Aguilar-Manzo v. Garland
This text of Aguilar-Manzo v. Garland (Aguilar-Manzo v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Case: 22-54, 04/19/2023, DktEntry: 31.1, Page 1 of 3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAXIMILIANO AGUILAR-MANZO, No. 22-54
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-242-893
v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 14, 2023** San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF***, District Judge.
Maximiliano Aguilar-Manzo petitions for review of an order of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). That order denied Aguilar-Manzo’s motion to
reconsider the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Case: 22-54, 04/19/2023, DktEntry: 31.1, Page 2 of 3
his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review
the denial of a motion to reconsider “for an abuse of discretion, reversing when
the denial is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d
1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We deny in part and grant in part the
petition for review, and remand to the BIA to consider the factors favoring
Aguilar-Manzo’s petition.
1. The BIA abused its discretion by failing to “proper[ly]
consider[]. . . all factors, both favorable and unfavorable,” when it reviewed
Aguilar-Manzo’s motion for reconsideration. Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025,
1032 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Franco-Rosendo v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 965, 967–
68 (9th Cir. 2006)). The BIA concluded that Aguilar-Manzo “affirmatively
waived the opportunity to apply for cancellation of removal” because he
“withdrew his applications for relief.” But the agency erred when it failed to
consider Aguilar-Manzo’s contention that he withdrew his applications because
he was under the mistaken impression that he had insufficient evidence of his
continuous physical presence to qualify for cancellation of removal.1
The BIA also concluded that Aguilar-Manzo was statutorily ineligible for
cancellation of removal because he “did not comply with the voluntary
departure order.” But it failed to address whether Aguilar-Manzo’s motion to
1 At the time, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), had not yet clarified that a defective Notice to Appear does not trigger the stop-time rule for accrual of continuous physical presence.
2 22-54 Case: 22-54, 04/19/2023, DktEntry: 31.1, Page 3 of 3
reopen was filed “prior to the expiration of the period allowed for voluntary
departure” such that it “terminat[ed] the grant of voluntary departure.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.26(e)(1). In particular, the BIA failed to consider a declaration from
Aguilar-Manzo’s counsel attesting, under penalty of perjury, to an attempt to
file Aguilar-Manzo’s motion for reopening prior to the termination of Aguilar-
Manzo’s period for voluntary departure.
The Government argues that Aguilar-Manzo has waived any challenge to
the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider. But Aguilar-Manzo’s brief
specifically asserts that the withdrawal of his cancellation of removal
application and his failure to voluntarily depart—both of which the BIA relied
upon as bases for denying his motion for reconsideration—occurred because the
Supreme Court had not yet clarified the effect of a deficient Notice to Appear
on the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, Aguilar-
Manzo’s challenge is not waived. Cf. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.
Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]ssues which are not specifically
and distinctly argued and raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.”).
2. The BIA did not err in rejecting Aguilar-Manzo’s jurisdictional
argument, which, in any event, has been forfeited. See id.; see also United
States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc)
(“[T]he failure of [a Notice to Appear] to include time and date information
does not deprive the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”).
PETITION DENIED IN PART; GRANTED IN PART.
3 22-54
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