upon general knowledge of these materials and on our experiments. Q. I will ask you, further, one question. Are any of the chemical principles or physical principles, which are involved in the experiments, which you conducted, new? A. No, sir; we did not do anything that was new or startling. We merely put small amounts of easily ignitahle material, such as could ordinarily get in. We merely turned the — opened the valves in such a manner, such as any workman might. We found it much easier to burn the manifold, if there is any slight leak — ”
At the conclusion of the witness’ testimony and after full cross-examination, the ruling of the court and the objections thereto were summarized by defendant’s objection as follows: "In order that the record may be perfectly clear, I move to strike out the testimony of Professor Haslam, so far as he has assumed to express an opinion as to the cause of the fire in 1920, which is the basis of this action, he having expressed that opinion upon the assumption of facts which are not established, and, secondly, upon the assumption of facts which would, if true, constitute negligence on the part of the defendant, not at all averred in the plaintiff’s statement of claim as a ground upon which this action has been brought.”
As to the first objection, viz. "the assumption of facts which are not established,” we have heretofore noted defendant’s not calling to the court’s attention any such omission in the preceding mass of testimony as then enabled the court to correct its ruling, or to give opposing counsel the opportunity to supply it. Indeed, the gravamen of the objection then made, as it now seems to us, was that the testimony should be ruled out, because, if true, it was for a cause of action not averred in the pleadings, a mistaken contention, as we view the plaintiff’s statement of claim and this testimony. Without referring to the testimony of the other scientific, professional, and practical witnesses, versed or experienced in the use of oxygen gas, it suffices to say that we have considered the rulings made in the receipt of their testimony and find no error.
It remains to consider the testimony tendered by the defendant and not received. On the examination in chief of plaintiff’s witness Luening, he was asked about the contents of a letter and a blue print received from the British Oxygen Company. On objection of defendant that the contents were best proved by the papers themselves, plaintiff dropped its line of inquiry. When the defendant attempted to cross-examine as to the letter, the court refused to allow this to be done. In so doing it committed no error. Not only were the papers not in evidence, but no suggestion is now made as to what information, pertinent or helpful, the question would have elicited, or what bearing it would have had on the case.
Nor can we find error in the court’s ad
mitting certain testimony of Shaw, a witness for the plaintiff. He had had large experience in installation of oxygen gas plants for several years prior to 1916, when he went into the employ of the defendant, and was its representative in installing the particular manifold here in question. His testimony, in substance, was that when he began his employment in 1916, and in conversation with Mr. Roberts, head of the defendants engineering department, he told him of a ehange of manifold manufacturing practice of a certain company, "together with the general knowledge I had of the dangers and happenings of oxygen plants in the country, indicated to me that the use of steel was not the proper thing in a charging manifold.” We are unable to see either error or injury in this testimony. It will, in the first place, be noted that it referred, not to discharging manifolds such as are here involved, but to charging manifolds, and was therefore harmless and irrelevant. On the other hand, if, inferentially, it bore on discharging manifolds, it was pertinent as showing knowledge by the officers of the company of alleged dangers in the use of steel in charging manifolds, and therefore, a fortiori, when used for discharging manifolds, and properly went to the jury for such consideration as the jury felt it deserved, on the question of negligence in furnishing the steel discharging manifold here involved. Moreover, it showed that Shaw himself, who, as defendant’s agent, installed this manifold, knew it was dangerous to use, and this wholly apart from any communication of his knowledge to Brown.
We find no error in the admission of the testimony of Slava Dlouhy that manifolds should be of brass, and not of steel, because the latter would burn, and the former would not. The proofs show his experience, knowledge of the business, and practices of others warranted the court in concluding he was sufficiently qualified to testify on that subject. As a boy of 12, he began and continued working for the AshtonLaird Company, manufacturers of high pressure gas apparatus, doing business of large volume and all over the country, until he became president of his own company, doing the same line of work. Without discussing the testimony of the witness Ruck, we may say we are likewise of opinion that his training, experience, and observation were such as to warrant the court in admitting his testimony.
Turning from consideration of the evidence concerning the material from which the manifold was made to the machining of that material, it will be remembered that the second issue defined in the heretofore quoted extract from the court’s charge, was
‘1
that, aside from the material of which the manifold was constructed, it was not properly made — it was not properly machined. ’ ’ The nature of this alleged improper machining was specified in the court’s eharge, viz.: ‘1 The particular points specified are that,- in the drilling, it was drilled from both ends, and where the two drills met a shoulder, which I have not seen, but you have, was left in the middle of the header, and that in addition to that the drilling left rough places in the interior surfaces of the manifold, fins I think they were called by some, little splinters, unevennesses of metal, and that this careless workmanship, as it is charged, increased the hazard which arose out of the kind of material used — increased the combustibility.”
The proofs showed the defendant company had no facilities to, and did not, manufacture or machine the manifold here in question. They got it and other parts of the manifold equipment from other firms, and then assembled these several parts in final shape. There was no evidence from what source or firm the particular manifold here involved came, other than this proof given by Mr. Van Fleet, the vice president in charge of operations of the defendant: ‘ ‘ Q. By whom were these steel bars drilled and prepared, and furnished to -you? A. We obtained them from two sources of supply. Q. What were they? A. The Schaefer. Machine Works, Philadelphia, and Edward Purvis & Son, Brooklyn. Q. Both of these concerns, then, I understand, furnished you with all of the steel pipe that you used in any of your manifolds down to 1920, or I suppose since? A. Yes; the drilled steel bar. Q. When furnished to you for the purpose, was the steel bar drilled? A. Yes. Q. And did those concerns also do the drilling for the valves? A. The machine work was done complete on the drilled bar. ” Following this he was asked, ‘ ‘ What is the reputation and standing of those firms?” Thereupon the court sustained an objection, and this is assigned for error.
Ho error was involved in its so doing. The court below was dealing with one particular manifold; the several parts of it were made by different firms; the assembling of these parts and making them into a manifold was the exclusive work of the defendant company; and the issue was wheth
er this particular manifold, which, be it observed, still remained the property of the defendant, was a manifold unfitted for discharging oxygen gas. There was proof pro and con as to whether it was properly machined for such use. That was a question of fact. How could the reputation of the firm that had done the machine work affect the issue, namely, whether the manifold was not properly machined, and because not properly machined, the defendant was guilty of negligence in using such an improperly machined article ? Assuredly it could not.
Following this, we note the assignments touching the court’s sustaining objections to admitting the testimony of several witnesses as to the machine work on the manifold in suit. At first sight, it might seem this was error; but, as the rulings of Judge MeKeehan are more closely studied, one is impressed by observing how carefully he made the issues on trial govern his rulings on testimony. Bearing that in mind, it will be seen the issue here involved was not whether the steel was "a good job of machining, better perhaps than the average”; whether "you find in that piece of steel any more roughness, or fins, and so on, than you would find in a well-drilled piece of steel”; whether "the smoothness of the bore in that Aireo manifold steel bar, compared with bores the result of first-class machining”; whether the witnesses "regard it as good machining” — tests put to these several witnesses, but whether the fins which were on the manifold, whether good or bad machining, made a steel discharge manifold unsafe for oxygen gas use.-
Without entering upon a discussion of other assigments, all of which have had due consideration, we draw this long opinion to a close by saying we find no error involved, and therefore affirm the judgment.