Aguilar Galdamez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-6715
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIDNY JESSIKA AGUILAR No. 24-6715 GALDAMEZ, Agency No. A208-380-882 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 3, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.***

Sindy Yessika Aguilar Galdamez, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. motion to reopen her application for Convention Against Torture protection. We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguilar Galdamez’s

motion to reopen as untimely. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th

Cir. 2020). Subject to exceptions not applicable here, a “motion to reopen shall be

filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of

removal”—here, on or before June 3, 2024. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).

Aguilar Galdamez filed her motion to reopen on June 3, 2024, but the filing was

rejected for not being “accompanied by a properly completed Notice of Entry of

Appearance (Form EOIR-27).” See BIA Practice Manual § 5.1(b)(1) (“All

motions to reopen . . . must be accompanied by a . . . Form EOIR-27[], even if the

practitioner is already the practitioner of record.”). Although Aguilar Galdamez

filed a corrected motion on June 14, 2024, she did not seek or obtain an extension

of time in which to file the motion to reopen. See BIA Practice Manual § 3.1(c)(2)

(“Parties wishing to correct the defect and refile after a rejection must do so by the

original deadline, unless an extension is expressly granted by the Board.”).

2. Aguilar Galdamez does not argue that she falls within any exception

under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Nor does she

request equitable tolling by establishing that “some extraordinary circumstance

stood in [her] way and prevented timely filing, and [s]he acted with due diligence

2 24-6715 in pursuing [her] rights.” Lara-Garcia v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1271, 1277 (9th Cir.

2022). Aguilar Galdamez’s sole explanation—that her counsel “believed that an

EOIR 27 was not required because he was the attorney of record in the matter”—

does not establish an “extraordinary circumstance” requiring the BIA to accept her

untimely filing.

3. The Board also denied Aguilar Galdamez’s motion to reopen on the

basis that “she has not established [that her] former counsel performed

deficiently,” reasoning that her former counsel made strategic choices “within the

‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” Aguilar Galdamez does not

challenge this independent ground for denial. That issue has been waived. See

United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, an issue

is waived when the appellant does not specifically and distinctly argue the issue in

his or her opening brief.”)

4. Our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening is

limited to “review[ing] any underlying legal or constitutional errors.” Lara-

Garcia, 49 F.4th at 1277. The BIA committed no such error in holding that

Aguilar Galdamez has not “shown the exceptional circumstances necessary to

warrant” sua sponte reopening. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir.

2020) (“In order for an individual to obtain sua sponte relief under 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(a), the Board must be persuaded that the respondent’s situation is truly

3 24-6715 exceptional.” (quotation marks omitted)).

PETITION DENIED.1

1 The temporary stay of removal continues until the mandate issues.

4 24-6715