Ahlgren v. Pierce County

543 N.W.2d 812, 198 Wis. 2d 576
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 5, 1995
Docket95-2088
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 543 N.W.2d 812 (Ahlgren v. Pierce County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ahlgren v. Pierce County, 543 N.W.2d 812, 198 Wis. 2d 576 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

CANE, P.J.

Gordon and Dorothy Ahlgren appeal an order affirming the decision of the Pierce County Land Use Management Committee and dismissing the Ahlgrens' petition for certiorari. We affirm the circuit court's order. 1

The Ahlgrens own Lot 1 of the Assessor's Plat of the Gordon Ahlgren property in the Town of Clifton, Pierce County. The Ahlgrens submitted a certified survey map to the Pierce County Zoning Office and requested that Lot 1 be split into two lots. The request was submitted to the committee, which-rejected the Ahlgrens' request on the basis that it is improper to divide a lot within an assessor's plat by means of a certified survey map. The committee determined that Lot 1 could be divided only by amending the assessor's plat based on § 70.27(4), Stats.

The Ahlgrens filed a writ of certiorari with the circuit court, asking that the court review the committee's determination and order the committee to approve the proposed division of Lot 1. The circuit court issued an order that affirmed the committee's decision to deny the Ahlgrens' request. The Ahlgrens now appeal.

The Ahlgrens raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether dividing a lot within an assessor's plat into two lots constitutes an amendment of the assessor's *579 plat; and (2) whether a certified survey map is a proper method to divide a lot located within an assessor's plat. Examination of these issues requires this court to interpret § 70.27(4), Stats. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. State ex rel. Frederick v. McCaughtry, 173 Wis. 2d 222, 225, 496 N.W.2d 177, 179 (Ct. App. 1992).

Section 70.27(4), Stats., provides:

AMENDMENTS. Amendments or corrections to an assessor's plat may be made at any time by the governing body by recording with the register of deeds a plat of the area affected by such amendment or correction, made and authenticated as provided by this section. It shall not be necessary to refer to any amendment of the plat, but all assessments or instruments wherein any parcel of land is described as being in an assessor's plat, shall be construed to mean the assessor's plat of lands with its amendments or corrections as it stood on the date of making such assessment or instrument, or such plats may be identified by number.

The Ahlgrens recognize that § 70.27(4), STATS., details the procedure for amending an assessor's plat, but contend that the section "does not contemplate, and consequently does not regulate, the simple division of a lot within an assessor’s plat." The County argues that division of a lot within an assessor's plat constitutes an amendment of the plat, even if the outside boundaries of the plat are not changed.

At issue is whether the word "amendment" in § 70.27(4), Stats., includes dividing a lot within an assessor's plat. The aim of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and our first resort is to the language of the statute itself. Northwest *580 Wholesale Lumber v. Anderson, 191 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 528 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Ct. App. 1995). If the words of the statute convey the legislative intent, that ends our inquiry. Id. We will not look beyond the plain language of a statute to search for other meanings; we simply apply the language to the case at hand. Id.

The word "amendment" is a nontechnical word and, therefore, it shall be construed according to common and approved usage. See § 990.01(1), STATS. The common and approved usage of words in a statute can be established by reference to a recognized dictionary. Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 339 N.W.2d 588, 590 (1983). According to WEBSTER'S Third New International Dictionary 68 (Unabr. 1976), amendment can be defined as the "act of amending esp. for the better," "correction of a fault or faults," "reformation (as of one's life)," and "the process of amending." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (6th ed. 1990) defines amendment as: "To change or modify for the better. To alter by modification, deletion, or addition." These definitions indicate, as the circuit court concluded, that an amendment is a change, and it follows that because dividing one lot into two lots is a change, the dividing process constitutes "amendment" under § 70.27(4), Stats.

The Ahlgrens oppose this interpretation of § 70.27(4), Stats. First, they argue that the second sentence of § 70.27(4) makes sense only if the word "amendment" is read to include a change in the outside boundary of an existing assessor's plat, but not a simple division of a lot within the plat. They explain, "Since it is not necessary to refer to any amendment of the plat, a simple division cannot be an amendment *581 because there would be no way to distinguish the two new resulting parcels." We disagree. The plain meaning of the second sentence in § 70.27(4) is that an assessor's plat, as originally ratified, includes all subsequent amendments or corrections, and that when one references the plat, he or she need not refer to each and every amendment that has been made. While the Ahl-grens have identified a situation where omitting references to the amendments may not adequately specify the lot to which reference is made, the statute does not prohibit one from mentioning amendments when it would be helpful. By using the words "need not," the statute simply suggests one may refer to a plat using its original name. We reject the Ahlgrens' argument that this sentence somehow signals a legislative directive that amendment can mean only changes in a plat's exterior boundaries.

The Ahlgrens also argue that an attorney general's opinion supports their position because it indicates that the purpose of assessor's plats is to eliminate uncertainties and reconcile discrepancies in real estate descriptions that have arisen in the past and presently hinder various local governmental functions. See 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 25, 26 (1972). The Ahlgrens argue that because their request to divide is not based on a discrepancy in a real estate description, they should not be required to accomplish this division using § 70.27, Stats., procedures. We disagree. There is nothing in the statute that suggests one should independently assess every potential plat division to determine whether following § 70.27 is necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose. The statute clearly requires that § 70.27 be used to amend an assessor's plat.

*582 The Ahlgrens also argue that under the attorney general's opinion, "it is clear amendments of the outer boundaries of lots in an assessor's plat [are] different from an internal division of a lot." We disagree. The relevant section of the attorney general's opinion printed the question posed and the attorney general's response:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake
2007 WI 73 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2007)
Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A.
953 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Illinois, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
543 N.W.2d 812, 198 Wis. 2d 576, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ahlgren-v-pierce-county-wisctapp-1995.