NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO AGUILAR-PADILLA, Nos. 24-4536, 25-276 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cv-00753-MO v. MEMORANDUM*
BOYDSTUN EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 5, 2026 Portland, Oregon
Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Boydstun Equipment Manufacturing fired Julio Aguilar-Padilla after he took
COVID-19 leave pursuant to an Oregon state agency’s COVID-era administrative
rule designed to protect quarantining workers from retaliation. See Or. Admin. R.
437-001-0744(3)(l)(B) (2020) (hereinafter “COVID Rule”). Aguilar-Padilla sought
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. statutory and noneconomic damages pursuant to federal and Oregon state
employment laws. The district court resolved some of Aguilar-Padilla’s claims on
summary judgment. At trial, a jury concluded Boydstun unlawfully terminated
Aguilar-Padilla and awarded damages. The district court rendered judgment in
Aguilar-Padilla’s favor and awarded his counsel full attorney’s fees. Boydstun
appeals both the judgment in Aguilar-Padilla’s favor and the attorney’s fees award.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and vacate
and remand in part.1
1. The Oregon Safe Employment Act (OSEA) includes an anti-retaliation
provision that states it is unlawful to take retaliatory employment action against an
employee because the employee “exercised on [his own] behalf . . . any right
afforded by” statutes enumerated in the OSEA. Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.062(5)(c).
Boydstun argues that the anti-retaliation provision does not support Aguilar-
Padilla’s retaliation claim because it is based on an administrative rule rather than
one of the statutes enumerated in the anti-retaliation provision. We review de novo
the district court’s application of state law. Judd v. Weinstein, 967 F.3d 952, 955
(9th Cir. 2020). When determining the meaning of a state law without on-point state
court authority, “we must ‘predict how the highest state court would decide the issue
1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts underlying this appeal, we do not detail them here.
2 24-4536, 25-276 using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions,
statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.’” Id. at 955–56 (quoting Lewis v.
Tel. Emps. Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, the
Oregon Supreme Court has directed that statutes are to be interpreted by examining
text and context, as well as “pertinent legislative history that a party may proffer
. . . . where that legislative history appears useful to the court’s analysis.” State v.
Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050 (Or. 2009).
The statutes enumerated in the OSEA’s anti-retaliation provision are
capacious: one mandates that employers provide “a place of employment which is
safe and healthful for employees,” Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.010; and another requires
employers to comply with “every requirement of every order, decision, direction,
standard, rule or regulation made or prescribed” by Oregon’s occupational health
and safety agency for health and safety purposes, Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.022. The
agency’s COVID Rule details requirements that employers must follow to protect
employee health and safety during the pandemic pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 654.010 and 654.022. See Or. Admin. R. 437-001-0744 (“These rules are needed
to protect workers throughout the state in the context of the current public health
3 24-4536, 25-276 emergency”).2 The OSEA affords a private cause of action for employees. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 654.062(6)(c).
The district court did not err by concluding that Boydstun’s violation of the
COVID Rule supported Aguilar-Padilla’s claim pursuant to the OSEA’s anti-
retaliation provision. Boydstun’s arguments to the contrary would narrow the scope
of the anti-retaliation provisions codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.062(a) and (b) in a
manner contrary to Oregon case law. See Vergara v. Patel, 471 P.3d 141, 152–53
(Or. Ct. App. 2020) (cleaner’s refusal to work without gloves—a protective
equipment requirement established by administrative rule—was actionable pursuant
to the anti-retaliation provisions).
2. Boydstun next argues that, to the extent the COVID Rule “afforded” a
right pursuant to the OSEA, it was the right to return to work after quarantine.
Therefore, Boydstun argues, it did not violate the COVID Rule’s requirements
because Aguilar-Padilla did not attempt to return to work.
The COVID Rule provided that whenever a state or local public health agency
or a medical provider “recommends an employee be restricted from work due to
quarantine or isolation for COVID-19,” an employer must “direct[]” the employee
2 The operative version of the COVID Rule was effective through May 2021, after which it was temporarily re-adopted and amended several times until its repeal in 2023. Oregon Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. Servs., 437-001-0744: Rule Addressing COVID-19 Workplace Risks, https://secure.sos.state.or.us/oard/viewSingleRule. action?ruleVrsnRsn=304311 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2026).
4 24-4536, 25-276 to “isolate at home and away from other non-quarantined individuals.” Or. Admin.
R. 437-001-0744(3)(l)(B). The COVID Rule also provided that such employee
“must be entitled to return to their previous job duties,” id., and gave notice to
employers that retaliating against an employee who quarantined would violate the
anti-retaliation provisions in the OSEA. Or. Admin. R. 437-001-0744(3)(l)(C). In
Oregon, agency rules are subject to “the same interpretive framework” as state
statutes. Godinez v. SAIF Corp., 346 P.3d 530, 534 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
The text of the COVID Rule plainly protects an employee’s ability to take
leave by requiring that an employer maintain a position for him. Thus, dismissal of
an employee during quarantine because he participated in quarantine violated the
right established by the COVID Rule. Cf. Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772,
778 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining similar federal anti-retaliation statute’s provision
that employee’s rights are presumptively denied when an employer fails to reinstate
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO AGUILAR-PADILLA, Nos. 24-4536, 25-276 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:21-cv-00753-MO v. MEMORANDUM*
BOYDSTUN EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 5, 2026 Portland, Oregon
Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Boydstun Equipment Manufacturing fired Julio Aguilar-Padilla after he took
COVID-19 leave pursuant to an Oregon state agency’s COVID-era administrative
rule designed to protect quarantining workers from retaliation. See Or. Admin. R.
437-001-0744(3)(l)(B) (2020) (hereinafter “COVID Rule”). Aguilar-Padilla sought
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. statutory and noneconomic damages pursuant to federal and Oregon state
employment laws. The district court resolved some of Aguilar-Padilla’s claims on
summary judgment. At trial, a jury concluded Boydstun unlawfully terminated
Aguilar-Padilla and awarded damages. The district court rendered judgment in
Aguilar-Padilla’s favor and awarded his counsel full attorney’s fees. Boydstun
appeals both the judgment in Aguilar-Padilla’s favor and the attorney’s fees award.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and vacate
and remand in part.1
1. The Oregon Safe Employment Act (OSEA) includes an anti-retaliation
provision that states it is unlawful to take retaliatory employment action against an
employee because the employee “exercised on [his own] behalf . . . any right
afforded by” statutes enumerated in the OSEA. Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.062(5)(c).
Boydstun argues that the anti-retaliation provision does not support Aguilar-
Padilla’s retaliation claim because it is based on an administrative rule rather than
one of the statutes enumerated in the anti-retaliation provision. We review de novo
the district court’s application of state law. Judd v. Weinstein, 967 F.3d 952, 955
(9th Cir. 2020). When determining the meaning of a state law without on-point state
court authority, “we must ‘predict how the highest state court would decide the issue
1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts underlying this appeal, we do not detail them here.
2 24-4536, 25-276 using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions,
statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.’” Id. at 955–56 (quoting Lewis v.
Tel. Emps. Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, the
Oregon Supreme Court has directed that statutes are to be interpreted by examining
text and context, as well as “pertinent legislative history that a party may proffer
. . . . where that legislative history appears useful to the court’s analysis.” State v.
Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050 (Or. 2009).
The statutes enumerated in the OSEA’s anti-retaliation provision are
capacious: one mandates that employers provide “a place of employment which is
safe and healthful for employees,” Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.010; and another requires
employers to comply with “every requirement of every order, decision, direction,
standard, rule or regulation made or prescribed” by Oregon’s occupational health
and safety agency for health and safety purposes, Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.022. The
agency’s COVID Rule details requirements that employers must follow to protect
employee health and safety during the pandemic pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 654.010 and 654.022. See Or. Admin. R. 437-001-0744 (“These rules are needed
to protect workers throughout the state in the context of the current public health
3 24-4536, 25-276 emergency”).2 The OSEA affords a private cause of action for employees. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 654.062(6)(c).
The district court did not err by concluding that Boydstun’s violation of the
COVID Rule supported Aguilar-Padilla’s claim pursuant to the OSEA’s anti-
retaliation provision. Boydstun’s arguments to the contrary would narrow the scope
of the anti-retaliation provisions codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 654.062(a) and (b) in a
manner contrary to Oregon case law. See Vergara v. Patel, 471 P.3d 141, 152–53
(Or. Ct. App. 2020) (cleaner’s refusal to work without gloves—a protective
equipment requirement established by administrative rule—was actionable pursuant
to the anti-retaliation provisions).
2. Boydstun next argues that, to the extent the COVID Rule “afforded” a
right pursuant to the OSEA, it was the right to return to work after quarantine.
Therefore, Boydstun argues, it did not violate the COVID Rule’s requirements
because Aguilar-Padilla did not attempt to return to work.
The COVID Rule provided that whenever a state or local public health agency
or a medical provider “recommends an employee be restricted from work due to
quarantine or isolation for COVID-19,” an employer must “direct[]” the employee
2 The operative version of the COVID Rule was effective through May 2021, after which it was temporarily re-adopted and amended several times until its repeal in 2023. Oregon Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. Servs., 437-001-0744: Rule Addressing COVID-19 Workplace Risks, https://secure.sos.state.or.us/oard/viewSingleRule. action?ruleVrsnRsn=304311 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2026).
4 24-4536, 25-276 to “isolate at home and away from other non-quarantined individuals.” Or. Admin.
R. 437-001-0744(3)(l)(B). The COVID Rule also provided that such employee
“must be entitled to return to their previous job duties,” id., and gave notice to
employers that retaliating against an employee who quarantined would violate the
anti-retaliation provisions in the OSEA. Or. Admin. R. 437-001-0744(3)(l)(C). In
Oregon, agency rules are subject to “the same interpretive framework” as state
statutes. Godinez v. SAIF Corp., 346 P.3d 530, 534 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
The text of the COVID Rule plainly protects an employee’s ability to take
leave by requiring that an employer maintain a position for him. Thus, dismissal of
an employee during quarantine because he participated in quarantine violated the
right established by the COVID Rule. Cf. Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772,
778 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining similar federal anti-retaliation statute’s provision
that employee’s rights are presumptively denied when an employer fails to reinstate
an employee who was on protected leave). The district court did not err in
interpreting the scope of the right afforded by the COVID Rule.
3. Boydstun argues that Jury Instruction 14 incorrectly stated the scope of
employer and employee duties created by the COVID Rule, thereby allowing the
jury to find that Boydstun retaliated against Aguilar-Padilla even if Aguilar-Padilla
had failed to quarantine. “We review de novo whether a district court’s jury
instructions accurately state the law,” and because Boydstun objected to Instruction
5 24-4536, 25-276 14, “we review for abuse of discretion [the] district court’s formulation” of the
instruction. Coston v. Nangalama, 13 F.4th 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). “We consider the issued instructions as a whole, but reversal is not
warranted” if the error was “more probably than not harmless.” Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
We conclude that the district court reasonably read the COVID Rule to require
Boydstun to direct Aguilar-Padilla to quarantine, and that Aguilar-Padilla had a
right—and a corresponding duty—to quarantine. But even if Instruction 14 was
erroneous, any error was more probably than not harmless. See id.
First, Aguilar-Padilla testified that he knew he had a duty to quarantine.
Second, though the jury heard competing stories about why Aguilar-Padilla was
fired—Aguilar-Padilla argued he was fired for quarantining, while Boydstun alleged
it fired Aguilar-Padilla for not quarantining correctly—the jury was presented with
compelling evidence that Aguilar-Padilla was fired for quarantining. Cf. Sanders,
657 F.3d at 782 (finding harmful error where “neither the jury’s verdict nor the
evidentiary record” permitted the court to determine whether a party had carried its
burden). The jury heard Aguilar-Padilla testify that, even before Boydstun was made
aware that Aguilar-Padilla might be leaving his home to buy groceries or obtain
medication, a Boydstun supervisor threatened to fire him because he did not come
into work and refused to provide proof of his wife’s positive COVID test result, not
6 24-4536, 25-276 because the supervisor suspected Aguilar-Padilla was failing to quarantine. 3
Testimony and contemporaneous documentation at trial showed that Boydstun’s
central concern was Aguilar-Padilla’s failure to report to work and refusal to provide
his wife’s COVID test result. The jury also heard evidence that, despite Boydstun’s
arguments that it took COVID-19 seriously and encouraged employees to
quarantine, Boydstun allowed another COVID-exposed employee to return to work
without testing and fired a third employee who took leave to quarantine. Boydstun’s
owner testified that he terminated that third employee because he had failed to
quarantine, but the evidence included a contemporaneously created company record
about that employee’s termination reflecting only that Boydstun was adamant the
employee provide proof of his wife’s positive COVID test result, which he refused
to do. The company record did not show that Boydstun suspected the employee was
not quarantining. Rather, the company’s records reflect that this third employee and
Aguilar-Padilla were both terminated for “abandon[ing]” their positions.
The jury specifically found that Aguilar-Padilla’s assertion of a protected right
was at least “a substantial factor” causing the adverse employment action. The only
protected right that Aguilar-Padilla asserted was the right to quarantine free from
3 An unchallenged jury instruction defined “adverse employment action” as both threatening to terminate Aguilar-Padilla and terminating him.
7 24-4536, 25-276 retaliation. On this record, we conclude that any error in Instruction 14 was more
probably than not harmless.
4. Boydstun challenges the district court’s award of full attorney’s fees to
Aguilar-Padilla. Boydstun argues that Claim 2, the anti-retaliation claim, was not
inextricably intertwined with Claim 1, the fee-bearing federal claim. In Boydstun’s
view, the only overlapping work done for these claims was for the development of
factual issues, not on efforts to establish that Aguilar-Padilla had a cognizable claim
pursuant to the OSEA’s anti-retaliation provision. Whether the district court applied
the correct legal standard to the determination of attorney’s fees is reviewed de novo,
and the fees award itself is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. City of
Honolulu, 938 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2019).
The district court identified the correct legal standard governing the fees
award. Applying that standard, the court concluded that Aguilar-Padilla was
required to prove unlawful termination in order to succeed on Claim 2, his state anti-
retaliation claim, and to recover full statutory damages on Claim 1, his federal sick
leave claim. The court reasoned that “full resolution of this case would have required
a trial that closely resembled the actual trial” even without Claim 2. In the district
court, Boydstun conceded that a similar trial would have been necessary to fully
resolve Claim 1.
8 24-4536, 25-276 Nevertheless, Boydstun points us to Aguilar-Padilla’s counsel’s work
opposing Boydstun’s motion to dismiss Claim 2 and argues that this work was not
necessary to prosecute Claim 1. We cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion by ruling that Aguilar-Padilla’s defeat of the motion to dismiss Claim 2
was essential to his full success on Claim 1. The motion argued that Aguilar-Padilla
had failed to establish facts sufficient to establish that he was discharged for
exercising a right afforded by the anti-retaliation provision. Without proving a
retaliatory motive, Aguilar-Padilla could not demonstrate entitlement to full
damages pursuant to the federal statute supporting Claim 1, and he could recover
only sick pay up to the date he was terminated. See Families First Coronavirus
Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116–127, div. E, § 5105, 134 Stat. 178, 197 (2020)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601 note) (subjecting employer who violates COVID leave
provision to penalties under the Fair Labor Standards Act § 216, which include
payment of lost wages and liquidated damages). In the trial court, Boydstun did not
dispute that Aguilar-Padilla’s total recovery pursuant to Claim 1 was dependent
upon the jury’s finding that Boydstun took retaliatory action in response to Aguilar-
Padilla’s assertion of a protected right.
However, Boydstun also argues that Aguilar-Padilla’s counsel’s work on
damages recoverable only pursuant to Claim 2 was both apportionable and
reasonably identifiable. We agree that there are at least some fee entries that should
9 24-4536, 25-276 have been deducted from the attorney’s fees award.4 We remand to the district court
to deduct the fees devoted solely to counsel’s work on Claim 2 damages.5
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED except as to the award of
attorney’s fees, which is VACATED AND REMANDED.
4 In the exhibit Boydstun filed in district court objecting to Aguilar-Padilla’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, we note some fee entries that appear to be clearly apportionable: (a) June 24, 2021, “review case law on remedies for 654.062,” for $418.00; (b) December 4, 2023, “PTC rsch: availability of emotional harm damages,” for $317.00; (c) January 18, 2024, “research procedural propriety of raising emotional harm availability,” for $1,828.40; (d) January 19, 2024, “research emotional harm,” for $2,612.00; (e) January 20, 2024, “prepare response re: emotional harm,” for $2,285.50; (f) January 21, 2024, “draft response to post-trial motions: (substantive) availability of noneconomic damages,” for $2,416.10; and (g) January 22, 2024, “prepare response re: procedural bar to challenging emotional harm availability,” for $3,069.10. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 162. 5 The district court is best suited for this task. While some billing entries are clearly apportionable, certain entries are more ambiguous, such as the September 8, 2023, entry for work to “[r]eview materials on damages.”
10 24-4536, 25-276