AHRMA Exchange v. County Development Corp.

2026 IL App (5th) 231317-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 5-23-1317
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 231317-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/14/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-1317 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

AHRMA EXCHANGE, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Christian County. ) v. ) No. 22-MR-55 ) CHRISTIAN COUNTY DEVELOPMENT ) CORPORATION, FRANKLIN PARTNERS LEASING, ) LLC, JACKSON PINES, LLC, ROTHSCHILD ) ASSOCIATED, LLLC, TUDOR BUILDING MASTER ) TENANT, LLC, 1818 WASHINGTON MASTER ) TENANT, LLL, AND 1900 WASHINGTON ) PARTNERS, LLC, ) Honorable ) Bryan M. Kibler, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment. ∗

ORDER

¶1 Held: We reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff’s declaratory action where subsections K and L of the Management Liability Form Coverage excludes coverage of the underlying lawsuit.

¶2 On August 26, 2022, the plaintiff, AHRMA Exchange, an insurance company, filed a

complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Christian County, Illinois, and an

∗ Justice Moore fully participated in the decision prior to his retirement. See Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6 (1992).

1 amended complaint on May 2, 2023. The amended complaint sought the circuit court’s

determination on whether the plaintiff owed a duty to defend or indemnify the defendant, Christian

County Development Corporation (CCDC), pursuant to policy number AHl2019121002 (Policy),

concerning a lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, matter

number 2222-CC04858 (underlying lawsuit). On November 17, 2023, the circuit court found that

the plaintiff had no duty to defend or indemnify under the General Liability Form Coverage

provision of the Policy, but that the plaintiff did have a duty under the Management Liability Form

Coverage, since none of the exclusions to that coverage applied. As such, the circuit court ruled in

favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint. For the following

reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The underlying lawsuit was filed against CCDC by the nominal parties to this action: the

defendants, Franklin Partners Leasing, LLC; Jackson Pines, LLC; Rothschild Associated, LLC;

Tudor Building Master Tenant, LLC; 1818 Washington Master Tenant, LLC; and 1900

Washington Partners, LLC (collectively, nominal defendants). The underlying lawsuit alleged

claims of breach of contract and negligence against CCDC concerning its care and competence in

managing various properties under certain management agreements that CCDC had entered into

with the nominal defendants.

¶5 On May 2, 2023, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment seeking

a determination by the circuit court on whether the plaintiff owed a duty to defend or indemnify

CCDC regarding the underlying lawsuit. The plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged that there was

no duty to defend or indemnify CCDC in the underlying lawsuit because the Policy issued to

CCDC did not provide, and specifically excluded, coverage for the underlying lawsuit. In the

2 interest of brevity, and for ease of reference, we will set forth the Policy’s provisions at issue in

this appeal in our analysis below.

¶6 On June 1, 2023, CCDC filed an answer to the plaintiff’s amended complaint and a motion

for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2-615 (West 2022)). The plaintiff filed a response to CCDC’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings and a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings on July 20, 2023. The circuit court

conducted a hearing on the motions on August 4, 2023, and took the matter under advisement.

¶7 By docket entry on November 17, 2023, the circuit court found that the plaintiff had no

duty to defend CCDC under the General Liability Form Coverage provisions of the Policy but held

that none of the exclusion provisions of the Management Liability Form Coverage of the Policy

applied. The circuit court stated that CCDC was being sued by the nominal defendants in the State

of Missouri for how it manages and operates its holding in that State and that it took out an

insurance policy in case of such an event. The circuit court further stated that it had reviewed the

different pleadings and the underlying lawsuit and could not find where any of the exclusions to

the Management Liability Form Coverage applied. Therefore, the circuit court ruled in favor of

the defendants on the pleadings and dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint for declaratory

judgment. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on December 14, 2023.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 On appeal, the plaintiff raises the sole issue of whether the circuit court erred in finding

that the exclusion provisions of the Management Liability Form Coverage did not exclude

coverage for the claims filed against CCDC in the underlying lawsuit. The plaintiff argues that

both subsections K and L of section “VI. EXCLUSIONS” of the Management Liability Form

Coverage specifically exclude coverage, and that subsections A, B, E, M, and N of the exclusions

3 either exclude coverage, or potentially exclude coverage, such that the factual issue cannot be

resolved through a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

¶ 10 Before proceeding with our analysis, we note the plaintiff’s lack of relevant authority

within its arguments. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), requires that

arguments shall contain “the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of

the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” The plaintiff cites relevant authority for the

standard of review on this issue. However, under the first section of the plaintiff’s arguments,

Management Liability Form Coverage Part Provisions, the plaintiff cites one case from the

Superior Court of Connecticut, National Waste Associates, LLC v. Travelers Casualty and Surety

Company of America, 51 Conn. Supp. 369 (2008), and then has several references to a commercial

insurance blog. Under the plaintiff’s argument regarding subsection L, the plaintiff cites a single

case in support of its argument, Associated Community Bancorp Inc. v. The Travelers, 2010 WL

1416842, an unpublished decision from the United States District Court, Connecticut. The

plaintiff’s brief has no other citations to authority within its remaining arguments.

¶ 11 Decisions of the federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, are not binding

on Illinois courts. Mekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., LLC, 347 Ill. App. 3d 828, 836 (2004).

This court is also not bound to follow decisions from other states. Travel 100 Group, Inc. v.

Mediterranean Shipping Co. (USA) Inc., 383 Ill. App. 3d 149, 157 (2008). The plaintiff’s reliance

on Associated Community Bancorp, Inc., is also misplaced since it is an interpretation of an

insurance contract under Connecticut law. The plaintiff gives no indication that controlling

precedent, after a diligent search, could not be located. At most, the plaintiff may cite these

decisions as persuasive authority. The plaintiff, however, does not acknowledge these cases as

nonbinding precedent, nor does it request this court to consider the reasoning of these cases as

4 persuasive authority. Further, directing this court to a commercial insurance blog site, with no

citation to the record to demonstrate that the information on the site was considered by the circuit

court, is unacceptable. See generally People v. Benford, 31 Ill. App. 3d 892, 894 (1975) (“the

purpose of review is to evaluate the record of the trial court, and, in general, the review will be

limited to what appears in the record.”). Although this court may take judicial notice of readily

verifiable facts from sources of indisputable accuracy, information on a commercial insurance blog

is not a source of indisputable accuracy. See generally Mad Cow Oil Company v. H&R. Oil

Properties, Inc., 2025 IL App (5th) 240895-U, ¶ 23 (circuit court erred in relying on information

from website to interpret the meaning of parcel documents).

¶ 12 A failure to cite relevant authority violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct.

1, 2020) and may cause a party to forfeit the issue on appeal. Fortech, L.L.C. v. R.W. Dunteman

Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d 804, 818 (2006). “The appellate court is not a depository in which the

appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.” Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v.

Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986). Rule 341, however, is not a limitation on this court’s

jurisdiction, but an admonishment to the parties. Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23.

As such, this court may consider improperly raised issues where the issues are evident, and the

merits of the appeal can be readily ascertained from the record on appeal. See id.; see also

Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001). A

reviewing court may also reverse or affirm on any grounds supported by the record. County of

Kankakee v. Anthony, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1048 (1999). Thus, we have elected to proceed with

the merits of this appeal.

¶ 13 We review de novo a ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section

2-615. Randall v. Lemke, 311 Ill. App. 3d 848, 850 (2000). All well-pleaded facts and reasonable

5 inferences therefrom are taken as true, and we will only consider those facts apparent from the

face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions contained in the

record. Gillen v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381, 385 (2005). “Judgment on the

pleadings is proper where the pleadings disclose no genuine issue of material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

¶ 14 The construction of an insurance policy is a question of law that we also review de novo.

Illinois State Bar Ass’n Mutual Insurance Co. v. Leighton Legal Group, LLC, 2018 IL App (4th)

170548, ¶ 40. “When determining whether an insurance provider has a duty to defend its insured

in a lawsuit, a court should generally apply an ‘eight corners rule.’ ” Farmers Automobile

Insurance Ass’n v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d 694, 698 (2000). That is, the

court compares the four corners of the underlying complaint with the four corners of the insurance

contract. Id. If the facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall within, or potentially within, the

insurance policy’s coverage, the insurer’s duty to defend is triggered. Pekin Insurance Co. v. St.

Paul Lutheran Church, 2016 IL App (4th) 150966, ¶ 63.

¶ 15 “The primary objective when construing the language of an insurance policy is to ascertain

and enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in their agreement.” Illinois State Bar Ass’n

Mutual Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (4th) 170548, ¶ 40. The terms of the policy are given their

plain and ordinary meaning where language is clear and unambiguous. County Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Oehler’s Home Care, Inc., 2019 IL App (4th) 190080, ¶ 59. We strictly construe any

ambiguities or provisions that limit or exclude coverage against the insurer who drafted the policy

and liberally in favor of the insured. Id. A court must construe the policy as a whole, taking into

account the type of insurance purchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose

of the contract. Id. “If an insurer relies on an exclusionary clause to deny coverage, it must be clear

6 and free from doubt that the exclusionary clause applies.” Illinois State Bar Ass’n Mutual

Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (4th) 170548, ¶ 37.

¶ 16 Here, the plaintiff argues that subsections K and L under the exclusionary clause of the

Management Liability Form Coverage specifically exclude coverage of the underlying lawsuit.

Those provisions state as follows:

“VI. EXCLUSIONS

We shall not be liable to make any payments for “loss” in connection with

any “claim” made against any ‘Insured’:

***

K. Based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in

consequence of, or in any way involving, the service of any “Insured” for any

person or entity other than those listed on the Declarations;

L. Based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in

consequence of, or in any way involving, the rendering or failure to render by any

‘Insured’ any opinion, treatment, consultation or service if such opinion, treatment,

consultation or service was rendered or not rendered:

1. For compensation from any source other than the ‘Insured’;”

¶ 17 The plaintiff states that CCDC is an “Insured” and is the only person or entity listed on the

Management Liability Form Coverage’s declarations. The underlying lawsuit involves allegations

related to the services performed, or failed to perform, by CCDC in its management of certain

properties that it was contractually required to perform under the various property management

agreements with the nominal defendants. Since the nominal defendants are not listed on the

Management Liability Form Coverage’s declarations, the plaintiff argues that CCDC services to

7 the nominal defendants were for a “person or entity other than those listed on the Declarations.”

As such, the plaintiff argues that the plain language of subsection K excludes coverage of the

underlying lawsuit. The plaintiff further argues that since CCDC was compensated by the nominal

defendants, a source other than the “Insured”, subsection L also excludes coverage of the

underlying lawsuit.

¶ 18 CCDC argues that the plaintiff’s pleadings fail to provide sufficient support that there is no

doubt the exclusionary clauses of the Management Liability Form Coverage apply to deny

coverage. On appeal, CCDC argues that subsections K and L create ambiguity because viewing

the policy as a whole, “excluding any execution of contractual duties from coverage is at odds with

the purpose and intent of the policy, thus creating ambiguity.” The plaintiff notes that CCDC did

not raise the argument of ambiguity in the circuit court and requests that this court find the

argument forfeited.

¶ 19 Generally, arguments not raised in the circuit court are forfeited on appeal. U.S. Bank Trust,

N.A. v. Colston, 2015 IL App (5th) 140100, ¶ 20. General forfeiture principles, however, may be

overlooked in a civil case and a reviewing court may consider an issue not raised below if the issue

is one of law, is fully briefed, and has been argued by the parties. Forest Preserve District of

Du Page County v. First National Bank of Franklin Park, 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 28. Further, forfeiture

is a limitation on the parties and not the reviewing court. People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435,

¶ 9. Here, the construction of an insurance contract is a question of law, and the parties have fully

briefed and argued the issue. Therefore, we will decline to apply forfeiture in this matter, but

caution CCDC that forfeiture will normally be applied if the argument is not clearly raised in the

lower court.

8 ¶ 20 Our review of the Policy demonstrates that it is comprised of several form coverages

including, but not limited to, Commercial General Liability; Hired and Non-Owned Automobiles;

Comprehensive Equipment Coverage; Business Income and Extra Expense; Employee Benefits

Liability; and Management Liability. Each coverage form has a “Declarations” and some coverage

forms have endorsements and/or addendums that apply to that specific coverage form. For

example, by endorsements, all the nominal defendants are listed as additional insured under the

General Liability Form Coverage. The only form coverage at issue in this appeal is the

Management Liability Form Coverage, and the Management Liability Form Coverage’s

declarations list only CCDC as the name of the insured.

¶ 21 Whether an ambiguity exists depends on whether the policy language is subject to more

than one reasonable interpretation. Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17

(2005). Subsection K states that the plaintiff will not be liable to make any payments for loss,

“[b]ased upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any

way involving, the service of any ‘Insured’ for any person or entity other than those listed on the

Declarations.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, because CCDC is the only entity listed in the declarations,

the plain language of subsection K limits coverage under the Management Liability Form

Coverage to services performed by CCDC for CCDC.

¶ 22 Subsection L states that the plaintiff will not be liable to make any payments for loss if the

loss resulted from, directly or indirectly, the rendering of, or the failure to render, services “for

compensation from any source other than the insured.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the plain

language of subsection L excludes coverage of loss resulting from services performed, or failed to

be performed, by CCDC for compensation from any person or entity other than CCDC.

9 ¶ 23 The underlying lawsuit alleged claims of breach of contract and negligence against CCDC

concerning its management of various properties under certain management agreements that

CCDC had entered into with the nominal defendants. The underlying lawsuit further stated that

the nominal defendants had “substantially paid all sums due under these property management

agreements” to CCDC. Comparing the four corners of the underlying lawsuit with the four corners

of the Management Liability Form Coverage, demonstrates that subsections K and L exclude

coverage since the underlying lawsuit involves services that were performed, or failed to be

perform, by CCDC for entities other than CCDC, and CCDC was compensated by entities other

than CCDC.

¶ 24 CCDC argues that “excluding any execution of contractual duties from coverage is at odds

with the purpose and intent of the policy, thus creating ambiguity,” but CCDC does not argue that

the language of either subsection K or L is ambiguous or subject to more than one reasonable

interpretation. Further, in viewing the policy as a whole, the nominal defendants were added by

endorsement to the General Liability Form Coverage, thereby indicating that they were required

to be listed as a named insured on the declarations for the General Liability Form Coverage in

order for the provisions of that form coverage to be applicable to the nominal defendants. The

nominal defendants were not listed, by endorsement or otherwise, in the Management Liability

Form Coverage.

¶ 25 As previously stated, where the language is clear and unambiguous, we give the terms of

the policy their plain and ordinary meaning. County Mutual Ins. Co., 2019 IL App (4th) 190080,

¶ 59. In this matter, the plain language of subsections K and L exclude coverage for the underlying

lawsuit since the services performed, or failed to be performed, by CCDC were for entities other

than CCDC and CCDC was compensated for the services by entities other than CCDC.

10 ¶ 26 While we agree with the circuit court that the overall purpose of the Policy was to cover

loss due to CCDC’s property management operations, the plain language of subsections K and L

of the Management Liability Form Coverage exempts coverage of the underlying lawsuit under

that form coverage. Since we have determined that subsections K and L exclude coverage of the

underlying lawsuit, we need not address any arguments regarding subsections A, B, E, M, and N

of the exclusions section of the Management Liability Form Coverage. We further make no

determinations regarding any other form of coverage provided in the Policy.

¶ 27 Because we have determined that subsections K and L of the Management Liability Form

Coverage exclude coverage of the underlying lawsuit, we find that the circuit court erred in

dismissing the plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court

and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the

plaintiff’s declaratory action.

¶ 30 Reversed and remanded.