Ainsley Morecroft v. Cpf Taylor Pond, LLC.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1210
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1210

AINSLEY MORECROFT

vs.

CPF TAYLOR POND, LLC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Ainsley Morecroft sued her former landlord, CPF Taylor

Pond, LLC (landlord), for violations of anti-discrimination and

fair housing laws. The Housing Court dismissed the complaint on

the basis of claim preclusion. Morecroft now appeals that

dismissal and seeks review of an earlier order to set aside a

default. We reverse the judgment of dismissal, affirm the order

to set aside the default, and remand for further proceedings.

Background. Morecroft lived in a property owned by the

landlord from 2017 until around April 2023. Throughout 2022,

Morecroft made several requests for reasonable accommodations,

which the landlord denied after deciding that they were not

based on a disability-related need. In December 2022, the landlord served Morecroft with a thirty-day notice to quit for

alleged lease violations; Morecroft asserts that the eviction

was in retaliation for her accommodation requests.

Thereafter, Morecroft filed a complaint with the

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). The

MCAD dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause;

Morecroft sought review of the determination pursuant to 804

Code Mass. Regs. § 1.08(4)(b) (2020), and the investigating

commissioner affirmed the dismissal.

Morecroft then filed this action in Housing Court. Her

complaint mistakenly named the defendant as "Village at Taylor

Pond" (the name of the housing complex where she had lived),

rather than using the landlord's name, CPF Taylor Pond, LLC. As

a result, no defendant entered an appearance, and a default was

entered. Thereafter, the landlord made a special appearance,

essentially moved to set aside the default, and argued that it

was neither named in nor served with the complaint. A judge set

aside the default and allowed Morecroft to amend her complaint

to name the landlord.

The landlord subsequently moved to dismiss, arguing that

the MCAD dismissal precluded the civil action. After a hearing,

2 a second judge allowed the motion. Morecroft now appeals both

the dismissal and the earlier order setting aside the default.1

Discussion. 1. Judgment of dismissal. Morecroft's brief

asserts in conclusory fashion that the dismissal was incorrect.

She also asserts that claim preclusion should not apply because

"the matter has not been properly adjudicated." This falls

short of proper argument. Ordinarily, "[t]he appellate court

need not pass upon questions or issues not argued in the brief."

Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019). We nonetheless address the issue here because the error

in dismissing the complaint is clear and capable of repetition.

We review the dismissal of a complaint on the basis of

claim preclusion de novo. See Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare

Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 (2019). "The invocation of claim

preclusion requires three elements: (1) the identity or privity

of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of

the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits"

(quotation and citation omitted). Kobrin v. Board of

Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005). Though we do

not know the content of either Morecroft's complaint to the MCAD

or the MCAD's dismissal thereof -- neither was provided in the

1 Morecroft also asks us to award damages. As an appellate court, it is not our place to do so. However, Morecroft may continue to pursue this relief on remand.

3 record appendix -- it appears undisputed that the first two

elements of claim preclusion are satisfied here. The third

element, however, is missing.

The landlord does not explain why the MCAD's dismissal for

lack of probable cause qualifies as a final judgment on the

merits or cite any authority so stating. Rather, the landlord

argues that Morecroft may choose between filing an MCAD

complaint or a civil action, but may not do both, citing King v.

First, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.2 (1999). But the

landlord's cited footnote merely states that G. L. c. 151B, § 9,

was amended in 1991 "to permit a plaintiff alleging housing

discrimination to commence a civil action . . . without first

filing a complaint with the MCAD." Id. King did not state that

the amendment created an exclusive choice between the two

avenues of relief. See id.

To the contrary, "[e]ven where the investigating

commissioner affirms the finding of no probable cause, nothing

in the statute precludes the complainant from filing a civil

action under G. L. c. 151B, § 9, so long as it is initiated

within the limitations period." Grandoit v. Massachusetts

Comm'n Against Discrimination, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 606

(2019). See Stern v. Haddad Dealerships of The Berkshires,

Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (D. Mass. 2007) (MCAD's lack of

probable cause determination has no preclusive effect).

4 Therefore, Morecroft's present action is not precluded merely

because the MCAD dismissed, and later affirmed the dismissal of,

her complaint alleging the same underlying facts.2

2. Setting aside default. An entry of default may be set

aside for "good cause." Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 (c), 365 Mass. 822

(1974). "There is no mechanical formula for determining whether

good cause exists[,] and courts may consider a host of relevant

factors" (citation omitted). Ceruolo v. Garcia, 92 Mass. App.

Ct. 185, 189 (2017). We review a decision to set aside an entry

of default for abuse of discretion. Id. at 188.

Here, the original complaint erroneously named "Village at

Taylor Pond" as the defendant. It is that entity, whatever its

legal status, that was defaulted on June 12, 2024. Only later,

on July 18, 2024, was the complaint amended to properly name the

landlord, CPF Taylor Pond, LLC, as the defendant, and only on

that date was the landlord served with the complaint. Thus, the

party against which Morecroft now seeks relief -- the landlord -

- was never defaulted. The removal of the default against

"Village at Taylor Pond" did not "injuriously affect[]

2 The landlord also argues that 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.08(4)(b)(3) (2020) prohibits judicial review of the MCAD's dismissal. This is true but immaterial; nothing in the complaint suggests that Morecroft is seeking judicial review rather than pursuing a separate, civil action arising from the same underlying events. Indeed, one judge stated during a hearing, "this is not an appeal to court. This is a separate litigation . . . ."

5 [Morecroft's] substantial rights" and thus there is no ground

for "disturbing" the order removing the default. G. L. c. 231,

§ 119. If there were any abuse of discretion (and we see none)

in removing the default, or in extending any deadlines before

Morecroft amended her complaint, it was harmless and would not

entitle Morecroft to relief in this appeal.

The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The order allowing the motion to set aside the entry of default is affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks, Smyth & Wood, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: November 20, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.