Ahnell v. Ahnell, No. Fa 94-0530371s (Sep. 11, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11600
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedSeptember 11, 2002
DocketNo. FA 94-0530371S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11600 (Ahnell v. Ahnell, No. Fa 94-0530371s (Sep. 11, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ahnell v. Ahnell, No. Fa 94-0530371s (Sep. 11, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11600 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AS CONCERNS PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO OPEN AND MODIFY JUDGMENT POST-JUDGMENT, DATED FEBRUARY 13, 2002
On February 21, 2002 the plaintiff, Charles P. Ahnell, through counsel filed a motion to open and modify judgment, post judgment, in which motion to open the plaintiff represents that since the date of the court order, meaning September 26, 1996, there has been a substantial change in circumstances. The motion goes on to say, more specifically, the defendant's earnings have changed. Furthermore, the defendant has received a substantial inheritance which has improved her financial situation thereby reducing her need for periodic alimony.

Review of the File

This matter was originally initiated pursuant to writ, summons and complaint dated March 30, 1994 and returnable April 19, 1994 in which the plaintiff petitioner sought a dissolution of the marriage and other relief as set forth in the complaint.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant at the time of the 1994 petition were represented by counsel and the same state of affairs continues to this date.

There were a variety of motions filed during the pendency of the petition prior to the actual dissolution including an answer and cross complaint that were filed on May 11, 1994. Both of the children issue of this marital union have now attained their majority and no issues as to the children are presently in dispute.

Financial affidavits of the parties were filed at various stages during the pendency of the proceedings.

At one point in time; to wit, in September of 1996, in the defendant's CT Page 11601 cross complaint, she requested a legal separation rather than a dissolution of the marriage.

On September 26, 1996 the court, Solomon, J., entered a decree of dissolution as concerns the marital union and entered certain orders incident thereto.

A motion to amend the judgment dated October 16, 1996 was granted by the court, Solomon, J.

The judgment by the court, Solomon, J., dated September 26, 1996 contained the following: a finding that the parties had been lawfully married on June 12, 1966 in New York; that residency was established for purposes of jurisdiction; that the marriage had irretrievably broken down; that there were no minor children at the time of the decree.

The court entered the following orders: that the plaintiff husband should quit claim all of his right, title and interest in the marital home at 29 Greentree Drive, Waterford to the defendant; the defendant to assume the mortgage, taxes, insurance thereon, and that the defendant to assume the obligation on a certain note to the defendant's parents. The judgment noted the assignment to the defendant of certain assets, automobiles, savings bond, Dreyfus liquid assets fund, jointly held mutual hinds including Pennsylvania Mutual, Courtland Trust, IM Constellation, AIM Winegarten and Acorn Fund. The Acorn Fund to belong to the now adult children exclusively; that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant $5,000.00 within 60 days payable through counsel; that the defendant should receive from the plaintiffs General Dynamics SSIP the sum of $63,000.00 by Qualified Domestic Relations Order; that the plaintiff should retain as his separate property the balance of the monies in the General Dynamics SSIP in the approximate amount of $125,000.00. Also, the plaintiff should retain the Dreyfus IRA in the amount of $36,000.00, a certain Mercedes Benz automobile, cash value of USAA life insurance policy in the amount of $28,000.00.

The judgment directed that the plaintiffs military pension should be divided equally with the defendant. It also provided that the plaintiffs Electric Boat/General Dynamics pension and its monthly accrued benefits should be divided equally with the defendant as of the September 26, 1996 value. The defendant shall be designated as surviving spouse of the joint survivor annuity as well as the pre-retirement death benefits for the entire benefit as of September 26, 1996. The judgment went on to provide that the plaintiff shall pay alimony to the defendant in the amount of $300.00 per week to terminate upon her death, her remarriage or in the event of a modification on further order of the court. CT Page 11602

The judgment went on to state this order is based on the defendant's earning capacity found to be $250.00 per week. As further alimony, the plaintiff shall maintain and pay the premium on Cobra medical insurance coverage for the defendant at his expense for a period of three years.

It provided for rights incident to the plaintiffs life insurance and that the plaintiff should designate the defendant as the sole irrevocable beneficiary except for the USAA life insurance policy.

This obligation to designate the defendant shall continue with plaintiffs obligation to pay alimony.

The judgment went on as concerns legal fees, a matter here of no consequence, and the division of personal property.

On September 4, 2002, the plaintiff and the defendant with their respective attorneys appeared before the court and testimony was received and exhibits offered with regard to the plaintiffs motion to open and modify judgment, post-judgment, dated February 13, 2002.

From that hearing, the court makes the following findings:

The defendant, Elizabeth W. Ahnell, has not remarried since the 1996 decree. She resides in the same home that was awarded to her at the time of the decree at 29 Greentree Drive in the town of Waterford.

The defendant has continued with her employment with Connecticut College which was the case when the dissolution was granted except that she is now employed on a full-time basis rather than a pad-time basis. Her position is that of a staff assistant.

In October of 2000, the defendant's mother Jean Welch passed away. The defendant is a co-executrix on said estate and the estate is still pending in the state of New York in the appropriate probate district and court. According to the testimony, the defendant and her brother are equal and sole beneficiaries as concerns their late parent. Various and sundry exhibits pertaining to the estate and issues relating thereto were offered which will be touched upon in due course.

A partial distribution has been made from the assets of the Welch estate in the amount of $95,000.00; one-half thereof going to the defendant and one-half to her brother. In addition, the defendant has apparently received reimbursement for expenses incurred by the defendant relative to the funeral of her late parent, probate costs and matters of CT Page 11603 like nature.

The home of the defendant's late parent was in the town of Remsenberg, New York and after the passing of the defendant's parent, according to the testimony, the real estate was sold for and in consideration of the sum of $350,000.00. There was allegedly no mortgage on the home in New York at the time of its sale.

The defendant testified that she is 59 years of age. The marriage prior to its dissolution was for a period of 30 years. The defendant indicated that she has health problems, which include high blood pressure, anxiety, depression, hormone replacement problems, bladder discomfort, osteoarthritis and that she takes medication for the above including sinusitis and medication for a stomach problem.

The defendant's earnings at Connecticut College are reflected on her financial affidavit and will be touched on in due course.

The defendant's employment consists of working 37-1/2 hours a week. Whether the defendant could earn more than what is presently the case is apparently an open question.

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Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ahnell-v-ahnell-no-fa-94-0530371s-sep-11-2002-connsuperct-2002.