NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNY CAROLINA AGUILAR- No. 23-61 VELASQUEZ, Agency No. A206-731-646 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge VANDYKE.
Petitioner Jenny Carolina Aguilar-Velasquez petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“IJ’s”) order denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where the BIA
conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s
decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s
opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.
2012) (quotation marks omitted). “We review factual findings for substantial
evidence and legal questions de novo.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626,
632 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020)).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. We review the agency’s determination that Petitioner did not establish
past persecution for substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. __,
2026 WL 598435, at *5–6 (Mar. 4, 2026). We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination.
Petitioner contends that the record compels the conclusion that she suffered
past persecution because (1) gang members forced Petitioner to lay on the ground
at gunpoint; (2) Petitioner saw both her husband and his brother be taken by gang
members, and both were killed soon after; (3) the same gang later killed her other
brother-in-law; (4) the gang made threats against her husband’s family (the
Guifarro-Figueroa family); and (5) after her husband’s family had moved away
from the area and Petitioner went to live with her mother, gang members drove by
2 23-61 Petitioner’s mother’s house and later asked her younger brother where she had
gone.
Although Petitioner was only 17 at the time, the fact that she was forced to
lay on the ground at gunpoint does not establish past persecution. See Sharma v.
Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases where brief
detentions without physical harm did not compel finding of past persecution).
As to the actions taken against members of the Guifarro-Figueroa family,
“harm to a petitioner’s close relatives, friends, or associates may contribute to a
successful showing of past persecution” where that harm is “part of a pattern of
persecution closely tied to [the petitioner her]self.” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d
1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Here, however, the record does not
compel the conclusion that the deaths of Petitioner’s husband and his brothers, or
the threats against the Guifarro-Figueroa family, were part of a pattern of
persecution closely tied to Petitioner. The gang never physically harmed
Petitioner, despite the fact that she was present when her husband was abducted
and again when her brother-in-law was abducted. Nor did the gang ever
specifically threaten Petitioner, although it threatened the Guifarro-Figueroa family
generally. Additionally, the gang did not bother other members of the Guifarro-
Figueroa family while they sold off their belongings and prepared to leave their
farm, because, according to Petitioner, the gang was “just interested in the land.”
3 23-61 In these circumstances, the record does not compel the conclusion that the gang’s
actions against the Guifarro-Figueroa family were closely tied to Petitioner.
Finally, even considered together with the other facts in the record, the fact
that gang members drove by Petitioner’s mother’s house while Petitioner was
staying there, and asked Petitioner’s brother where she was, does not compel the
conclusion that the gang intended to harm her.
In sum, considering “the cumulative effect of all the incidents that [the]
Petitioner has suffered,” we conclude that those incidents do not compel a finding
of past persecution. Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1061 (quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1172, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2004)).
2. Where there is no past persecution, a petitioner may still establish
eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution. See
Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2021). In such cases, the
petitioner bears the burden to show a well-founded fear of future persecution. See
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)–(2). As discussed above, Petitioner was never personally
harmed or threatened by the gang. She resided safely in Honduras for two years
after she left the Guifarro-Figueroa farm—first with her mother in Ocotillo and
then with her grandfather in a different town. Her mother and children remained
unharmed in Honduras for an additional five years after Petitioner left for the
United States. In these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
4 23-61 determination that Petitioner does not have a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
3. To be eligible for statutory withholding of removal in the absence of
past persecution, Petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that she will
be persecuted if she returns to Honduras. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Because
petitioner has failed to show that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution,
she cannot show that future persecution is more likely than not. See Wakkary, 558
F.3d at 1065 (observing that statutory withholding has a higher standard of proof
for future persecution than does asylum). Thus, Petitioner’s claim for withholding
of removal fails for the same reasons that her asylum claim fails.
4. Petitioner also contends that the agency erred in denying her relief
under CAT. She asserts that she is likely to face torture if she returns to Honduras
and that the Honduran government is likely to acquiesce in such torture.
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determination that the
government would not acquiesce in future torture. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Petitioner argues that the agency’s
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNY CAROLINA AGUILAR- No. 23-61 VELASQUEZ, Agency No. A206-731-646 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge VANDYKE.
Petitioner Jenny Carolina Aguilar-Velasquez petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“IJ’s”) order denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where the BIA
conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s
decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s
opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.
2012) (quotation marks omitted). “We review factual findings for substantial
evidence and legal questions de novo.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626,
632 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020)).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
1. We review the agency’s determination that Petitioner did not establish
past persecution for substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. __,
2026 WL 598435, at *5–6 (Mar. 4, 2026). We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination.
Petitioner contends that the record compels the conclusion that she suffered
past persecution because (1) gang members forced Petitioner to lay on the ground
at gunpoint; (2) Petitioner saw both her husband and his brother be taken by gang
members, and both were killed soon after; (3) the same gang later killed her other
brother-in-law; (4) the gang made threats against her husband’s family (the
Guifarro-Figueroa family); and (5) after her husband’s family had moved away
from the area and Petitioner went to live with her mother, gang members drove by
2 23-61 Petitioner’s mother’s house and later asked her younger brother where she had
gone.
Although Petitioner was only 17 at the time, the fact that she was forced to
lay on the ground at gunpoint does not establish past persecution. See Sharma v.
Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases where brief
detentions without physical harm did not compel finding of past persecution).
As to the actions taken against members of the Guifarro-Figueroa family,
“harm to a petitioner’s close relatives, friends, or associates may contribute to a
successful showing of past persecution” where that harm is “part of a pattern of
persecution closely tied to [the petitioner her]self.” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d
1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Here, however, the record does not
compel the conclusion that the deaths of Petitioner’s husband and his brothers, or
the threats against the Guifarro-Figueroa family, were part of a pattern of
persecution closely tied to Petitioner. The gang never physically harmed
Petitioner, despite the fact that she was present when her husband was abducted
and again when her brother-in-law was abducted. Nor did the gang ever
specifically threaten Petitioner, although it threatened the Guifarro-Figueroa family
generally. Additionally, the gang did not bother other members of the Guifarro-
Figueroa family while they sold off their belongings and prepared to leave their
farm, because, according to Petitioner, the gang was “just interested in the land.”
3 23-61 In these circumstances, the record does not compel the conclusion that the gang’s
actions against the Guifarro-Figueroa family were closely tied to Petitioner.
Finally, even considered together with the other facts in the record, the fact
that gang members drove by Petitioner’s mother’s house while Petitioner was
staying there, and asked Petitioner’s brother where she was, does not compel the
conclusion that the gang intended to harm her.
In sum, considering “the cumulative effect of all the incidents that [the]
Petitioner has suffered,” we conclude that those incidents do not compel a finding
of past persecution. Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1061 (quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1172, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2004)).
2. Where there is no past persecution, a petitioner may still establish
eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution. See
Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2021). In such cases, the
petitioner bears the burden to show a well-founded fear of future persecution. See
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)–(2). As discussed above, Petitioner was never personally
harmed or threatened by the gang. She resided safely in Honduras for two years
after she left the Guifarro-Figueroa farm—first with her mother in Ocotillo and
then with her grandfather in a different town. Her mother and children remained
unharmed in Honduras for an additional five years after Petitioner left for the
United States. In these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
4 23-61 determination that Petitioner does not have a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
3. To be eligible for statutory withholding of removal in the absence of
past persecution, Petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that she will
be persecuted if she returns to Honduras. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Because
petitioner has failed to show that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution,
she cannot show that future persecution is more likely than not. See Wakkary, 558
F.3d at 1065 (observing that statutory withholding has a higher standard of proof
for future persecution than does asylum). Thus, Petitioner’s claim for withholding
of removal fails for the same reasons that her asylum claim fails.
4. Petitioner also contends that the agency erred in denying her relief
under CAT. She asserts that she is likely to face torture if she returns to Honduras
and that the Honduran government is likely to acquiesce in such torture.
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determination that the
government would not acquiesce in future torture. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Petitioner argues that the agency’s
determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the police did not
investigate the death of her husband and because country conditions evidence
establishes that Honduran police are corrupt and ineffective. However,
“[e]vidence that the police were aware of a particular crime, but failed to bring the
5 23-61 perpetrators to justice, is not in itself sufficient to establish acquiescence in the
crime.” Id. Nor does evidence that the government has generally been ineffective
in rooting out corruption and preventing crime compel a finding that the
government would acquiesce in future torture. See id.; B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th
827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022). Because the record here does not compel the conclusion
that the Honduran government would acquiesce in Petitioner’s torture, we uphold
the agency’s determination that Petitioner is not eligible for relief under CAT.
5. Petitioner also contends that the agency’s analysis was flawed because
it failed to address the expert testimony of Dr. James Phillips, who opined that
Petitioner is likely to be tortured or killed if she returns to Honduras and that the
Honduran government would be unwilling or unable to prevent it. However, the
BIA is “under no obligation to discuss [a] report [that is] neither ‘highly probative
[n]or potentially dispositive.’” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 771 (9th Cir.
2022) (quoting Castillo v. Barr, 980 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020)).
Regarding future harm, Phillips based his opinion on the facts that, (1)
because the gang asked about Petitioner’s whereabouts, it was “reasonable for
[Petitioner] to assume that [the gang was] looking for her to threaten or kill her,”
and (2) Petitioner’s statement in her declaration that she stood to inherit the
Guifarro-Figueroa land. But the agency considered the gang’s inquiries into
Petitioner’s whereabouts, and the fact that it was “reasonable to assume” the gang
6 23-61 was planning to threaten or kill her does not compel the conclusion that the gang
intended to harm her in the past or intends to harm her in the future. Additionally,
the agency found Petitioner not credible as to her testimony that she would inherit
the Guifarro-Figueroa land, and Petitioner does not appeal that finding. As to
Phillips’s opinion that the government would be “unable or unwilling to offer
protection or assistance to individuals in situations similar to those of [Petitioner]”
that opinion was based on general country conditions evidence about the Honduran
government’s ineffectiveness in rooting out corruption and addressing gang
violence, which the BIA did consider. In these circumstances, Phillips’s report
was neither highly probative nor potentially dispositive, so the BIA did not err by
failing to address it.
PETITION DENIED.1
1 The stay of removal will dissolve upon the issuance of the mandate.
7 23-61 FILED APR 17 2026 Aguilar-Velasquez v. Bondi, No. 23-61 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
For the reasons stated in Rojas-Espinoza v. Bondi, 167 F.4th 1069, 1077–78
(9th Cir. 2026) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the grant of rehearing en banc)—and
because Petitioner showed no likelihood of success on the merits—I would not leave
the temporary stay of removal in place.