Ahrens v. Lansdale Board of Adjustment

41 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 1966 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 215
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County
DecidedJuly 11, 1966
Docketno. 14188 of 1964
StatusPublished

This text of 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (Ahrens v. Lansdale Board of Adjustment) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ahrens v. Lansdale Board of Adjustment, 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 1966 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).

Opinion

Forrest, P. J.,

This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Lansdale sustaining the decision of the borough building and zoning officer in issuing a building permit to the intervenors, Bruno and Tina D’Angelo, authorizing them to alter an existing garage situate on their premises, 60 Elm Drive, Lansdale, and authorizing them to conduct a “home occupation” therein.

The original application by Mrs. D’Angelo was in the form of a letter dated June 30, 1964, specifying her contemplated wedding gown and accessory “home occupation”. Following the issuance of the permit, an appeal was filed with the board. A hearing was held on October 8, 1964, at which time the board, construing the permit as a building permit rather than a zoning permit, refused to allow any testimony as to use, but, nevertheless, held the use proper. The matter was [474]*474then appealed to this court. After argument, the court determined that a zoning issue was involved and ordered the matter remanded to the Lansdale Board of Adjustment for a full hearing on the zoning issue. Thereafter, the D’Angelos petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to allow an appeal to said ruling, which was denied. A second hearing, pursuant to our order, was held on July 29, 1965, and on December 23, 1965, the board rendered its decision, again dismissing the appeal. This denial by the board is the basis of the matter now before the court which, after oral argument before the court en banc, is ready for disposition.

Since this court took no additional testimony, the scope of our review is confined to an examination of the record to determine whether the board was guilty of a manifest abuse of discretion or an error of law: Jacobi v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 413 Pa. 286 (1964).

The premises in question are situate in a class A residence district, pursuant to the Lansdale zoning ordinance. Article IY, Section 300, relating to a class A residence district, provides as follows:

“Section 300. A building may be erected, altered or used, and a lot or premises may be used for any of the following purposes and for no other: . . .

“4. Accessory use on the same lot with, and customarily incidental to any of the above permitted uses. This shall be understood to include a professional office ..., or rooms used for home occupations, provided that the office, studio or occupational room is located in a dwelling in which the practitioner resides or in a building accessory thereto, and provided further that no goods are publicly displayed on the premises”.

The issue before the court is whether Mrs. D’Angelo’s bridal service is a home occupation permitted in [475]*475this district or a commercial enterprise or business being conducted in a residential district, contrary to the zoning ordinance.

In resolving this issue, we must first define “home occupation”; said term not being defined by the zoning ordinance. On page 9 of its opinion, quoting from Bassett on Zoning, the board states:

“During the formative period of comprehensive zoning it became evidenced that districts could not be confined to principal uses only. It had always been customary for occupants of homes to carry on gainful employment as something accessory and incidental to the residential use. The doctor, the dentist, the lawyer or notary had from time immemorial used his own home for his office. Similarily, the dressmaker, milliner and music teacher worked in her own home. The earliest zoning ordinances took communities as they existed and did not try to prevent customary practices that met with no objection from the community”.

Thus, the concept of a home occupation encompasses those historical and customary occupations which have been traditionally carried on incidentally to a residential use. It is apparent that the Borough of Lansdale has adopted this concept of “home occupation”, as evidenced by the use of the words “customarily incidental” in describing permitted accessory uses. On page 8 of its opinion, the board states that “courts seem to be concerned with the manner in which the particular occupation was or would be conducted rather than its nature alone”. Coupling the aforesaid with the requirement of non-public display of goods, we proceed to examine the use in this case.

Basically, Tina D’Angelo’s operation is as follows: A prospective bride wishing to avail herself of Mrs. D’Angelo’s services arrives by appointment. After a general discussion as to services desired, a showing of unfinished samples or pictures of gowns is followed by [476]*476discussions on fabric, necklines, sleeves, etc. Upon making a selection, the client’s measurements are sent to New York or Boston, where the basic gown is manufactured. No cutting or sewing of the gown itself is done on the premises. Upon receiving the gown, Mrs. D’Angelo gives it style by adding lace applique and beads or other decorative material. In addition to any required adjustments in size, a headpiece or veil is made by Mrs. D’Angelo and perhaps gloves added to complete the ensemble. This same procedure is followed for the bridesmaids’ gowns as well. She also furnishes other personal needs of the bride and her party, including underpinnings or crinolines. After all the sewing has been done, Mrs. D’Angelo, or her part-time seamstress, presses the articles, using a conventional iron and ironing board, and then hand delivers the entire outfit to the bride.

Intervenor’s brief in support of the decision of the board, and the board’s opinion, are based primarily upon the proposition that dressmaking and millinery are generally recognized as permissible accessory uses of a dwelling in the form of a home occupation. This basic proposition is sound; however, as the board stated in their opinion, the courts are concerned with the manner in which the occupation is conducted, rather than the nature alone.

Appellants base their objections primarily upon the manner and scope of the D’Angelo operation. The physical facilities are fairly extensive. The alterations to their oversize garage were valued by Mrs. D’Angelo at $4,000. The testimony indicated that the office space was not partitioned off, as originally planned, and that the closets designated for storage of “bridal gowns” are not put to that use.

The financial records indicate considerable volume for a home occupation. They show gross expenditures of $10,298.17 for the first six months of operation. In-[477]*477eluded in this sum is an item of wages in excess of $3,000. Concerning income during the period, Mr. Lampert, Mrs. D’Angelo’s accountant, testified that he “took a tape of whatever moneys did come in in my head” and that the income roughly ran close to $11,-000.

The quarterly unemployment tax and Federal withholding returns filed by Mrs. D’Angelo for the first two quarters of 1965 listed three employes, Mary Roboschil, Christine McLaren and Anthony Rosano. During the period, Mary Roboschil, who testified that she works for Mrs. D’Angelo part time, some weeks not at all, some weeks one or two days and sometimes full weeks of 33 to 40 hours, received $882.60. Christine McLaren, who is primarily a domestic for Mrs. D’Angelo, also works part time in the “home occupation”, according to the testimony of Mr. Lampert. Mr. Rosano is apparently a bill collector for Mrs. D’Angelo’s former Railroad Avenue “Towne Shoppe” women’s apparel business. In addition to the aforesaid, Mrs. D’Angelo has a Jackie Bombay do contracting work for her.

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Related

Jacobi v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
196 A.2d 742 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
41 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 1966 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ahrens-v-lansdale-board-of-adjustment-pactcomplmontgo-1966.