Aikens v. Sahuarita, Town of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-00199
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Stephen Aikens, et al., No. CV-24-00199-TUC-RCC

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Town of Sahuarita, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Defendants Town of Sahuarita, Sergeant Eric Heath, 16 Lieutenant Juan Zamora, Sergeant Oscar Fruge, and Officer Zachery Woodrow’s Motion 17 to Enforce Settlement. (Doc. 14.) The Court held a case management conference on 18 October 22, 2024, and ordered the parties to simultaneously brief whether Plaintiffs 19 Stephen and Deborah Aikens1 can seek relief beyond that indicated in their Notice of 20 Claim. (Doc. 18.) The Court denies the motion and limits Plaintiffs’ monetary recovery 21 on their state claims to $1.00. 22 I. Factual and Procedural History 23 This case arises from a law enforcement interaction at Plaintiffs’ residence on 24 April 19, 2023. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim on October 16, 2023. (Doc. 25 14-1 at 2–4.) The Notice of Claim indicated former police officer Stephen Aikens was 26 concerned “by the handling of the situation,” but Plaintiffs were “willing to accept $1.00 27 1 Plaintiffs’ pleadings alternately refer to Plaintiffs’ last name as “Aiken” or “Aikens.” 28 The Court refers to each Plaintiff by the surname Aikens, the name listed on the Complaint and the docket. 1 and mandatory training for all officers on exigent circumstances within six (6) months of 2 an agreement to resolve their claims at this stage.” (Id. at 3–4.) Defendants responded on 3 December 18, 2023, indicating a willingness to resolve the case for $1.00 and additional 4 training, but requiring a written settlement agreement with standard terms. (Doc. 14-2 at 5 2.) Subsequent communications between counsel involved discussions regarding the 6 scope of the training and the review of body camera footage. (Docs. 14-3–14-7.) On 7 March 29, 2024, Plaintiffs’ then-counsel, Richard Wintory, sent a letter outlining specific 8 training requirements to Defendants’ counsel Jim Jellison. (Doc. 14-8.) Jellison 9 responded on April 3, 2024, with a “draft” settlement agreement “for review and 10 comment.” (Doc. 14-9.) On April 5, 2024, Wintory responded that he had not heard back 11 from his clients regarding the draft settlement agreement, and stated he “will try and call 12 [Plaintiffs] again” and “will follow up with [Jellison] first of next week.” (Doc. 14-10.) 13 Instead, Plaintiffs filed their federal Complaint on April 10, 2024, alleging six federal and 14 three state law claims. (Doc. 1 at 6–9.) 15 Jellison emailed Wintory on April 17, 2024, indicating that he believed the 16 settlement was accepted on April 3, 2024, when Defendants “accepted your April 1, 2024 17 settlement offer.”2 (Doc. 14-12.) On April 17, 2024, Wintory responded, stating he would 18 relay Defendants’ position to Plaintiffs, and that he “would get [Jellison] a formal 19 response next week” after he “had the opportunity to get client input.” (Doc. 14-13.) 20 However, on April 23, 2024, Wintory informed Jellison that Plaintiffs had retained 21 present counsel, Dustin Romney, that day. (Doc. 14-14.) Romney later emailed Jellison 22 on April 30, 2024, indicating he believed “there may have already been a binding 23 settlement” and asking to discuss the matter. (Doc. 14-15.) 24 Defendants filed the present Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement on 25 September 12, 2024. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 15) and Defendants a 26 Reply (Doc. 16).

27 2 Plaintiffs’ April 1 settlement offer appears to be a typographical error. The email also states Plaintiffs’ offer was received March 29, 2024, and Defendants “accepted [the] offer 28 of settlement and emailed [Wintory] a draft Settlement and General Release Agreement” on April 3, 0224, and a revised agreement later that day. (Doc. 14-12.) 1 II. Settlement Agreement 2 Defendants argue that an agreement was reached based on the parties’ 3 communications and the draft settlement agreement. (Doc. 14.) They contend that 4 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Claim constituted an offer, which Defendants accepted, and the 5 essential terms of the settlement—i.e., the $1.00 payment and additional training—were 6 agreed upon. (Id. at 6.) They also emphasize that Wintory never explicitly disputed the 7 existence of a settlement agreement and Romney believed an agreement had been 8 reached. (Id.) 9 Plaintiffs argue there is no binding settlement agreement because there was no 10 unequivocal acceptance of an offer and no meeting of the minds regarding the essential 11 terms. (Doc. 15 at 3.) They add that Wintory’s March 29, 2024 letter was not an offer, 12 and, even if construed as an offer, Defendants’ response constituted a counteroffer due to 13 the inclusion of additional terms. (Id. at 3, 5.) 14 A district court may enforce a settlement agreement in cases where (1) the 15 agreement is complete, and (2) both parties agreed to the material terms of settlement. 16 Escobedo v. Solano, No. 1:23-cv-00373 KES SKO, 2025 WL 407324, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 17 Jan. 8, 2025) (first citing Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 18 1994), then citing Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987)). An enforceable 19 contract requires “an offer, acceptance, consideration, a sufficiently specific statement of 20 the parties’ obligations, and mutual assent.” Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 435 P.3d 1032, 1035 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (citations omitted); Myers v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 734 F. Supp. 22 3d 912, 919 (D. Ariz. 2024) ("In Arizona, for a valid contract to exist, the contract must 23 manifest mutual assent, i.e., the parties’ intent to be bound.”) (citations omitted). "Mutual 24 assent is based on objective evidence, not on the hidden intent of the parties, and 25 objective evidence includes both written and spoken words, as well as acts." Buckholtz, 26 435 P.3d at 1035. 27 The Court finds that no enforceable settlement agreement existed between the 28 parties because there was no assent to the material terms of training. While the parties 1 engaged in settlement negotiations, the record does not demonstrate a meeting of the 2 minds on all material terms. Defendants’ initial response to the Notice of Claim included 3 additional terms, transforming it into a counteroffer. These additional requirements 4 included “a general release of claims, a no-admissions clause, the execution of a CMS 5 affidavit, a promise to dismiss any administrative or judicial filings, and a promise to 6 refrain from any further filings arising from the facts of this case.” (Doc. 14-2.) 7 The subsequent communications and draft settlement agreement further reflect 8 ongoing negotiations about material aspects of the officer training. For instance, Wintory 9 indicates that the release of body camera footage would further clarify “the types of 10 training needed.” (Doc. 14-3.) After reviewing the body camera footage, Wintory stated 11 his clients needed certain “components of the incident . . . addressed in training” to come 12 to a settlement agreement. (Doc. 14-8 at 2.) The negotiations regarding types of training 13 demonstrates this material term of settlement had not been decided. 14 Moreover, in response to Wintory’s added requirements for settlement, Jellison 15 sent Wintory a draft for “review and comment,” with empty signature spots. (Doc. 14-9 16 at 2–9.) Wintory responded that he sent the draft to Plaintiffs but had not received a 17 response and would attempt to contact them again to get their response to the proposed 18 settlement. (Doc. 14-10.) None of these facts suggest either party believed they had 19 entered into a binding agreement. Romney’s subsequent request—soon after taking on 20 this case—to meet Jellison to discuss whether a binding agreement existed does not 21 change this conclusion. 22 III. Counsel’s Authority to Settle 23 “An attorney without actual authority to settle a dispute can nevertheless do so if 24 the other party to the agreement reasonably assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do 25 the act on the basis of the client's (and not the lawyer’s) manifestation of such 26 authorization.” See Robertson v. Alling, 351 P.3d 352, 356 ¶ 17 (Ariz. 2015) (cleaned 27 up). “The party seeking to enforce the settlement bears the burden of showing that its 28 reliance on the attorney’s apparent authority was reasonable.” Id. (citing Miller v. Mason- 1 McDuffie Co. of S. Cal., 739 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1987)). 2 Plaintiffs argue their counsel lacked authority to settle, emphasizing no explicit 3 authorization was given to finalize settlement terms after December 2023. (Doc. 15 at 7.) 4 They also contend counsel's actions were part of ongoing negotiations and that the 5 training requirements “were material to Plaintiff in reaching an agreement.” (Id. at 6.) 6 Plaintiffs alternatively indicate counsel exceeded his authority. (Id.) 7 Defendants argue Plaintiffs' counsel’s actions suggested he had the authority to 8 settle the case. (Doc. 14 at 6.) For instance, counsel’s filing of the Notice of Claim and 9 subsequent communications suggest Plaintiffs intended to settle and a contract was 10 formed. (Id. at 6–7.) They assert that counsel’s apparent authority was supported by the 11 lack of objection from Plaintiffs during negotiations. (Doc. 16 at 2.) 12 Based on Wintory’s statements and Plaintiffs’ actions, the Court concludes 13 Defendants could not reasonably assume Wintory was authorized to enter into a 14 settlement agreement. Wintory never suggested he had authority to agree to the 15 settlement terms. Rather, he indicated on multiple occasions that he needed to get his 16 clients’ approval. In addition, the language in the emails does not suggest either party 17 believed Wintory had authority to settle. Jellison sent a “draft” settlement agreement for 18 “review and comment,” and Wintory responded that he needed to show and get approval 19 from his clients. 20 IV. Ability to Exceed Notice of Claim 21 a. Federal Claims 22 Plaintiffs argue that A.R.S. § 12-821.01 does not apply to their federal law claims 23 (six of eight total claims). (Doc. 20 at 2.) Defendants make no counterargument. The 24 Court finds that the state notice requirements do not apply to Plaintiffs’ federal § 1983 25 claims. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (declining to apply state statute to 26 plaintiff’s § 1983 claim “as a matter of equitable federalism”). 27 b. State Claims 28 Plaintiffs next assert they are not limited to the $1.00 settlement offer in their 1 Notice of Claim because the language in A.R.S. § 12-821.01 does not limit damages 2 sought in subsequent litigation—once the public entity rejects the offer, the plaintiff is 3 free to litigate for any provable amount. (Doc. 20 at 2, 4.) They argue that if the statute 4 capped damages, public entities would never accept settlement offers “because the mere 5 existence of an offer would function as a damages cap and would allow the public entity 6 to continue litigating without any additional risk exposure.” (Id. at 4.) Finally, Plaintiffs 7 argue that interpreting the statute as a damages cap would violate the Arizona 8 Constitution's Anti-Abrogation Clause and due process by forcing litigants to cap 9 damages without discovery. (Id. at 5 (citing Ariz. Const. art. II § 31).) 10 Defendants counter that Plaintiffs are limited to the $1.00 compensation and 11 mandatory training because the purpose of the sum certain requirement in A.R.S. § 12- 12 821.01(A) is to allow for investigation, assessment, settlement, financial planning, and 13 budgeting. (Doc. 19 at 2.) Defendants contend Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim clearly stated 14 their willingness to accept $1.00 and mandatory training, with no suggestion of seeking 15 an increased amount in litigation, and no factual support for any other amount. (Id. at 3, 16 5.) 17 For the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds Plaintiffs cannot litigate this 18 matter above the $1.00 amount sought in the Notice of Claim because it provided neither 19 (1) a sum certain, nor (2) notice of liability beyond nominal damages. 20 i. Sum Certain Requirement 21 Arizona Revised Statute § 12-821.01 requires that a plaintiff with “claims against 22 a public entity” provide a notice of claim that “contain[s] a specific amount for which the 23 claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). 24 Meaning, “[t]he claimant must present the [governmental entity] with a definite amount 25 which he is willing to accept as full satisfaction of his claim. As long as the claimant 26 states a definite and exact amount, and the government may completely satisfy its liability 27 by paying that sum, the claim letter satisfies the sum certain requirement.” Yollin v. City 28 of Glendale, 191 P.3d 1040, 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added); City of Mesa v. 1 Ryan in and for Cnty. of Maricopa, 557 P.3d 316, 319 (Ariz. 2024) ("All that is required 2 is that the claimant offer a specific settlement amount that leaves no room for debate 3 about what the public entity must pay to settle the claim.") (emphasis added) (citing Deer 4 Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (Ariz. 2007)). The sum 5 certain requirement “protects the [public entity] from excess or unwarranted liability and 6 facilitates settlement of claims by allowing” the public entity to investigate, budget, and 7 consider settlement. Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1045. “[C]laimants must strictly comply with the 8 statute.” City of Mesa, 557 P.3d at 319 (citing Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa Cnty., 9 144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ariz. 2006)). Failure to comply “bar[s a plaintiff] from suing the 10 public entity or employee on the claim.” City of Mesa, 557 P.3d at 317. 11 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Claim offer of $1.00 and police training did not meet the sum 12 certain requirement because it did not state an exact monetary amount that would settle 13 the entire claim. See Chunnui v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV-24-00503-PHX-MTL, 14 2024 WL 4858383, at *6 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2024) (finding notice of claim invalid 15 because "there is no amount of money each Defendant could offer to satisfy its liability") 16 (emphasis added). The Notice of Claim was a two-part offer—a nominal monetary sum 17 and non-monetary training. Its insufficiency is supported by Plaintiffs’ argument that 18 despite both parties agreeing to the $1.00, a binding settlement could not have occurred 19 because the terms of the police training were still being negotiated. The addition of non- 20 monetary conditions to settlement is not provided for in the statute, and strict compliance 21 is mandated. The failure to meet the sum certain requirements means Plaintiffs are 22 prevented from suing Defendants entirely on the state claims. See City of Mesa, 557 P.3d 23 at 317. However, Plaintiffs may still seek the nominal damages and training. 24 ii. Nominal Damages 25 Certain forms of relief are not subject to Arizona Revised Statute § 12-821.01 26 notice requirements—for instance, claims for declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief. 27 See Spectrum Pac. W. LLC v. City of Yuma, 507 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1189 (D. Ariz. 2020) 28 (declaratory and injunctive relief); see also Bollfrass v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-19- 1 04014-PHX-MTL, 2020 WL 3440289, at *16 (D. Ariz. June 23, 2020) (equitable relief). 2 The Ninth Circuit has stated that Arizona would also exempt claims for one dollar in 3 nominal damages as they “are more like pure declaratory relief because they are by 4 definition minute and so of no budgetary consequence,” and “have no direct effect upon 5 [a public entity’s] financial planning or budgeting.” Platt v. Moore, 15 F.4th 895, 903 6 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Martineau v. Maricopa Cnty., 86 P.3d 912, 915 (Ariz. Ct. App. 7 2007)). Moreover, unlike “punitive and compensatory damages, nominal damages are 8 awarded to vindicate rights,” and to identify “the prevailing party for the purposes of 9 awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 10 872 (9th Cir. 2017). 11 Even if the Notice of Claim included a sum certain, it asked for only nominal 12 damages and did not provide a sufficient basis for Defendants to assess liability, consider 13 settlement, or budget for litigation beyond that amount. The Notice of Claim stated that 14 Stephen Aikens was a former police officer who suffered “indignity,” approximately 15 $50.00 in property damage, and distress. (Doc. 14-1 at 2.) Plaintiffs were concerned with 16 how officers handled a warrantless entry to their home and were willing to settle for 17 $1.00 and training on exigent circumstances. (Id.) “Nominal damages claims of one 18 dollar have consistently been understood as categorically different from even small 19 compensatory damages claims, as compensatory damages and nominal damages serve 20 distinct purposes.”" Mohareb v. Maricopa Cnty. Spec. Health Care Dist., No. CV-23- 21 02226-PHX-DWL, 2024 WL 2746952, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 29, 2024) (quoting Platt, 15 22 F.4th at 904)). Plaintiffs were seeking a nominal sum and the vindication of their rights. 23 However, there was no indication that if settlement failed, Plaintiffs would seek actual, 24 compensatory, or punitive damages, forms of relief that could greatly affect the entity’s 25 coffers. Based on the Notice of Claim, Defendants could not adequately assess liability, 26 consider settlement, and budget for future litigation beyond the nominal sum. Unlike 27 these larger claims for monetary relief, because nominal damages and equitable relief are 28 not subject to the notice of claim requirements, a failure to meet these requirements does not preclude Plaintiffs from pursuing their state claims seeking $1.00 (nominal damages) || and officer training (equitable relief). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ state claims may proceed, but 3|| relief is limited to $1.00.° 4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement || Agreement is DENIED. (Doc. 14.) 6 Dated this 26th day of February, 2025. 7 8 9 fl Dp i ST (rl _— - 10 Honorable Raner ©. Collins 11 senior United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 > Exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs. See Bayer, 861 F.3d at 872.

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