Ahearn v. Rescare West Virginia

208 F.R.D. 565, 171 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3247, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13622, 2002 WL 1723746
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 8, 2002
DocketNo. CIV.A. 2:02-0368
StatusPublished

This text of 208 F.R.D. 565 (Ahearn v. Rescare West Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ahearn v. Rescare West Virginia, 208 F.R.D. 565, 171 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3247, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13622, 2002 WL 1723746 (W.D. Va. 2002).

Opinion

[567]*567 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

STANLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court are (1) Petitioner’s Motion to Quash Respondent’s Notice of Deposition Pending Decision Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(C)(1), filed May 17, 2002 (Document # 14); and (2) Motion to Quash or for Protective Order, filed May 28, 2002, by nonparties, Frank Hornick and his employer, District 1199, the Service Employees International Union (Document #20). The parties and nonparties have responded and replied, the court heard oral argument on July 2, 2002, and the motions are ripe for decision.

Procedural History and Factual Background

On April 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (the “Act”). (Document # 1.) After a charge and amended charge were filed with Petitioner, Petitioner issued a complaint, which was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or “NLRB”) beginning on April 24, 2002. The complaint generally alleges that Respondent has been engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. (Document # 1, 11113, 4.) The matter currently is pending before the ALJ.

More specifically, Petitioner alleges that Respondent, a corporation engaged in the operation of group homes for the mentally disabled at various facilities in West Virginia, in some cases through its employees, solicited employees at its Amherstdale, Man and Accoville locations and at other locations to sign a petition to decertify the union as their collective bargaining representative, promised employees that its Logan Group Homes employees would receive increased wages or benefits if they voted to decertify the union and informed employees that its Logan Group Homes employees had received improved wages and benefits because they voted to decertify the union. In addition, Petitioner alleges that Respondent withdrew recognition of the union as its exclusive collective bargaining representative, refused to arbitrate grievances that the union filed under the terms of the prior collective-bargaining agreement and implemented various wage and benefit changes without prior notice to the union and without affording the union an opportunity to bargain. (Document # 1, H 6(a)-(n), prayer for relief U Ka)-(b).)

In the Petition before the District Court, Petitioner asserts that unless enjoined, Respondent will continue to violate the Act. (Document # 1,118.) On April 23, 2002, Petitioner also filed a Motion to Hear 10(J) Petition on the Administrative Law Judge’s Hearing Transcript and Exhibits Supplemented, if Necessary, by Affidavit Evidence. (Document #2.) By Order and Notice entered June 3, 2002, the District Court denied the pending motions without prejudice. With respect to the issue of whether there is reasonable cause to believe the Act has been violated, the District Court set a briefing schedule and indicated that if it determined reasonable cause had been shown, that it would schedule an early evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether interim injunctive relief is just and proper. (Document # 24.)

Petitioner’s Motion to Quash

Respondent noticed the deposition of Petitioner Richard L. Ahearn, Regional Director of the Ninth Region of the NLRB, but did not identify the testimony sought from Mr. Ahearn in the notice of deposition. Petitioner argues that the deposition notice should be quashed because Respondent seeks disclosure of information that is not relevant to the issues before the District Court related to whether an injunction should issue. In addition, Petitioner argues that he possesses no discoverable information. According to Petitioner, the only inquiries that could be made of him concern the factual basis and underlying reason for the decision to seek injunctive relief and what significance Mr. Ahearn attached to various facts, thereby clearly implicating the deliberative process privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. Petitioner further argues that Respondent has made no showing of substantial need.

[568]*568In response, Respondent states that it does not seek information protected by the deliberative process privilege or work product doctrine and that it only seeks facts Mr. Ahearn possesses relevant to the Petition pending before the court. Respondent points out that Mr. Ahearn verified his knowledge of the facts giving rise to the Petition. In addition, at the hearing on these motions, Respondent argued that Mr. Ah-earn may know facts underlying the allegations of the Petition.

The court finds that Petitioner’s Motion should be granted. Mr. Ahearn was not a witness to the events at issue in this case and has no first hand knowledge of relevant evidence in the case. Furthermore, any and all evidence relied upon by Mr. Ahearn in bringing the Petitioner was presented at the administrative hearing. The evidence to be considered by the ALJ in determining the merits of the alleged unfair labor practices and which form the basis for determining reasonable cause in the injunctive proceeding before the District Court, is contained solely in the record before the ALJ. Thus, the only reasonable area of inquiry would involve Mr. Ahearn’s mental impressions and opinions in weighing the evidence generated from the Board’s investigation. Mr. Ahearn was the “recipient of information distilled from the investigations of his agents and of analysis which is clearly the work product of his attorneys and investigators.” NLRB v. Trades Council, 131 LRRM 2022, 2024, 1989 WL 98643 (3d Cir.1989) (attached to Petitioner’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash). As such, any information within Mr. Ahearn’s knowledge and control “is so intertwined with the litigation process of the Board as to be privileged absent a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the information by other means.” Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-513, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592-93 (3d Cir.1984)). Respondent has not made the requisite showing of substantial need or an inability to obtain the information by other means. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

Motion to Quash or for Protective Order-Frank Homick/the Union

Respondents served two subpoenas, one seeking production of documents from Service Employees International Union, District 1119 (the “Union”) and the other seeking to depose Frank Horniek, the Union representative who services the West Virginia unionized operations of Respondent and the Union’s records custodian. Mr. Horniek and the Union (collectively referred to as the “Union”) argue that the information and documents sought are irrelevant and confidential.

Respondent’s subpoena duces tecum served on the Union identified twelve (12) document requests. The Union agreed to produce documents responsive to Request Numbers 4 through 10, with agreement from Respondent that by turning over such documents, the Union did not waive any rights to object in other proceedings.

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Related

Hickman v. Taylor
329 U.S. 495 (Supreme Court, 1947)
Madden v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753
229 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Illinois, 1964)
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.
738 F.2d 587 (Third Circuit, 1984)
International Union v. Garner
102 F.R.D. 108 (M.D. Tennessee, 1984)
D'Amico v. Cox Creek Refining Co.
126 F.R.D. 501 (D. Maryland, 1989)
Kobell v. Reid Plastics, Inc.
136 F.R.D. 575 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
208 F.R.D. 565, 171 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3247, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13622, 2002 WL 1723746, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ahearn-v-rescare-west-virginia-vawd-2002.