Aida Pantoja v. United States Postal Service

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided June 25, 2024·No. CH-0353-19-0458-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

AIDA L. PANTOJA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0353-19-0458-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: June 25, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Aida L. Pantoja , Cudahy, Wisconsin, pro se.

Deborah L. Lisy , Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant again challenges the processing of her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint, argues that the agency failed to provide all of the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

information necessary to adjudicate her case, and asserts that the administrative judge erred by concluding that the agency did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to return the appellant to duty, and therefore, she failed to establish Board jurisdiction over her claim that she was denied restoration. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the burden of proof that an appellant must meet to establish jurisdiction over her restoration appeal, we AFFIRM the initial decision. The Board has jurisdiction to review whether an agency’s denial of restoration to a partially recovered employee was arbitrary and capricious. Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 659 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 2011), superseded in part by regulation on other grounds as stated in Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c). Thus, to establish jurisdiction over a claim of denial of restoration as a partially recovered employee, an appellant is required to make nonfrivolous allegations of the following: (1) she was absent from her position due to a compensable injury; (2) she recovered sufficiently to return to duty on a part-time basis or to return to work in a position with less demanding physical requirements than those 3

previously required of her; (3) the agency denied her request for restoration; and (4) the denial was arbitrary and capricious. See Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 404, ¶ 12 (2016); Kingsley, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 11; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(4), (b). Once an appellant establishes jurisdiction, she is entitled to a hearing at which she must prove the merits of her restoration appeal by a preponderance of the evidence. Kingsley, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 12; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(4). In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that the appellant had to establish jurisdiction over her appeal by preponderant evidence. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3. This was in error. Effective March 30, 2015, the Board issued regulations that adopted a nonfrivolous allegation standard for establishing jurisdiction in restoration appeals. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(4), (b); see Hamilton, 123 M.S.P.R. 404, ¶¶ 11-12. Nevertheless, we conclude that the administrative judge’s error is of no legal consequence because it did not adversely affect the appellant’s substantive rights. Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981); see Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 5 n.2 (2016) (finding an administrative judge’s error in citing to the preponderant evidence standard harmless in a restoration appeal because he properly determined that the appellant failed to present nonfrivolous allegations of jurisdiction), aff’d per curiam, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017). On review, the appellant has not disputed the administrative judge’s findings that she failed to identify any available work within her restrictions or provide any evidence that there was work to be performed that the agency failed to offer her, or denied that the agency eventually offered her a modified job offer after completing its search for available work duties. ID at 7-8; IAF, Tab 17 at 187-89. Consequently, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the agency’s failure to provide the appellant with a work assignment until after her July 30, 2018 medical release did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious 4

denial of the appellant’s restoration rights, and conclude that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over her appeal even under the lower nonfrivolous allegation standard. 2 ID at 6-8. Finally, in the absence of an otherwise appealable action, we lack jurisdiction to address the appellant’s claim that the agency erred in processing her EEO complaint. 3 Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 4-5; see Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012) (concluding that, absent an

2 After the initial decision in this appeal was issued, the Board issued a decision in Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, which clarified when a denial of restoration may be arbitrary and capricious. The Board in Cronin held that, although agencies may undertake restoration efforts beyond the minimum effort required by OPM under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), an agency’s failure to comply with self-imposed obligations cannot itself constitute a violation of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) such that a resulting denial of restoration would be rendered arbitrary and capricious for purposes of establishing Board jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c). Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20.

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Aida Pantoja v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2024).

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