Aguilar Nepamuceno v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 21, 2025
Docket22-700
StatusUnpublished

This text of Aguilar Nepamuceno v. Bondi (Aguilar Nepamuceno v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aguilar Nepamuceno v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO AGUILAR NEPAMUCENO, No. 22-700 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-243-204 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 19, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, HURWITZ, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Antonio Aguilar Nepamuceno, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an

appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying cancellation of

removal. Although we lack jurisdiction to review questions of fact underlying

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). denials of cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have jurisdiction

to review “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Whether a qualifying relative will suffer the requisite hardship to permit cancellation

of removal is reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact. See Wilkinson v.

Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 217 (2024). We review for substantial evidence “whether

the BIA erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard

to a given set of facts.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir.

2025).

We deny the petition.

1. Aguilar Nepamuceno contends that his Notice to Appear (“NTA”) was

“defective” and “incapable of vesting” the immigration court with jurisdiction

because it lacked date and time information. But “the failure of an NTA to include

time and date information does not deprive the immigration court of subject matter

jurisdiction.” United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1188 (9th Cir.

2022) (en banc). Immigration courts have “jurisdiction over removal proceedings

when the initial Notice to Appear does not specify the time and date of the

proceedings, but later notices of hearing include that information.” Karingithi v.

Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2019). Aguilar Nepamuceno received a

notice one week after the initial NTA containing the requisite information.

2 22-700 2. Aguilar Nepamuceno contends that the BIA erred in concluding that his

two older children were no longer qualifying relatives because they turned 21 before

the IJ ruled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (defining a qualifying child as “an unmarried

person under twenty-one years of age”). He contends that because they were under

21 when the application was filed, they should have been treated as qualifying

relatives. However, § 1229b(b)(1)(D) requires a noncitizen “seeking cancellation to

establish hardship to a qualifying relative as of the time the IJ adjudicates” the

application, not when it was filed. Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 655, 664 (9th

Cir. 2016).

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Aguilar

Nepamuceno’s removal would not impose an “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” on his youngest child, his only qualifying relative. The requisite hardship

to a child is typically established by showing “very serious health issues, or

compelling special needs in school.” Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965, 966 (9th

Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Aguilar Nepamuceno testified that although his youngest

child was sad about the prospect of his removal, she was doing well in school and

had no health issues. The agency acknowledged that Aguilar Nepamuceno’s removal

would financially impact his child, but substantial evidence supports its conclusion

that he did not establish she will “suffer hardship substantially beyond that which

3 22-700 would ordinarily be expected to result from” his removal, Chete Juarez v. Ashcroft,

376 F.3d 944, 949 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.1

1 The motion to refer to mediation, Dkt. 42, is denied.

4 22-700

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Related

Alberto Mendez-Garcia v. Loretta Lynch
840 F.3d 655 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Serah Karingithi v. Matthew Whitaker
913 F.3d 1158 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
United States v. Juan Bastide-Hernandez
39 F.4th 1187 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Fernandez v. Mukasey
520 F.3d 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi
137 F.4th 996 (Ninth Circuit, 2025)

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