Aguilar v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: August 12, 2022
• Docket: 4:19-cv-00359
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Michael Edward Aguilar, No. CV-19-00359-TUC-JGZ

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Charles L Ryan, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Michael Edward Aguilar’s Motion 16 Requesting the Court Order the Pima County Detention Complex to Cease from 17 Obstructing Petitioner’s Access to the Courts. (Doc. 83.) Aguilar asserts that Pima County 18 detention officials are obstructing his access by indefinitely suspending his use of an 19 electronic tablet, which he uses to “remain studious and up-to-date” on federal habeas 20 materials. (Id. at 4.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 84, 85.) For the following reasons, 21 the Court will deny the motion. 22 The Court construes Aguilar’s motion as a motion for injunctive relief. Generally, 23 “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the 24 court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC 25 v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015); see De Beers Consol. Mines v. 26 United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (preliminary injunctive relief is inappropriate for 27 matters “lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”). But an exception to this rule arises 28 where the injunctive relief sought is related to a prisoner’s access to the courts. See Prince v. Schriro, et al., CV 08-1299-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 1456648, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2|| 2009) (where the relief sought relates to a prisoner’s access to the court, “a nexus between || the preliminary relief and the ultimate relief sought is not required[,]” and the court need not consider the merits of the underlying complaint) (citing Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 5 || 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990)). 6 The constitutional right of access to the courts encompasses a right to litigate 7 || without active interference. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011), 8 || overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015). To support an active interference claim, a prisoner must allege facts showing that || officials’ actions hindered the ability to litigate and that, as a result, the prisoner suffered 11 || actual injury. Silva, 658 F.3d at 1102; see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (to 12 || maintain an access-to-the-courts claim, a prisoner must show an “actual injury” resulting 13 || from the defendant’s actions). Actual injury must be “actual prejudice ...such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-49. 15 Aguilar has not alleged any facts supporting that he has suffered actual prejudice in this case, such as an inability to present a claim. In fact, the claims in Aguilar’s petition 17|| have been fully briefed, and the Court will issue an order in due course. 18 Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED that Aguilar’s Motion Requesting the Court Order the Pima 20 || County Detention Complex to Cease from Obstructing Petitioner’s Access to the Courts (Doc. 83) is DENIED. 22 Dated this 11th day of August, 2022. 23 24 □ 25 pote Soipe 26 Honoral le Jennife ve Zfpps United States District Judge 27 28

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